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THE PRESIDENT AT HIS WORST

It has been a patriotic pleasure, more than once or twice, in these pages to call attention to the President at his best. He has at times seemed so prescient in his statesmanship, so eloquent in his expression, and so sympathetic in his contact with and accurate in his interpretation of the mind and heart of the American people as to make commendation superfluous and exhortations of public support for his policies works of supererogation. The gratifying memory of such occasions makes it all the more unpleasant, yet none the less a duty, to regard him in his present extraordinary adventure, in mid-progress as these words are written, as being altogether at his worst.

We may pass by—though indeed it is the supreme consideration—the fact that he is at his worst in advocating a policy which is tantamount to betrayal of the independence and integrity of the United States and quite incompatible with those principles of nationality upon which this Republic was founded and upon which it has been developed to its present majestic proportions and beneficent might. That error is the greatest that any President of the United States has ever committed, or is likely ever to commit. But it was committed some time ago and is not peculiar to the current circumstances to which we have made reference.

In his performance of “swinging round the circle,” then, the President is at his worst in the very conception and purport of his tour. It was no light evil to renew his gross

neglect of official duty. He had already absented himself from his constitutional place of service for a number of months, during which time he had ignored some of the most pressing demands of national administration and had inflicted by default incalculable embarrassments and losses upon the country, beside incurring most ominous menaces—as he now himself confesses—for the future. Instead, however, of striving to atone at least in part for such disastrous nonfeasance, he sought the earliest possible pretext for resuming it, and at a time when every moment was big with crying needs of close attention to duty at the seat of government, he again for a period of weeks deserted his post.

Worse still, at a time when every patriotic motive and consideration demanded harmony, confidence and cooperation among all branches and members of the government and between them and the people, he deliberately set forth upon a mission of dissension, intent upon arousing class antagonisms and party animosities and upon undermining the nation's confidence in its own chosen lawmakers, and hoping to foment popular passions for the coercion of a coordinate branch of the government and for subversion of some of the most essential principles of the Constitution. Never before was so shameless and so mischievous an errand undertaken by a President of the United States.

There was, it is true, little cause for surprise. Months before the President had conducted in Europe a campaign of appeal to the people of those countries against their own governments. The astounding tolerance which permitted him to do this thing, which we can explain on only the ground of paralyzing stupefaction, naturally encouraged him to repeat the performance here, where he was at least free from danger of administrative interference. Yet we cannot admit that the successful performance of an evil act with impunity, excuses or palliates its repetition.

Having thus entered upon an indefensible undertaking, the President was and is at his worst in the manner of its execution. History records no other public utterances so unworthy as the diatribes which he has been copiously emitting wherever in his judgment they would do the most harm. They have no title to be considered as the addresses of a scholarly statesman intent upon informing the public upon weighty matters of national moment. They are reduced to the category of the shrill railings of a common

scold, substituting personal vituperation for the arguments which he could not convincingly command. For the President of the United States to go about the country shouting at the majority of the Senate of the United States in effect and in literal phrase, "Put up or shut up, you contemptible quitters, before you are hanged upon a gibbet!" is the most humiliating spectacle our political history records. Not even poor, passionate, uncultured President Johnson in his "swinging round the circle," ever descended to such depths of coarse abuse. We were accustomed to such language from Denis Kearney, in the Sand Lots days. Proceeding from a President of the United States distinguished for academic scholarship and urbane culture, it is astounding and revolting.

The President is at his worst, too, in the delusive vagueness and evasions of his utterances when he does assume to address himself to the great issues which are engaging the thought of the nation. For months the general principles had been discussed to repletion. There was nothing new to say about them. There was indeed no controversy concerning them; or if there was difference of opinion it was by common consent regarded as irremediable. But certain very specific, concrete questions had arisen, on which the people were not satisfied, and on which they earnestly desired precise information as to the President's meaning and as to his reasons for adopting the course he did. Such information would have been so welcome and so valuable that the giving of it would almost have excused the President for the needless manner in which he elected to give it. But he did not give it. He deliberately and with his unsurpassed dexterity evaded giving it. From all such matters he distracted attention by bringing forward all sorts of irrelevant and undisputed topics. Thus, to cite a single example, he sought to dispose of all the well-founded objections to our undertaking to protect all nations against external aggression, by dwelling elaborately and unctuously upon the impropriety and impossibility of our guaranteeing them against domestic revolution! Reduced to its ultimate elements, his argument amounted to this: That we must meddle in some way with the affairs of all nations, and since we cannot meddle in their domestic affairs we must do so with their external relations. Asked to explain something which needed explanation, he entered instead into elaborate and verbose ex-

planation of something which needed none. Complaining that in Washington the Senate involved the subject in mist, he proceeded himself to immerse it in a veritable London fog.

We all know his theory of Presidential functions, which he has not only publicly expressed but also diligently and pertinaciously endeavored to exemplify in his own administration of the office; and which is at direct variance with that of the Constitution and with the best practice of his predecessors. He has told us that the President is the sole official representative of the whole nation, and that he is required to make report to nobody but the nation at large; that he is not to be the mere Chief Executive, but is to be the general initiator and director of policies of government, so that instead of his executing the laws which Congress enacts, Congress will enact the laws which he prescribes. We cannot agree with that theory, and we are confident that the American nation does not. But even if it were the correct theory, and if such was the proper place of the President in our governmental system, we should doubt if it were possible for anyone to show himself more thoroughly unsuited to fill such a place than President Wilson has done and is doing in this amazing exhibition of himself at his worst.

OUR OWN RACE WAR

A MORDANT reflection upon the zeal of some Americans to implicate this country in all the racial and other conflicts which may arise in Europe appears in the circumstance of record that at the very time when they were seeking that end the United States was itself suffering a race war of its own, of most exacerbated character and ominous proportions. If the disturbances, riots and loss of life, often under the most atrocious circumstances, which have recently occurred at Chicago, Washington, Knoxville, St. Louis, Memphis, Birmingham and elsewhere, had occurred in some minor European country, and had involved some minority racial or religious element, there would have been in this country vociferous and impassioned protests, demands for intervention, denunciations of the country in question as incapable of decent government, and solemn preachments upon the necessity of our tying ourselves hand and foot in a League of Nations in order to put a stop to

such doings. It might be well for such altruistic propagandists to consider the ancient adjuration, Physician, heal thyself.

For it is manifest that the troubles here have all the essential characteristics of a race war, of nation-wide extent. We used to hear of and censoriously to deplore persecutions and lynchings in the South. These did occur, and still occur. But for years past the most extensive and most bitter conflicts between the white and black races have occurred in the North, and it is there that such racial antagonism is to-day by far most ominous. For it is there that it most arises from deep-seated, general causes. It is true that all or nearly all of these savage outbreaks, like the lynchings in the South, are attributed to some local and temporary causes. Probably such incidents do serve as pretexts. But it would be a fatal mistake to suppose that such were the sole or chief causes of the troubles. The real cause, which makes the danger that local and temporary incidents will thus be used as pretexts for widespread conflicts, lies much deeper and further back, in a general and permanent state of mind.

A century and a third ago the evil was unerringly forecast. At that time the State of New York sought to get rid of human slavery and the Legislature adopted a bill for its gradual abolition. But the bill was vetoed for the reason that while it emancipated negroes it also disfranchised them. The Council of Revision in vetoing the bill, which otherwise it would have been eager to approve, dwelt strongly upon the actual and potential evil of thus creating a class of citizens suffering from invidious discrimination, charged with the same duties, responsibilities and accountability to the law that their neighbors were, but enjoying less rights and privileges. Such a system would not merely establish an aristocracy instead of a democracy, but would create a dissatisfied and discontented class, which some time might be a menace to the State.

That was quite true then, and it is equally true and applicable to-day, in a wider and deeper sense. In the Southern States the negroes are emancipated but practically disfranchised. In the North they are both emancipated and enfranchised, but they suffer severe adverse discrimination on social and economic grounds which is in some respects

more offensive to them and more mischievous in its results than exclusion from the ballot.

Now the result of this is just what the New York Council of Revision foresaw in 1785, only it is still more extensive. It is both objective and subjective. It causes the negroes to feel themselves the object of adverse discrimination, and thus makes them dissatisfied and discontented. Being human, some of them become resentful. Such influences working on the baser minds among them incite to crime, while they cause even the better minds to sympathize with those who thus violently and unlawfully protest, and to resist the just punishment of the criminals. Thus a certain solidarity of the race is produced, causing what would otherwise be an insignificant incident often to be exploited into widespread disorder.

Even more serious is the subjective influence of this state of affairs upon the white race. It is not to be doubted that because of their discrimination against them, white men generally have a less favorable regard for negroes than they otherwise would, and are thus inclined to take more severe measures against them for any lapses by individuals. An outrage or two, even of the most offensive kind, committed by a member of any other race, would not inspire any general movement against that race as a whole, as such occurrences too often do when the guilty persons are negroes.

Both races are, in brief, suffering from the logical and, it is to be feared, inevitable effects of the discrimination of the one against the other, and of the division of the citizenry of the country into two classes, with either actually or practically different rights and privileges. This diagnosis of the case does not, of course, convey a prescription for its immediate cure. But a frank recognition of the cause of the trouble should at least tend towards its ultimate amelioration. What is quite certain is that it should act as a restraint upon our too frequent censoriousness of other nations, and a prudent deterrent upon those who would make us a party to or a guardian against similar troubles in other lands. We should certainly—even, we imagine, the President would—object to having European nations intervene in our domestic race war, or to our being required to give guarantees to, let us say, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, that we would not permit pogroms against the negroes.

THE NATIONS AND THE LAW

BY DAVID JAYNE HILL

THERE exists at this time, more than at any other since the revolutionary movements of the eighteenth century, a widespread upheaval of the established order, accompanied by very radical demands for social change. Unlike that earlier revolutionary movement, which was actuated by a general desire to substitute the rule of law for a régime of arbitrary power, the present movement tends to ignore, and even to challenge, a system of social order based on the fundamental principles of justice, of which the members of the Bar and of the Bench are even more than others the entrusted guardians.

The conclusion of the Great War, in which our country was unexpectedly called to participate for the defense of the rights of our fellow-citizens and the dignity of law itself, and in which it has borne such an effective part, has left the world in a condition of impoverishment, unrest, and uncertainty that creates a state of deep anxiety in every thoughtful mind.

We are confronted with a World-Community which at present possesses no generally accepted and enforceable World-Law. I speak of a "World-Community," because the achievements of inventive genius in establishing human control over the forces of nature have so nearly annihilated space and so accelerated the possibilities of time, that the old isolation is no longer possible. There is no mountain so high, no ocean so wide, as to furnish an impassable barrier between nations. The day of fortified frontiers has passed away forever. The air has become a highway of swift invasion. This change of international relationship has occurred so suddenly that it is difficult to appreciate its significance. Little more than fifty years ago, Bismarck said: "The Orient lies so far away that I do not even read the reports of our ambassador at Constantinople;" but

¹ From an address to the American Bar Association.

to-day, by the air route, the Golden Horn is nearer to Berlin in time than Paris by the through express.

The experience of the war has taught us, that henceforth, no nation can preserve its seclusion and live apart. Actively or passively, its life is affected by the needs, the animosities, and the purposes of other nations. Whatever our theories of national policy may be, we cannot escape some kind of relation with every other nation in the world. Our argosies will be afloat on every sea, and there will be no port that will deny them admission. The important question is, what shall be the basis of those relations? Shall we base them upon a combination of world-wide power, or shall we base them upon the principle of free co-operation under the regulation of accepted law?

When we consider how incalculable the relations of national power have become, how mutable and how ephemeral they have been, with what fatality the weak have always been subjected to the will of the strong, and how imperiously the strong have always ruled the weak, we seem to be compelled to accept the conclusion, that every form of power is a danger and not a safeguard, unless it is both responsible to a legally organized community and under its control. Underlying the whole problem of international intercourse and obligation, therefore, is the question of the stability, the integrity, and the responsibility of the national units which compose the world of States with which we have to deal.

If the World-Community is ever to possess a World-Law, it will depend upon the legal structure and purposes of the States by which that law is to be maintained. We cannot expect international peace or lawful procedure, unless the nations are capable of securing obedience to law within their own jurisdiction, and are so organized and so controlled as to admit and execute their legal obligations to one another. The fundamental issue of world order is not, therefore, the possibility of forming a union of Powers strong enough to impose its will upon other States, which would in effect destroy their responsibility, but the question whether the Powers entering into such a combination are disposed to bind themselves to the acceptance and observance of definite legal principles, irrespective of their commercial interests and military strength. Here is the test by which any such proposal must be judged; for States

based upon the idea of law, existing to enforce the law, and charged with responsibility for the protection of rights under the law, would change their whole aim and character if they participated in any combination of power not itself controlled by law.

We must then, repudiate, as inconsistent with the nature of a truly constitutional State, any form of international association that does not assume as its first postulate the authority of International Law over all nations, regardless of their magnitude, commercial interests, or military efficiency. In this one respect, all sovereign States,—great or small, rich or poor, powerful or weak,—stand upon the same footing, and must be subordinated to a common law. No union of forces aiming at preponderance of power for the purpose of controlling the commerce of the world can meet this test. No mutually defensive alliance of Great Powers designed to establish a permanent control of subject nations can face this conception of law. Here the jurist and the politician must part company. They do not speak the same language, nor think the same thought. The one has in mind the erection of an institution of justice, created by the common consent of nations; the other, the preservation of empire and the exploitation of the defenseless, by collusion with compliant co-partners and the suppression and ultimate extinction of possible rivals.

The attitude towards these antithetical and irreconcilable conceptions of international relationship assumed by different nations will depend upon their idea of the nature of the State as a political institution. If the State is arbitrary power, and its chief end is to extend its jurisdiction and increase its possessions, then the idea of any universal principle of equity limiting its activities and nullifying its aspirations seems hostile to its purpose of existence. In that case, its statesmen will think first of the means of extending power; by war, if the nation be a military one; by supremacy on the sea, the great highway of trade, if the nation possesses maritime interests; by diplomacy, if there are still possibilities of national development through secret bargains and a distribution of "compensations." In an age when the cost and liabilities of war are great, such nations will naturally be deeply interested in peace. They will be eager even to enforce peace; because an enforced peace, under the aegis of predominant power, is the condi-

tion of securing and augmenting the wealth which war, like a pestilence or a cyclone, would ruin or sweep away. But they will hesitate to commit themselves to the observance of any definite law, or the judgment of any judicial tribunal, which is not under their influence; and yet they will be eager, in order to appear fair and honest, to profess their attachment to justice, taking care however to accept no legal obligations which they cannot in some way evade.

In this description of a State whose being and end is power, I am not thinking of Treitschke's famous definition, or of the Prussianized German Empire as the only example of it. It applies to every really imperial Power, whatever its pretensions of democracy may be, which aims at colonial expansion, holds subject peoples under its absolute control, and thwarts their efforts to obtain the privilege of self-government.

I shall not, in this anxious and troubled time, attempt to specify particular governments, much less particular peoples. I do, however, call attention to the fact, that governments change, and that they are always composed of men. No man can with certainty predict what the government of any European State will be ten or even five years from now. It would be an error to suppose that imperialism is essentially dynastic. Its present phase is that of race domination and economic control. Imperialism is not so much a form of government as it is a lust for power. The greatest danger to the peace of the world to-day is the menace of the socialized State; which is based on a crassly materialistic philosophy, and if generally realized would transform whole nations into industrial and commercial corporations claiming absolute sovereign authority, pitted against one another in rivalry to possess the wealth of the world.

I am making these statements with no purpose of disparaging any nation. I am making them because they apply to all nations; whose governments change, and whose unregulated power is subject to the impulses, the passions, the interests, and the ambitions of men. I am making them, because, to my mind, there is incalculable danger to human rights, to liberty, to national independence, and to national honor, in any partnership of power that looks toward mutual advantage over other nations, and is not itself under a rule of law. Democracies that choose power, and not

law, as their governing principle may be as absolute and as arbitrary as any single autocratic ruler, and much more difficult to withstand.

It is the challenge to law, in whatever form it comes, that constitutes the danger. And yet it is challenged. Arbitrary power knows no law. Those who represent such power see in law what it is, their persistent enemy. Such men, statesmen, demagogues and class protagonists,—seek for colleagues and alliances, as the necessary aids to the execution of their private policies. They are anxious to engage in their adventures, and to incriminate by partnership, the innocent, the unsuspecting, and the inexperienced. For this they shelter their designs by professions of virtue, loyalty, and devotion to high ideals. But the test may always be applied, if there is a disposition to apply it. In its international application the formula is: What relics of imperialism are you ready to abandon? Are you ready to accept, without qualification, a body of law based on universally received axioms of equity, axioms which you impose upon your own nationals in all their civil and criminal relations? Are you willing to modify the doctrine that the State is power, by admitting that the State is power wholly subject to fundamental principles of law?

There is a conception of the State radically different from the one I have just described. It was foreshadowed by a philosophy of enlightenment that disclosed the insolence and usurpation of power unregulated by law, and demanded the abolition of it; but its logical conclusions were first embodied in an actual form of government by the American colonies in the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

It should not be overlooked, and yet I have never heard it emphasized, that, in declaring their independence, those colonies uttered a protest, not primarily against the right to tax, nor yet against the withholding of representation in the law-making body, which were secondary, but against the King's refusal to grant the colonies a government based on law. The first charge "submitted to a candid world," to use the language of the Declaration, is: "He has refused his assent to laws of immediate and pressing importance and necessary for the public good." That was the gravamen in that terrible indictment. It runs through all the twelve subsequent accusations of misrule, ascending

through the entire gamut of complaint with increasing intensity, declaring among other things, "He has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers;" and ending with the climax, as if it were the acme of perversity: "He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation." The claim to law, as the most precious possession of citizenship, recurs at intervals throughout the remainder of the indictment. Three times, in the midst of the fourteen additional specifications of usurpation, the writer of the Declaration returns to his demand for unperverted law as the one central purpose of the document.

On its constructive side, the same spirit animates the thought. "All men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,"—which implies that the true source of law is in the nature of man, and not in the possession of arbitrary power; and, hence, "to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

It seems like resorting to commonplace, to repeat these familiar words; and, in fact, it would be, were they not usually recited in a manner so mechanical as to obscure their deep significance. Since these expressions became a part of our breviary of patriotism, our foreign contacts have been numerous and intimate, particularly those of the educated world with the German universities. Through that influence and a dread of provincialism, the precepts of a contradictory philosophy have been introduced into our political thinking. It is the omnipotent State, not the moral attribute of human personality, it is contended, that is the true source of law. Law is, therefore, to be imposed from above, not derived from the nature of that which it is to govern. The State, it is held, is the sole creator of rights. As sole master and proprietor, it not only commands without limit, but may expropriate without consent.

Under the plea of superior national efficiency, these political and economic doctrines now offer, in democratic countries, an easy opportunity for class control. As State supremacy in its socialized form has grown in favor, men have gradually abandoned the venerable doctrine of "Natural Rights,"—which, in substance, is simply the axiom

that there are in human personality inherent claims to just treatment,—an axiom on which, in the end, all jural conceptions rest, and upon which the whole structure of the American system of law and government is founded.

To the practising lawyer this doctrine is naturally of little interest. He wins no cases by it, except perhaps when he appeals to the sentiment of justice, still undefined, but a living fountain of righteousness, in the reason and the conscience of a jury. His interest is in actual statutes, judicial decisions, and the accepted precepts of the Common Law which the great English judges,—the finest ornament of English life and character,—developed through their interpretation of customs by which generations of men had found it possible to live and work together. Small, indeed, would be the retainers that clients would pay for disquisitions on the "Rights of Man"; and yet the doctrine of "Natural Law" will live in the hearts of men as long as human nature endures and can find a voice. To the lawyer it may be nothing, but to the people it is everything.

The honest client comes to his lawyer in the faith that civilization has provided a way to give him justice. His lawyer may know that, through his client's ignorance of what justice really is, or through the law's imperfection, his hope may not be realized. The difference is that the client's idea of right is subjective, the lawyer's knowledge is objective. The distinction between "inherent rights" and "legal rights" is, therefore, evident. Looked at historically, we see that rights have generally been treated as if they were not inherent, but merely the gracious gifts of governments,—concessions of privilege from the throne of power. The founders of the American State revolted against this idea of law. They were anxious about their inherent rights, and meant to make some of them at least legal rights. In England, long before that time, the "Commons" had obtained through their power to control the purse, the privilege of making laws, subject to the approval of the King and the Lords, and this was also the proud heritage of the colonists; but no inherent right of man, as man, had ever anywhere received a formal legal guarantee by any government. Even Magna Charta had not done that; for, under it, nothing was reserved to the individual which the "law of the land" could not take away. But the American Bills of Rights demanded certain spe-

cific guarantees as the condition of their consent to government. Believing these rights to be theirs by virtue of their nature as men, they could not permit government either to withhold or accord them. They, therefore, created a government which was bound, by the charter that gave it being, to respect and protect life, liberty, the enjoyment of property, religious freedom, free speech, and free assembly, when not hostile or treasonable to the government instituted to give them protection.

This was an entirely new conception of governmental authority. It founded the State upon a fundamental law, to which all legislation must conform. It was intended to forbid and prevent government by arbitrary decree. It affirmed that there are "natural rights" which all law-makers must respect, and which even majorities cannot legally override, unless they have first torn to shreds and utterly destroyed the charters of liberty in our State and Federal Constitutions,—a danger to which our liberties are always exposed.

Whatever may be held regarding the authority of "natural rights," there are certain fundamental human claims to just treatment and to strong protection, so clear, so urgent, and so indisputable in their outcry for recognition and security, that the undertone of their pleading runs through all the free expressions of the human mind since thought began to be recorded. Until they are established,—and they can be established only through the law,—brave men will dare to say, as Theodore Roosevelt said to his law professor: "Professor Dwight, do you tell me that what you have said is the law? Then I stand here to say, that the law is wrong!"

All honor to this passion for justice; but justice in complicated cases can rarely be ascertained by one man, or in one moment. Like truth, it requires long, ardent, and deliberate pursuit. It is not to be determined by the will of the uninstructed. It cannot be arrived at by the response to a pleader appealing to a class possessing an interest in the decision. If the decisions of the Bench are imperfect, the decisions of the street are certain to be more so. Justice must come, if it can be attained at all, from a deliberate survey of conditions that looks through the whole problem and reaches the ultimate principle by which it may be solved.

There was superb wisdom in embodying in the Federal Constitution two provisions which had never before been united in any federal system: (1) the reservation to the people of certain rights which could not be legally taken away by legislative action; and (2) the creation of a judicial tribunal with power to interpret the fundamental law, and thus prevent legislative encroachments upon the inherent rights which it was designed to safeguard against the danger of invasion by any power within the State. For the first time in the history of the world, the humblest citizen was guaranteed protection even against the Government itself.

Founded upon the idea of law, and existing under the protection of law, the United States of America, more perhaps than any other sovereign Power, has aimed to establish its relations with other governments on the basis of law; and has instinctively shrunk from extending them, even when provoked by the turbulence and insolence of comparatively impotent neighbors, on a basis of preponderant power. In all the international councils in which we have as a nation hitherto participated, our Government has endeavored to establish law as a standard for the conduct of sovereign States. Being itself a creation of law, it has appeared natural to base its foreign relations upon it. Very early in our history, International Law was adopted as a part of our legal system. The reasons for it were obvious. It had not only been accepted in the Common Law which we inherited from England, but was expressly recognized and appealed to in our foreign negotiations and in our courts. Not only this, but the principles advocated by the great writers on the Law of Nations were identical with those upon which our conception of the true nature of the State was founded. Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and Vattel, were favorite authors with Adams, Hamilton, Franklin, and other colonial statesmen, before the Declaration of Independence, and were constantly consulted both in the Continental Congress and in the Constitutional Convention of 1787. They, too, believed in, and advocated, "natural rights," and found in them a foundation for a Law of Nations far more extended, and even more authoritative, than the customary usages of the time.

International Law created through the treaty-making power has always seemed to American statesmen the very

perfection of legislation, because it is founded entirely upon free agreement, and not at all upon compulsion; and, besides, under the American Constitution, it is, in its final determination at least, the work of an elected representative law-making body. No method could be devised that would render the law, when thus agreed upon, more completely the expression of the mind and purpose of the peoples in whose behalf it is made. The fact that such law-making treaties are now habitually negotiated in all constitutional States by responsible ministries, themselves members of the legislatures of the countries they represent, adds immensely to the perfection of this method of procedure. Here is a process by which a complete system of World-Law can eventually be created; and it can be accomplished as soon as the Great Powers are prepared to act under a rule of law. In the present international situation, therefore, we turn with more than usual solicitude to inquire what prospect of such an achievement lies before us.

This interest is further accentuated by the fact that the object of our participation in the Great War as a belligerent nation was the preservation of the rights of our fellow-citizens secured to them under International Law. No other official reason for engaging in the war has ever been given. We had, as a Government, remained neutral, even in the presence of ruthless atrocities, until a further effort to preserve neutrality would have been dishonorable, and a shameful neglect of the constitutional duty of "common defense." It had become apparent that, unless we took part in the struggle, there would soon be no rule of law by the consent of the governed anywhere in the world.

It is nowhere disputed, that we entered into the war for the preservation of international rights which the Law of Nations accorded us, which had been brutally violated, and were placed in perpetual jeopardy. Other objects, not contemplated in the declaration of war, have been permitted to obscure the real reason for our engaging in it, and have entirely subordinated that reason in the settlements of peace. With these objects I do not here propose to deal; but it is of importance to note, that, in advising the Congress on April 2, 1917, that Germany's course be declared to be one of war against the United States, the reason for accepting the challenge was stated by the President in the following words: "International Law had its origin in the attempt to

set up some law which would be respected and observed upon the seas, where no nation had right of dominion and where lay the free highways of the world. By painful stage after stage has that law been built up, with meagre enough results, indeed, after all was accomplished that could be accomplished, but always with a clear view, at least, of what the heart and conscience of mankind demanded. This minimum of right the German Government has swept aside under the plea of retaliation and necessity." In a later passage of his message, the President further specified the reason for the entrance of the United States into the war, by saying: "The German Government denies the right of neutrals to use arms at all within the areas of the sea which it has proscribed, even in the defense of those rights which no modern publicist has ever before questioned their right to defend."

Here is the reason, the only officially stated reason, why the United States became a belligerent in the Great War.

We turn then with more than historical interest to inquire what have been the fortunes of International Law in the settlements of peace.

An examination of the fourteen conditions of peace proposed by the President on January 8, 1918, eight months after the declaration of war, discloses the fact, that there is in these rubrics no reference to International Law as having been violated, or as something to be vindicated and reestablished. In fact, it is not there stated that the United States ever had any reason for entering the war, unless that may be implied in the second rubric, which demands "absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war"; a principle for which our enemy professed to be contending.

In the proposal of a League of Nations, made on September 27, 1918, the restoration of the Law of Nations was not included among the five objects to be obtained in the peace. In the correspondence with the Imperial German Government regarding terms of peace, which led up to the acceptance of the armistice, and in the armistice itself, International Law was not made a subject of discussion.

That the vindication of violated law required not only a peace of victory, but a peace distinctly punitive of such violations, is clearly evident. Was it not for that crime that Germany was to be punished?

In some vague sense, I suppose, there is a general impression among the people in Germany that the rest of the world has united in condemning the conduct of the Imperial Government, and that the terms of peace imposed upon them are an attempt to punish its offenses; but there are reasons for thinking that the prevailing sentiment among them is simply one of regret that, with all their boasted strength, they were too feeble to win the war, coupled with resentment that they were denied the compromise peace which they expected. In brief, the national mind has not been lifted out of the conviction that the problem of national existence is purely and solely a problem of power.

It would have been an impressive demonstration of the justice of the punishment inflicted upon the German nation and its allies, if, at the time of the virtual surrender under the terms of the armistice, there had been publicly read at Berlin, from the balcony of the Palace where William the Second falsely proclaimed a war to preserve Germany from invasion,—which many Germans still believe was a justified defense,—the speech of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, in which he confessed that the invasion of Belgium was a violation of International Law, with a proclamation that it was for this, the illegal use of the submarine, and other ruthless violations of solemnly accepted law, that the terms of the Peace of Versailles were, in the name of the law, to be visited upon the nation that had supported these atrocities.

Taking into account the circumstances in which the war was begun by Germany, and the purposes of the Central Governments and their allies, severe penalties based on the principle of reparation alone were plainly merited. But there is a higher point of view than this. It is not merely that the Belgians, the French, and others were irreparably wronged and injured. Beyond and above this, an offense was committed against what is most sacred in human civilization, namely, the authority of accepted law and the solemn pledge to observe it. It is upon this ground, and upon this ground only, that the German people, who before the penalties are fully inflicted will have produced an entirely new generation, and will number a hundred millions of deeply resentful recalcitrants, could be made to understand that their punishment involves not merely material damages, as in a civil matter, but a crime against the dignity

and sanctity of law itself. If it were understood and believed in Germany that the United States, and perhaps other powers signatory of the Peace, had taken up arms, not for gain, not because they were rivals, not for any advantage over the German people, but solely to vindicate the law,—which was their law as well as ours,—it could have no other effect than to strengthen whatever law-abiding spirit may exist in the noblest minds, and to set them irrevocably against the military autocracy that induced them by false pretenses to perpetrate this national crime.

I would not be understood as stressing what may seem to many a merely technical point. What I wish to accentuate is, that a punitive peace is an impossible peace, in the present state of the world, unless it is also, in some sense, a constructive peace. You cannot expect that eighty million people, composing a great and capable industrial nation, hedged in by States less potent in numbers and not more capable in military efficiency, will be content to go on, for more than a whole generation, paying heavy indemnities, excluded from every prospect of colonial possessions,—especially a warlike people that lately entertained a dream of world-dominion,—unless they are permanently either held down by a superior military force, or see in their compliance with the penalty the operation of some system of justice, offering to them an open path of honorable and equal opportunity of life.

It is no part of my present purpose to discuss this problem of power, further than to say, that a punitive peace can be made really effective only upon condition that it inaugurates a new era of justice, as well as of peace, in which the vanquished equally with the victors will be the beneficiaries when the penalty is paid.

We turn then to the Treaty of Versailles, to inquire to what extent this condition is fulfilled; and discover, to our disappointment, that the Covenant of the League of Nations, which we are told is to be the instrument for the maintenance of peace, contains no declaration that sovereign States as such, possess any rights whatever. We find in it no provision of law by which their conduct toward one another may be judged; no promise of a court before which their wrongs may be brought and their legal rights judicially determined; no method by which a weak State may legally enforce its right against a Great Power, if that Power is

indisposed to recognize its claim; no reference to that "rapidly increasing Statute Book of the Law of Nations," as the *corpus juris* solemnly established in the Hague Conventions has been called, and no reference to the violations of it during the war.

I am trying to make these statements with absolute precision, because it is popularly believed that this Covenant was designed to do all that it has failed to do. It is true that there is, in the Preamble, a reference to "understandings of International Law," but it contains no pledge to observe the law, or to adopt it as a judicial rule, or to accept it otherwise than as a subject of separate "understandings." It is, indeed, provided, in Article XIV, that "the Council shall formulate and submit to the members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice"; but there is no promise to constitute it or to accept its decisions, and it will be competent to hear only such disputes "of an international character which the parties thereto shall submit to it."

On the other hand, matters of vital national consequence are to be entrusted to the purely diplomatic decisions of the Council or the Assembly, such as the important question whether an issue is, or is not, one of International Law; and, under Article XV, these bodies, unregulated by any law or form of procedure, are charged with judicial functions, possessing power to make an award which bars one disputant from further asserting or defending his right if the other accepts the decision.

I shall not here undertake to discuss the powers possessed by this League, regarding which there are wide differences of opinion. It is, however, of vital importance to recognize the indisputable fact, that this Covenant not only makes no advance in the development of International Law, but wholly overlooks the status attained by it, through the work of the great international congresses since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. As an eminent authority has said, "For almost a century the Society of Nations had been working its way toward an international legislature, and had almost reached its goal. It began by the recognition of express consent as a source of the laws which regulate the intercourse of States, side by side with the tacit consent embodied in binding customs. Then an organ was slowly evolved for the formal annunciation and registration of that

express consent. This organ was a periodical assemblage of representatives of the governments of all civilized States. In 1907 its membership was almost complete. Then came the day when the firm foundations of the earth rocked beneath our feet, and the light of the sun of progress was quenched in the red mist of war."

We had believed, until the cataclysm came, that a Society of Nations really existed, with the possibility of a legislature based on free consent, a growing system of law, and a rudimentary judiciary. Since 1914, there has been only retrogression and no sign of future progress. A Great Power, leading others in its train, bade defiance to this whole system. Unfortunately, the nations had not realized that they had a common interest in maintaining it; until, one by one, they were drawn into the vortex of violence that was destroying it. A terrible experience has taught the world, that, unless this highest and most endangered community of interest among nations can be reestablished and supported by organized defense, we shall again, in some form, be subjected to the insolence and havoc of arbitrary power.

There is then a vital necessity for the continued union and consultation of the Powers which have been the victors in the Great War; but it is equally essential that their aim should be the rehabilitation and enforcement of law, rather than a combination of legally unregulated forces.

The Supreme Council of the Conference at Paris has, apparently, not been deeply impressed with this necessity. Allowance must, perhaps, be made for the fact that it is a political not a judicial body. It has not regarded its decisions as subject to any rule of law. It has set no limits to its jurisdiction, and has not been solicitous regarding the source of its authority. It has considered itself empowered, as representing the victors, not only to make terms for the vanquished, which was its prerogative, but to coerce independent sovereign States, fix their boundaries, and determine their destinies.

In view of the fact that it was the violations of International Law that brought the United States into the war, the slight consideration given to it in the Covenant of the League of Nations has created astonishment in the minds of American jurists. Noting that no provision was made for it in the future, in March, 1919, during the period when

the Covenant was undergoing revision, one of the most distinguished members of this Association proposed, among other suggestions, an amendment to the Covenant, reading:

"The Executive Council shall call a general conference of the Powers to meet not less than two years or more than five years after the signing of this Convention for the purpose of reviewing the condition of International Law, and agreeing upon and stating in authoritative form the principles and rules thereof.

"Thereafter regular conferences for that purpose shall be called and held at stated times."

That recommendation, having been approved by a Committee composed of some of the most eminent members of the American Bar, and by the Executive Council of the American Society of International Law, upon request of the Department of State, was forwarded to Paris.

From the fact that this proposal led to no action, I shall not draw the inference that it received no attention. The source from which it came could hardly permit of its being treated in that manner. I am, therefore, compelled to believe, until further enlightened, that it was considered inexpedient for the Conference to recognize any international law-making authority outside the limits of the League itself. If this be true, it is a reversal of the whole theory of legislation by consent. Either, in the purpose of the Conference, there is to be no review and revision of International Law, or such revision is to be exclusively the work of the League, a minority body in the Society of Nations; and, therefore, incapable of making law for that society without its consent.

It is a part of the theory of this League, that, henceforth, there are to be no neutral nations, and hence no neutral rights;—rights of which the President said, in his appeal for a declaration of war, that no modern publicist had ever before questioned them, or the right to defend them, rights for the defense of which this country has more than once engaged in war.

Until it is assured of the legal protection of all its rights, no free nation, great or small, can wisely surrender either its right of self-defense or its right to remain neutral in the quarrels of others. No combination of Great Powers itself unregulated by fixed principles of law can give this assurance.

I offer no criticism upon an effort to preserve the peace of the world by the consultation and cooperation of the Great Powers, or to an organized agreement on their part to pursue, condemn, and punish an outlaw, even though the culprit may claim the prerogatives of a sovereign State. Such an agreement is imperatively demanded; but it should be dedicated without equivocation or reserve to the service of the law, which it should aim to reestablish, to render more perfect, and to enforce whenever it is threatened with violation.

The whole world cries out for peace, for order, for the protection and the reinvigoration of honest industry. We have been told that America is to save the world and rescue civilization from dissolution. I believe that, while there are limits to national responsibility, our country has a great part to play in this sublime achievement, but we must do it in our way; in the way that has made us, in a little more than a century, the most unified, the most virile, and the most potent single Power in the world. And when we ask ourselves what it is that has given us this unity, this virility, and this potency, the answer is, that we have founded this nation upon principles of law, and upon the guarantees of individual rights under the law. That is our great contribution to civilization; and if we are to be of use to other nations, old or new, our first thought must be to remain our own masters, to preserve our independence, to control our own forces as a nation by our own laws, and to protect from any form of detraction or perversion that heritage of organized liberty which has given us peace at home and prestige abroad.

DAVID JAYNE HILL

JAPAN'S USE OF HER HEGEMONY

BY JOHN C. FERGUSON

IN the November, 1914, issue of this REVIEW appeared an article in which it was declared that the hegemony of Asia had passed from British into Japanese hands. This view has not been seriously disputed. It is important to enquire what use has been made by Japan of her newly-acquired hegemony. The first official statement in the matter was made by the Tokyo Foreign Office, after the publication of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, that "Japan's position vis-a-vis China has been considerably enhanced since the outbreak of hostilities in Europe."

That Japan has not confined her activities during the period of the war solely to strengthening her position in China is clearly shown by an announcement of the Ministry of the Navy as to Japan's naval assistance to the Allied Cause. In addition to ships in the Mediterranean and in the Suez Canal, Japan's activities were as follows: Indian Ocean, China waters, and about Singapore: Armoured cruiser *Iwate* (with Vice-Adm. Chisaka in command of the First Special Duty Squadron), two cruisers, and four torpedo-destroyers.

Penang: One gunboat.

Pacific Ocean and about San Francisco: One cruiser.

The Hawaiiis: One armoured cruiser.

The South Sea Islands: One gunboat.

Vladivostok: Battleship *Mikasa* (with Rear-Adm. Kawabara in command of the Fifth Battle Squadron). In addition, a marine corps is temporarily kept at Habarovsk to have custody of the captured warships.

Yangtsekiang: Cruiser *Suma* (with Rear-Adm. Yamaoka in command of the China Squadron) and five gunboats.

The patrol of the Pacific Ocean, of the Indian Ocean, of the waters of Malysia and Polynesia was assigned to

Japan exclusively after the early part of 1915. Her will was law from Aden at the southern entrance of the Red Sea to San Francisco and upon her was the responsibility for the maintenance of order and the repression of German influence. She rendered prompt assistance to Great Britain in the suppression of the mutiny at Singapore and her well-known determination to support her Ally had also controlling influence in checking any possible outburst of disorder in India. In all her dealings with her war-associates having Asiatic relations, Japan has been scrupulously careful to fulfil every obligation which her position involved and to refrain from taking any advantage of the adverse circumstances of the war to further her own special interests. Her hegemony, while indisputable, was directed to the furtherance of the general cause and to the defeat of the Central Powers. The European Allies owe a profound debt of gratitude to Japan for her share in the war.

But what of her dealings with her Asiatic partner, China? Has Japan been as careful in her relations with China as with her European Allies? Has she observed the same caution against using her power for the furtherance of her own "special interests" and has her "territorial propinquity" to China made her sensitive to the aspirations and hopes of the new Republic which threw off the shackles of absolutism in 1911? Japan and China are one in literature, in religion, and in racial development—t'ung wên, t'ung chiao, t'ung tsung, as is claimed by the ardent East Asiatic Society, Tung Ah Huei. Has this intimacy of relationship made Japan keenly sensitive of the responsibility of her military strength and has she refrained from coercive measures designed to further her own "special interests?" Has she cultivated a better understanding with China and has she used her power to restrain disorder and heal breaches? Judgment in the matter is left to the reader. I confine myself to a statement of what has happened since 1914.

On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war upon Germany, Germany having sent no reply to the Ultimatum of Japan. After Japan's declaration of war upon Germany, China fixed thirty miles of fighting area around Kiaochow as the limit within which Japanese forces should confine themselves in their operations against German defences.

Much correspondence between the Chinese and Japanese Governments ensued, but up to the present, this has not been published. It was mainly concerned with the landing of Japanese troops at Lungkow, their marching across neutral territory to Kiaochow and the forcible purchases of food and supplies from Chinese farmers en route. There was a strong protest by the Chinese Government against the actions taken by the Japanese forces, but finally, under pressure, China withdrew these objections. Lungkow is approximately 200 miles from Tsingtao, the port of Kiaochow. The Japanese troops which disembarked here marched across country to Weihsien which is about midway on the railroad leading from Tsingtao to Tsinan, the capital of the province. From this central place, troops were sent westward along the whole line of the railway and a considerable force was stationed at Tsinan. Eastward, the troops were moved for military operations against the German fortifications. By selecting Lungkow as the port of debarkation for her troops, Japan chose a method of exhibiting her troops to as many people as possible in the province of Shantung. It was not a military necessity which led her to choose this port, but rather the desire to spread her influence over the whole Shantung peninsula.

The German garrison of Kiaochow was obliged to capitulate and was carried off to Japan as prisoners of war. The small British contingent which had been cooperating with the Japanese in the attack was withdrawn and the entire control of Germany's former interests passed into Japanese hands. Everything great and small, definite and undefined, passed from Germany to Japan. Negotiations were continuous for several months between China and Japan on the general questions involved in the transfer, but were abruptly ended by the sudden and unexpected presentation of the Twenty-One Demands.

These Twenty-One Demands were handed to President Yuan by Mr. Hioiki, the Japanese Minister, on January 18, 1915, and mark an epoch in the relation of the two countries. It was intended by Japan that these Demands and the conversation with Yuan should be kept secret until China had given her reply to them, but early in February the full text of the Demands became known to British and American newspaper correspondents in Peking. It should be noted that these Demands were submitted while the

Japanese troops, sent to capture Tsingtao, still remained on Chinese soil. During the period of negotiations, troops, sent from Japan to relieve Japanese garrisons in China, arrived while the troops which they were intended to relieve still remained. It is probable that those troops were held in readiness to enforce compliance with the Demands, if found necessary.

After much parleying and many denials of the report that Demands had been presented, the truth was finally acknowledged and a Memorandum concerning them was handed to the Legations of Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States in Peking. This Memorandum contained only eleven demands and these were given publicity by the Associated Press in a despatch from Peking, dated February 17, 1915. Previous to the publication of the Eleven Demands, the text of the entire Twenty-One Demands had been obtained, and it is understood that both texts were presented to the Cabinet at Washington in its meeting of February 19th, 1915. About the middle of March the United States Government addressed a note to Japan, independent of Great Britain, France and Russia, inquiring from the Japanese Government the reason for the discrepancy in the text as communicated to the Legations and that furnished to the State Department by the Chinese Minister in Washington. This inquiry was replied to on March 22nd by Baron Kato, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The purport of this note and the reply has never been made public but it may be readily conjectured by referring to an interview between Baron Kato, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a correspondent of the Associated Press, February 28, 1915. In referring to Japan's policy in China, Baron Kato said that Japan had no idea of attempting any wanton encroachment upon the integrity of China or any other nation. Japan had ambitions which were altogether laudable, but he most emphatically declared that those ambitions did not include any desire to monopolize interests in China or in the Pacific. Her aspiration was to get that share of those interests to which she was rightfully entitled, without interfering with the interests of other nations.

These Twenty-One Demands were divided into five Groups. Group I referred to Japanese interests in Shan-

tung province which had been acquired by conquest of Germany. Group II had reference to Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; Group III to the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company; Group IV to the non-alienation of the coast of China. Group V was so remarkable that three of its provisions are quoted in full:

Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese advisers in political, financial and military affairs.

Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places (in China) shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 per cent or more) of what is needed by the Chinese Government or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

So outrageous were the demands in Group V deemed that China refused even to discuss its contents. It was felt by the Chinese that the demands of this group bore a direct resemblance to the measures taken by the Japanese Government previous to the annexation of Korea. When the contents of this group were discussed by various governments with Japanese representatives abroad, the representatives explained that the Japanese Government had only presented them as desiderata and that they should be separated from the eleven demands which were duly communicated to the Powers. The most specious justification was made by Baron Kato in the Japanese Diet, May 22, 1915, when he said, "We had to see what China would say about this Fifth Group and there was, therefore, no necessity of communicating it. Later on account of the appearance of erroneous accounts of this group, Japan decided to

make the matter public." So strong was the opposition to Group V and also to Group III, which referred to the Hanyehping concessions, that Mr. Hioki clearly foresaw that it would be impossible to force the Chinese Government to consent to them. For this reason he presented a list of revised demands on April 26, 1915. In reply to these revised demands, a conference was held at the Board of Foreign Affairs, Peking, May 1st, when Minister Lu read to Mr. Hioki a memorandum and presented to him China's reply. This reply was most conciliatory in tone and substance. It agreed to almost all of the demands in the first four Groups with slight amendments in some cases, but in regard to Group V it stated that they all infringe China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers or the principle of equal opportunity.

Shortly after China's reply had been handed to the Japanese Minister it became known that Japan intended to present an Ultimatum to China and to back up this Ultimatum by a show of military and naval strength. Before this project was finally decided upon by the Japanese Government, it was submitted by Premier Okuma and Minister Kato to the Elder Statesmen, who fully approved of it. On May 7th it was duly presented to China. It was a lengthy defense of what had been done by Japan in the discussion of the Demands and concluded with the following:

Therefore the Chinese Government should appreciate the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government by immediately accepting without any alteration all the articles of Group I, II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes in connection with Fukien province in Group V as contained in the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April.

The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock P. M. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take steps they may deem necessary.

The filing of this Ultimatum caused consternation in Peking which was to all intents and purposes isolated by the European war from other friends. On the following day, May 8th, China gave her consent to Japan's final demand stating in her Note that this action was taken by her "with a view to preserving the peace of the Far East" or in other and plainer words, she acknowledged that she bowed before *force majeure*. As a result of the accept-

ance by China of the conditions of the Ultimatum, the Japanese Government officially announced on May 9th that the naval and military movement in connection with the Chinese situation had been cancelled. The details were hastily arranged and the final treaties and notes signed on May 25th. These Demands emerged as a direct result of the increased political strength of the military party on account of the defeat of Germany at Kiaochow and the participation of Japan in the protection of the interests of Western nations in Asia and on the Pacific Ocean. The gains of Japan may be considered under the four geographical groups into which the Demands were divided.

SHANTUNG

As to the leased territory of Kiaochow, it may be remembered that in the Ultimatum which Japan delivered on August 15, 1914, the second clause asked that Germany should "deliver on a date not later than September 15th to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." This promise was materially changed by the Note of May 25 which was as follows: "When after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the leased territory to China under the following conditions:

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a commercial port.
2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Government.
3. If the Foreign Powers desire it, an international concession may be established.
4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and property of Germany and the conditions and procedures relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the restoration."

It will be noticed that by this Note, Japan reserves for her own exclusive jurisdiction a "concession." Every indication points to Tsingtao as the "concession" which it is

intended to retain. Tsingtao is the part of Kiaochow which the Germans developed into a city with good roads and many fine residences. Here is the terminus of the railway; here are the docks, government offices, and fortifications. It is the most valuable part of "the entire leased territory of Kiaochow."

In addition to Kiaochow, Japan acquired Germany's other rights in Shantung. These included the Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, 256 miles in length. This was completed in 1904 and connects the port of Tsingtao with the capital of Shantung province, Tsinan. This railway has two short branches of 28 and 26 miles respectively leading to mining properties. Along this railway a body of Chinese railway guards had been maintained, but this was disbanded and Japanese troops were substituted for them. At all important stations, Japanese post offices were established. The collieries of the Shantung Bergbau Gesellschaft at Fangtse in Weihsien district, 102 miles from Tsingtao, at Hungshan in Poshan district, 168 miles from Tsingtao and Kinlinghsien with an annual output of nearly a million tons of coal were the property of the Railway and were acquired by Japan. At Tsinanfu, the capital, German interests were centered in one district and this was occupied by Japanese troops.

Two other important railway projects were acquired, one of approximately 200 miles to connect the Tsingtao railway with the Tientsin-Pukow railway at Yihsien, and the other of 230 miles length to connect Tsinan with some point on the Peking-Hankow railway, presumably at Kaifeng. These had been granted in 1908 to a German company. Besides these two lines, there is also the line northward from Weihsien to Lungkow or Chefoo of more than 100 miles.

An important step of Japan in Shantung was taken by changing the military administration to a civil one. This took place October 1st, 1917, and on that date the Tsingtao Civil Administration Act was published in the "Official Gazette" at Tokyo. The new Act created a Department of Civil Administration in the Tsingtao Garrison Staff Office whose business it is to look after all executive and judicial affairs excepting the Military Administration of the occupied territory in Shantung province. For this purpose, a Civil Administration Office was established,

and divided into two Bureaus: the Bureau of Railways and the Bureau of Communications. The system of Civil Administration thus established included altogether about 600 officials.

Simultaneously with the promulgation of this Act, the Government issued the following statement, setting forth the reasons for it:

After the Empire had occupied Germany's Eastern Asiatic military base in and around Tsingtao, the Commander of the Tsingtao Garrison was appointed to administer all affairs, both military and civil. As to the welfare of the people, the Military Administration Office was established to look after that, and as to the railways and mines, the Shantung Railway Administration Office looked after them. Since then, three years have elapsed; order now has been fairly well stabilized, and the people are enjoying a peaceful life. It was decided, therefore, to supersede the Military Administration by a Civil, in order to better the government, and to protect the industry of the people, of the occupied territory.

The important changes brought about by the new act were: (1) the establishment at a number of places outside of Tsingtao of Civil Administration Offices "in order to contribute to the welfare of the people;" (2) The substitution of gendarmes for the police that were formerly stationed along the Shantung Railway between Tsingtao and Tsinan; (3) The appointment of the Japanese Consul at Tsinan to the additional office of Civil Administrator, "so as to smooth the relationship between the Civil Administrative and Consular affairs." The final part of the statement issued by the Government is to the effect that: "The object sought in the Civil Administration in Tsingtao is to give assurance of security to the people, so that they can industriously pursue their daily toil, thus to put the cordial relationship between Japan and China into a firmer position. There is no intention in the least to alter the property or status quo of the occupied territory."

In the latter part of 1918, negotiations were carried on between the Terauchi Administration and the Tuan Chi-jui Cabinet for two new railway concessions. As a quid pro quo, China was promised the withdrawal of civil offices from Tsinan, Choutsun, and Fangtze, along the existing railway line from Kiaochow to Tsinan. However, on account of the unexpected termination of the European war, the Japanese Government was reluctant to fulfil its part of the contract as to these rail-

way concessions, and for this reason it was announced that the actual abolition of the Japanese civil offices in Shantung province would not be carried out. The Administration of Japan along the railway line and in all the chief centers between Kiaochow and Tsinan is similar in many respects to that exercised by Germany during its occupation of Belgium.

MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA

As a result of the treaties of May 25, 1915, the "enhancement of Japan's interests" in Manchuria is even more noticeable than that in Shantung province to which reference has been made. Apart from the agreement as to the leasing of "land necessary for erecting suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural enterprises," and as to Japanese subjects being "free to reside and travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture of any kind whatsoever," and as to the opening of "certain suitable places in Eastern Inner Mongolia as commercial ports," the most notable "enhancements" were the extension of the lease of Port Arthur to 1997, the postponement of the date for restoring the South Manchurian Railway to 2002, and the fixing of the date of the expiration of the Antung-Mukden Railway contract as 2007. By this treaty Japan out-russianized Russia in her grip upon Manchuria. In addition to extension of railway interests, Japan acquired permission to select, prospect, and work coal and iron mines in six districts of Manchuria and three of Kirin.

As if these were not sufficient for her subjects, it was further agreed that "if foreign capital is required for building necessary railways in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, China may negotiate for a loan with Japanese capitalists first" and that "hereafter, if foreign advisers, instructors on political, financial, military, or police matters are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first." The "necessary railways in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia" above referred to are the following five lines: (1) Changchun to Chaoyang; (2) Chaoyang to Jehol; (3) Kaiyuan to Hailung; (4) Ssupinkai to Chaoyang; and (5) Kirin to Hailung. A loan agreement for the construction of a section of the first of these five lines, viz., that between Ssupinkai and Chao-

yang, has already been signed with the Yokohama Specie Bank for \$3,400,000. The section is between Ssupinkai and Chengchiatun, a distance of about 52 miles.

THE YANGTSE VALLEY

Japan's influence in the Yangtse Valley has been extended but not to the extent desired and planned for. The central point of interest was the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company, the control of which was the object of Group III in the Twenty-One Demands. This Hanyehping Company consists of three enterprises: (a) the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, located outside of the city of Hanyang at the junction of the Yangtse and Han Rivers; (b) the Ping-hsiang mines, located in the western border of the province of Kiangsi, and connected by water route and railway with the Siang River in Hunan province; and (c) the Tayeh Iron Mines, located about 70 miles east of Hankow in the province of Hupeh. These three properties were originally under the control of Sheng Hsüan-huai, at one time head of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. and of the Chinese Telegraph Co., Director-General of Railways, and later Minister of the Board of Communication.

Previous to the incorporation of the Hanyehping Company Sheng Hsüan-huai had found it necessary to enlarge and develop the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, and in order to accomplish this result he borrowed additional German capital on the security of the Ping-hsiang Mines. These loans were intended for the erection of new blast-furnaces, but in the process of construction these loans were found to be inadequate and from time to time additional loans were secured from Japanese banks. Application was made to British, American, and French bankers for loans to complete the re-organization of the Hanyang plant, but in every instance the bankers of these countries insisted upon the control of the Works during the tenure of the loan. It was impossible for Sheng Hsüan-huai to agree to any foreign control, as the Works were considered to be a semi-official undertaking. Hence it was necessary for Sheng to devise a scheme by which he could secure the capital necessary for the enlargement of the Works while at the same time he retained undivided control.

This was accomplished by a development of the principle laid down in the first Japanese loan, viz.: that of forward sales. Sheng agreed that he would furnish, for a term of twenty to thirty years, an annual supply of iron ore on an amortization plan which provided for the repayment of principal and interest. As the needs of the Works increased Sheng made further loans from the Japanese, on the same principle of forward sales. The amount of iron ore thus pledged to Japan annually amounts to about 300,000 tons, and there is a provision by which a certain amount of pig-iron may be substituted for iron ore.

This arrangement with the Japanese was purely a financial one and did not cripple or embarrass the Tayeh Mines, which were able to continue the supply of all the iron ore needed by the Hanyang Works in addition to supplying the amount specified in the contracts with the Japanese.

No change occurred in the status of this Company until Group III was presented which demanded that "the Hanyehping Company shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and that without the previous consent of Japan, China shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of the Company nor cause the Company to dispose freely of the same." This demand was refused and in its place there was an exchange of Notes in which it was agreed that "if in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese capitalists agree upon cooperation, the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without the consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Japanese."

In addition to Japan's concessions for the building and operation of the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railway of 87 miles, and for the operation of the Tungkuanshan Mines, near Tatung, in Anhui province, both of which were obtained before the outbreak of the European war, Japanese capitalists have secured since that time the right to operate the valuable iron and coal mines of Fanchang and Tao-chung, near Wuhu, and of the Fenghuangshan Iron Mine, near Nanking.

FUKIEN PROVINCE

In one aspect of the Twenty-One Demands affecting the province of Fukien, the United States was interested, as it is a comment upon an arrangement which had already been cancelled. After the visit of the American Fleet to Amoy, in its cruise around the world, negotiations were begun between the Bethlehem Steel Works and the Chinese Government for the purpose of loaning to China \$20,000,000 which would be used for the building of docks and a naval base at some suitable location on the China coast. After careful surveys had been made by Chinese naval officers it was decided that the best site would be at San Tuao, on the Fukien Coast. A contract for this purpose was duly signed. In the autumn of 1911 an American visited Peking and completed the negotiations for the loan to the Chinese Government for the building of its naval base and dockyards. Before work could be commenced the Revolution of 1911 broke out, followed by an increase in Japanese influence to such an extent that the Chinese Government felt obliged to decide not to proceed with its scheme of establishing a naval base. This decision automatically put an end to the American loan.

There was already no occasion for Japan's insistence upon assurances from the Chinese Government, but nevertheless these were sought eagerly, and in addition the straw man "of permitting foreign nations to establish on the coast of Fukien province, dockyards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases or other military establishments" was set up only to be ceremoniously knocked off its pedestal. The additional assurance was obtained that China has "no intention of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting up the afore-mentioned establishments." This was a blow aimed at America, although America's place in the scene was already vacant.

The year 1916 was one of backing and filling as far as the active pushing of Japanese interests was concerned, but after the signing of that strange document, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, Japan began to take advantage of her "special interests due to territorial propinquity." China was sorely in need of money and ready to bargain away her birth-rights for a mess of pottage to satisfy her immediate craving. Whereupon a series of loans succeeded and the

funds obtained thereby were largely squandered in fatuous military expeditions sent by the Peking Government against southern provinces whose grievances should have been adjusted and not spurned. Since the establishment of the present Hara Ministry in Japan, it has been announced as a policy that the Japanese Government will "withhold such financial assistance to China as is likely in their opinion to add to the complications of her internal situation." It stated also that "loans supplied to China under the existing conditions of domestic strife in that country are liable to interfere with the re-establishment of peace and unity in China so essential to her own interests as well as to the interests of foreign Powers." This is a complete reversal and disavowment of the policy of the Terauchi Cabinet, and it is a just description of these troublesome small loans of 1917 to say that they added to "the complications of China's internal situation." Some of these loans will be merged eventually into the Four Power Reorganization Loan and others can be combined or refloated with new and more suitable security but for the moment they are sources of unprofitable irritation.

The above is a rapid and incomplete survey of Japan's use of her hegemony so far as China is concerned. In Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, in Shantung province, in the Yangtse Valley and in Fukien province, "Japan's position in China has been considerably enhanced." The reader may judge for himself whether or not this enhancement has been obtained by predatory methods. That it has been obtained at the cost of the goodwill of China cannot be doubted.

JOHN C. FERGUSON.

WHAT IS AN ANARCHIST?

BY GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER

SOMEBODY called Henry Ford an anarchist. This, he said, was untrue. He declared that he had been damaged to the tune of a million dollars, and he brought suit to recover that sum.

The jury, being possessed of a sense of humor, estimated his damage at six cents.

Nobody cares much whether Ford is an anarchist or merely what his testimony shows him to be. But his libel suit has brought the subject of anarchy into the foreground of our thinking and we find ourselves asking whether this heresy can properly be imputed to the man who is at the moment the most conspicuous person in the world.

What is an anarchist, anyway?

Ford says an anarchist is a man who is against the Government and throws bombs.

That is a pretty good definition. Dress is up a bit by cutting out the bombs and it would sound quite well—thus:

“An anarchist is one who seeks to overthrow the existing Government and to establish nothing in its place.”

Tested by this definition, is Woodrow Wilson an anarchist? That is a startling question, but it is asked in all seriousness, and it deserves careful consideration. Before answering it, here are some points to consider:

Against the conclusion that Mr. Wilson is an anarchist, are most of his public utterances. He has written books and made speeches in which he treats with great respect government in general and this government in particular. If there is anything to be said on the other side, it is not on account of his preaching, but because of his practice.

Is it possible that, while preaching government, he is promoting anarchy?

In favor of this view, it might be said that he exerted every ounce of pressure he could command to upset the

government established by the strong hand of President Huerta in Mexico, and, as the only substitute, seriously proposed Villa, the incarnation of anarchy and lawlessness.

This action, however, was not due to a desire to overturn government as such, but merely to Mr. Wilson's belief that President Huerta was a bad man and that it would be better for Mexico and the world to have Villa in his place. While, therefore, there is no doubt that what Mr. Wilson did promoted anarchy and caused bloodshed and enormous pecuniary loss, it cannot fairly be said that he intended the natural consequences of his act. It was merely a monumental blunder.

The recent impotent attempt to go bandit-hunting within the preserves of an independent state shows how little he understands the elements of international law.

Again, it might be urged that he had the intentions of an anarchist when he consistently sought to separate the German people from their government, apparently heedless of the frightful danger which ensued—that when victory had crowned our sacrifices, there would be no stable or responsible government with which to make peace.

But this was not the pursuit of anarchy for anarchy's sake. It was merely a thing done under the fixed delusion that the heart of the German people was not in the war, and that if only enough talk were addressed to them they would throw down their arms. Indeed, it is quite possible that to this day Mr. Wilson believes it was his letters and speeches which produced the collapse of German militarism rather than the intense pressure organized and exerted by Marshal Foch.

Mr. Wilson's action in the Italian situation comes much nearer to the move of an anarchist. At a time when it was of the utmost importance to preserve in Europe something like respect for constituted authority and organized government, he deliberately undertook to array the Italian people against their own Government—not as a desperate measure resorted to against an enemy in war-time, but as a legitimate step in the intercourse between friendly nations.

There are rumors also that during the Peace Conference Mr. Wilson again and again forced the hand of Lloyd George and Clemenceau by veiled threats of an appeal to laboring men in England and France to join him in coercing their respective governments.

This way of doing things helps to bring the idea of government into disrepute. It promotes anarchy and arouses class feeling. The man who resorts to it is worse than a demagogue. A demagogue, by appealing to the passion or prejudice of the moment, attempts to rally masses of his fellow citizens to his support in order that he may become a powerful factor in his own country. What Mr. Wilson appears to have done is to stir up, or threaten to stir up, the masses of the people in friendly countries against their own governments in order to compel their representatives to accept his solution of international problems. Such a procedure promotes anarchy. Is the promoter of anarchy an anarchist?

The answer depends upon a single point—whether a man is an anarchist merely because he makes wreckage of government, or whether it is necessary that he have the *intention* of a wrecker. That Mr. Wilson has done far more than any man in this generation to undermine our American Constitutional system may be held as a permissible individual opinion. That he has meant to undermine it or that he has had an intent hostile to government, is not for a moment to be believed. The fact seems to be that Mr. Wilson is by temperament and habit of thought entirely unfitted to hold the office of Chief Magistrate in any state in which the legislature and the judiciary are intended to share with the executive the responsibilities of government.

To be a worthy President under a constitutional system like ours, a man must not merely play the part of a public servant, but must also recognize that certain other people are likewise public servants, and that the theory of our government is that all should work together as a team.

Mr. Wilson's decision to go to Paris as our Peace Commissioner was entirely consistent with a conception of government in which all functions can best be discharged by a single governmental officer. Our system contemplates the calm and unprejudiced review, first by the President and then by the Senate, of the work accomplished in conference by our commissioners. The fact that if he acted as commissioner and dominated his associates there would be nobody but the Senate to review his work, not only seemed to Mr. Wilson no reason for remaining at his desk, but suggested to him the possibility of so dealing with the Senators as to make their revision purely formal.

Mr. Wilson has wonderful powers, but they are those which fit a man for solitary rule. He doubtless conceives of himself as the agent of the people. But the fact is that while he has a genius for principalship, he has no capacity for agency. He talks much of the mandate of the people; but seemingly his working test of what the people want is to inquire what it is that he himself has determined to do. A man of Mr. Wilson's type cannot be a servant, and therefore cannot be a public servant.

As for team work, he apparently has no conception of its meaning. In the present governmental crisis, it probably never occurs to him that the Constitution of the United States is the standing expression of the will of the people, and that under it the Senate is charged with the duty of exercising a free judgment upon the Covenant and the Treaty. No doubt he is entirely honest in his belief that the determination of the Senate to make the treaty safe by amendment is due either to provincial narrowness or pure perversity. That the people want action taken according to a collective judgment and not according to a solitary obsession, is a truth for which there is no room in his capacious head.

When this article appears in print Mr. Wilson may be "swinging around the circle." Doubtless he will do this with a sincere belief that in true democratic fashion he is reporting to his masters, the people, and that he is seeking their mandate for execution when he returns to Washington. In point of fact, his journey will be merely a sustained effort to secure backing in his struggle to run the Government alone. It will be a desperate attempt to persuade the American people that they will be safer and happier if they trust their President rather than their Constitution.

Mr. Wilson has a large personal following, but he has to a great extent dissolved the Democratic Party. There are plenty of public assurances of loyalty to him from party leaders and workers, but the real state of mind of these men is an open secret. He can command much individual support for his League and Treaty programme by the very process of appealing to the people against their Senate. But this involves the sacrifice of a governmental system to his own conception of how a particular issue ought to be

decided. Such a procedure is essentially destructive. It is not revolutionary in the best sense, because there is no proposal to substitute anything for our Constitution except the will of one man. The Executive who permits himself to make such an appeal may not recognize himself as an enemy of all government, but he is certainly the enemy of our American governmental system, and, if allowed a free hand, would undoubtedly bring about its disintegration.

It is aside from the purpose of this article to comment upon the painful revelation of Mr. Wilson's political morality recently afforded by the White House conference. Suffice it to observe that the seeds of death are lurking in his attempt to get the Allies to adopt the League by representing that its covenants mean what they say and in his desperate efforts to secure ratification here by giving assurances that the covenants can be made to mean whatever we choose to read into them. It is characteristic of such a mind to be more absorbed by chaotic international conditions than by the more normal though sufficiently exacting problems which are the incidents of an orderly and established national government. Mr. Wilson is an internationalist not because he is disloyal to the United States, but because he thinks he can directly influence all nations for good instead of serving the world best by serving America. He is not consciously opposed to all government as such. He is, therefore, not an anarchist in the proper sense of that term. But he has a temperament and habit of mind distinctly hostile to a form of government such as ours. He would make an ideal president for the League of Nations, both because he would have no national prejudices to overcome, and because the Covenant of the League of Nations is essentially un-American in that it exalts the executive department of government at the expense of both the legislative and judicial. The interests of the League would be entirely safe in his hands because there would be no larger entity into which he could resolve it—at least, not unless and until effective communication can be established with the people of Mars. And if we cannot have an American as the League's first President, our second choice ought certainly to be a man from America.

GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER.

OSA, THE MARTYRED CITY

BY RILEY ALLEN

[Major Allen, an American journalist, became Acting Secretary of the Red Cross Commission to Siberia toward the end of 1918. The American Red Cross headquarters received word in April of the present year that Major Allen had come down with typhus at Petropavlosk. They have had no further news of him, and assume that he has recovered. The occasion for his writing the following article was a relief survey made by several members of the Commission across Siberia into Eastern Russia. This long journey was undertaken in order to determine conditions and to furnish data for a decision as to the best method of distributing Red Cross supplies. Major Allen reached Osa shortly after the Bolsheviki withdrew, having previously announced that they intended to make Osa an example of Soviet administration. They did. —EDITOR.]

There are cities and towns in the zone of war henceforth to be known forever by the martyrdom they have suffered—Louvain, Ypres, Lille, Reims, Verdun. German frightfulness has given them immemorial significance. The World has throbbed with their pain, a great tide of sympathy has flown out to them; their recovery from the Huns has been signalized by prayers and pomp and rejoicing.

There are other cities and towns that have suffered martyrdom unknown to the world: little hamlets where the scourge has fallen as heavily as upon burning Louvain or bombarded Reims. Obscure, remote from the center of conflict, the very names are perhaps not on the map; or, if there, hold no meaning to the casual reader. Nor is it only by the Germans that these helpless communities have been put to the fire and sword. The "Red Terror" of Bolshevism has added to German brutality new ingenuities of cruelty. And this is the story of one obscure town that has suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Bolsheviks—the story of Osa.

We reached Osa at the close of a March day—a day of wintry cold, yet already raw with that damp and penetrating chill which gives promise of the spring thaw. We had come by sleigh two days from Kungur, in the province of Perm, leaving the railroad at Kungur and taking two-passenger *sanyi* over the frozen roads out through the pine and fir forests, whose dark green was occasionally lightened with slim white birches springing straight as wands from the untrodden and immaculate snow. Through the somber walls of forest our path led westerly for some seventy miles, with Osa at the end. The narrow *droshky* track ran between high banks of snow, the ruts worn deep and hardened by the passage of many sleighs.

On the second day we came out from the forest to the valley of the Kama river, a wide and beautiful valley, snow-covered now, but in summer rich with grain, feeding thousands of cattle, horses and sheep, supporting a prosperous peasantry.

There were eleven in our party: an American Red Cross Commission of four; two American army officers; a Chicago newspaperman; a Russian colonel from the staff at Kungur; a Russian lieutenant from Omsk, and two orderlies. Our passenger and baggage vehicles made a long, dark line on the great white plain; and from time to time we passed or saw in the distance other dark lines. Sometimes these were peasant sleighs, bound for distant markets or returning; sometimes military “echelons,” each sled carrying munitions or guns for the Osa front; sometimes caravans with frozen meat, bread, cheese and butter, destined also for the Russian soldiers. Sometimes the dark lines crept more slowly than at others—these were sleighs with wounded soldiers, sent back to the hospitals at Kungur or Perm. We passed several such; the rude sledges, with a little coarse straw in the bottoms, bumped jerkily over the snow-packed hummocks, each bump wrenching the wounded man sorely; but with that endurance of pain which seems in the Russian to mock torn flesh and quivering nerve, the hurt men never flinched. They looked at us curiously, wearily, raising their heads from beneath the thin blankets or worn overcoats that covered them, nodding with friendliness, and then dropping back again upon their straw.

Other lines appeared from time to time, men marching in straggling groups of twenties and forties back from the

front. As we passed them, we saw at the head and tail of the little processions soldiers in Russian uniform with bayoneted rifles. They were the guards, the processions were of Bolshevik prisoners. In these lines there were men and boys of all ages; occasionally women, infrequently a child with its mother. Lads of sixteen and seventeen walked with grandsires of sixty. Just from the fighting front and from the starving districts behind the Red lines, their clothes and faces told plainly a story of Bolshevik desperation and disorganization. They were often ragged beyond belief, with starveling cheeks, matted hair, and unkempt beards. On their feet they wore *lapti*, more often than boots—the *lapti* is a wickerwork of split birch twigs, shaped roughly to fit the foot and tied with thongs of young birch shoots—and often through the *lapti* could be seen their bare feet purpled by the cold. Some had uniforms, or parts of uniforms—an overcoat here, a blouse there, elsewhere a pair of trousers with a faded stripe down the outside seams. These lines moved as slowly as the wounded men; passed us with scarcely a glance and moved on, a procession of tattered demalions, a parade of mournful scarecrows.

In the afternoon, as our ponies trotted steadily down the Kama plain, a light snow began to fall, but toward evening the sky cleared. We neared Osa at sunset, and a bright red glow of clouds hung on the western horizon. Against this glow, one lonely landmark stood out starkly—the tall spire of a cathedral in the city we were to visit. Silhouetted against the deepening scarlet, it seemed to rise high above flames, just as it had risen when the Bolsheviks, evacuating the city three weeks before, had applied the torch to finish the work begun with the sword, bayonet and bullet. Long after the noble curve of the Byzantine tower was lost in the dusk, the four-armed cross of the Greek Catholic church stretched stalwartly aloft toward the evening sky.

Until driven out by Admiral Kolchak's soldiers, Osa was in full possession of the Bolsheviks. They had occupied it after the November revolution. For ten months the Bolshevik military and civilian governments had entire control. Here they had set up a staff headquarters, and a "chief commissar" had ruled, with regiments to enforce the commands and decrees of the civil officials under him. Here they had announced, in posted widely proclamations,

that they would demonstrate Bolshevik government, in which every citizen would be a "tovarish," sharing in the plenitude of food, in the distribution of land, in popular education. There would be no more poverty, no more oppression by arrogant officials, no more capitalistic or bureaucratic exploitation of artisan or peasant. The people of Osa and its surrounding country would be masters and mistresses of their own destiny, guided by the enlightened doctrines of Lenine and Trotsky. Each man was to have ample land to till, horses, cows and farm implements, a vote in all affairs. The "communistic era" was come. And for seven months the commissar and his subordinates administered in Osa the high, the low and the middle justice. They had, in this peasant town of eastern Russia, unhampered opportunity to put into practice the principles they preached. The story of Osa is the story of that practice.

We found comfortable accommodations prepared for us in a three-story stone building, the Zemstvo Uprava, once headquarters of the Reds. They had left the marks of their democratic rule upon it in broken balustrades, smashed chandeliers, and soiled walls.

In the evening we dined with the commandant of the Osa troops, Colonel Casagrande, whose spurs were won in the war against the Central Powers and who had been one of the many officers of the Russian Grand Army to refuse any dealings save battle with the Bolsheviks. Italian-born, the colonel was naturalized as a Russian citizen in 1915, and has been in the camp or on the field for five years. It was he and his troops who drove the Reds from Osa and occupied it on March 7, 1919, and it was he who then telegraphed to the headquarters staff of the northern Russian Army, at Ekaterinburg, telling the first authentic details of the Bolshevik rule in this part of Russia.

I had seen a copy of his telegram at Ekaterinburg. He asked that men be sent to Osa to administer the board of aldermen, the public utilities, the post-office, the customs, the telegraph office and other civic and municipal institutions. The Reds had gone, but during their régime they had killed the officials who had formerly held these posts and put Bolshevik favorites in their places. When the Red Army fled, there were no officials left in Osa. Nor were there remaining there other men who could take the posts. The commissar and the soldiers had made sure of that.

After dinner, Colonel Casagrande told us the story. Long Russian cigarettes were lighted. Pale Russian tea in tall glasses, and colorless, fiery vodka were passed around. The commandant brought forth documents and photographs. Bolshevik documents they were, and the photographs (there were hundreds of them) were of Bolshevik leaders—commissars, agitators, spies, officers, provocateurs, organizers. Photographs also of Bolshevik work—slaughtered men and women, lying buried as they fell; hastily dug trenches half-filled with slain, “close-ups” showing unmistakable evidences of savage and fiendish cruelty in the killing.

This grisly gallery of pictures is part of the multitudinous evidence which the All-Siberian Government is steadily accumulating. It is part of the mute but unimpeachable testimony which indicates how closely Bolshevik practice approximates Bolshevik preaching. Remember that the ink was scarcely dry on the Red's proclamation of friendship, brotherhood, and justice for all Russians when the indiscriminate killings began.

In the winter of 1917-1918 Osa was a town of 10,000 people. By the early spring of 1919 it was less than 8,000.

“At least 2,000 men and women were killed—slaughtered in cold blood by the Reds,” the Colonel told us. “They killed people who would not at once turn over all their property to the so-called communism; they killed people who had given everything. Some were shot after pretense of trial; others without even the pretense. Last August and September, and late in February and early March of this year, were the worst of all. In the late summer there had been an attempt on Lenine's life, and the order—there are documents to prove this—went out to enforce the supreme authority of the ‘proletariat government.’ Then began the ‘Red Terror’—a régime of sheer wholesale murder. It was then that Osa suffered most deeply. And again this spring, when the Reds saw that we would soon force them to evacuate the town, they redoubled their slaughter and looting. Since the 1918 atrocities, as nearly as we can estimate, about 500 have been killed here by order of the Bolshevik officials—the commissar or some subordinate. Often petty officials would order the death of citizens who had displeased them. No order to kill was disobeyed.”

Each night in August and September there were raids by the search-parties of Reds on houses in the town, or among the peasant homes in the fields, and numbers of men and women were taken out and summarily shot. The average each night, for a week at a time, is estimated at between 20 and 30, but this is only an approximation. Men would disappear; the frantic wives would seek for them in vain, beg for information of the commissar; and be rudely dismissed, or perhaps taken also, to disappear forever. The Reds surrounded their raids sometimes with secrecy and always with terror. They came to the home of their victim usually between eleven and four at night, often drunk, and invariably with violent bluster, breaking down doors and firing into windows.

"When we occupied Osa," the Colonel went on, "we found that the Reds had prepared orders for their soldiers to kill the entire male population of this district of 16 years or over, but they were driven out before they could put the order in effect."

There were six regiments of Bolshevik soldiers garrisoning the town, each regiment of from 1,500 to 2,000 men. Besides the soldiers told off for the searching-parties and for the "executions" which followed in the early dawn, many volunteer squads roamed the town and country-side, bringing to headquarters men and women whom they branded forthwith as anti-Bolsheviks, as "enemies of the revolution," and who were condemned out of hand. How many inoffensive people were slain without even the preliminary of a march to the Bolshevik commissar, no one can say.

We were examining some of the captured Bolshevik documents when three men came into the dining hall and were greeted with cordial courtesy by our host. One was the mayor of Osa, Skrutkovski; another, the president of the local zemstvo, Volokitin; the third, a priest, Father Speranski. They had been asked to come and meet the Red Cross men and tell us something of their own knowledge of Bolshevik administration.

The priest was a man of great height, straight-backed and lean in his long black robe. His waving brown hair fell to his shoulders. His full brown beard, just shot with gray, his thin face, firm, compressed lips, finely moulded nose, deepset, kindly eyes, and broad, placid forehead gave

him the aspect of some biblical character. We had heard of priests driven from their churches after the fall of the Czar, repudiated as hypocrites by their parishioners because of their ill living; but Father Speranski was obviously not one of these, for he was greeted with instant respect. And we were told later that he had displayed steadfast bravery in his ministrations during the Bolshevik régime.

The mayor's comment on the Bolsheviks was largely concerning their attitude towards education.

"In principle," he said, "the Bolshevik had here what they called 'free labor Schools.' In practice it was a farce—and a tragedy. First there were many school teachers, good ones, killed. Then the Reds installed their own, or the pupils chose them. The Bolsheviks gave to the pupils, even of the grade schools, the right to form students' councils and choose their own teachers. The result was hopeless inefficiency and confusion. The pupils did as they pleased, and if the teacher protested, they dismissed him. They broke up desks and tables, tore down black-boards, and burned schoolbooks in frequent outbursts of hoodlumism, unchecked by the so-called committee of education. Few in any school studied, the rest played. The teacher would either give up in despair and go home in the morning for the rest of the day, or get drunk.

"To illustrate the Bolshevik theory of education: Here is one instance: Their teachers were told to give astronomy lessons from the Socialistic point of view. Every astronomical fact, every comet and constellation, must have a meaning in the progress and ultimate success of Socialism and communism all over the world. And as the heads of educational system here were ignoramuses their instruction was absolutely ridiculous. Many teachers could not write their own names."

We turned to the priest for his comment.

"The Bolsheviks from the beginning," said he, "have been against religion—not only mine, but all religion. At an orphan home here their first act was to shut up the chapel and forbid its use on pain of the usual penalty—death. In the schools they stopped the use of the Scriptures and the display of Scriptural pictures of any sort. They prohibited the dearly-loved sign of the cross. They instructed their teachers to tell the children to say, 'There is

no God.' From one church they took to prison five priests and a number of others. Twenty in all from the Osa churches were taken at this time to court for what the Reds called a 'trial,' accused of being enemies of the communism. They were beaten, some of them mutilated. One night three priests were taken from our church and shot.

"The Reds looted cathedrals, churches, and chapels, and defiled the sacred places. And their reign here was one of constant bloodshed. I myself saw many murders, saw many prisoners taken in the city or country killed with the butt of a rifle or with the bayonet. I saw others kicked to death, and others tortured before their death, and I have also seen men still living thrown alive into trenches and soil shoveled in on them."

The Colonel had been fingering the leaves of the big album. "Here are some of the Reds of particular note," he said. "Here is a boy, Serge Kitaieff, who was, at 13, a spy for the Reds, with a price on his head in Osa; and here is a sailor of the Black Sea Fleet who rose to be a powerful Bolshevik politician. Here"—he turned the pages—"are many women commissars, mostly young women, you will see. And we have found that the women commissars are beyond the men in their cruelty. They are the most blood-thirsty of all. There are women of less than twenty whose administration is more fiendish than you Americans can conceive. In one town about which we have collected information, the commissar is a girl about 16 years old. She ordered 300 people killed in one day."

A considerable number of these Bolsheviks have been captured. Many, facing death, have confessed, and the Russian military intelligence departments have detailed accounts of the Bolshevik plans for further wholesale murders.

"We have more Bolshevik documents than you can possibly examine, but tomorrow, if you wish, you may have evidence of your own eyes and ears; you may hear from the people here what Bolshevism has meant to them," said the Colonel as he bade us good-night.

On the following morning several sleighs awaited us at staff headquarters. We headed for the Kama river, across a level snowfield. Not far from the staff building, the *sanyi* halted and the Colonel pointed out the city theater. "You may be interested in this. There will probably be,

over there, bodies of some of those murdered by the Reds. They bring in bodies here each day," he informed us.

The interior of the theater had been transformed into a great dark room that looked like something between a church and a mausoleum. Indeed, it is used for funeral services, which partake of both.

Fourteen things lay on the wooden floor. I call them "things" because scarcely any vestige of human quality remained in those incredibly withered, distorted forms covered with rotting rags, to which clung clods of brown earth and lumps of snow. And yet beneath those moldy garments were human bodies. They were now little more than mummies, after the months that had passed while they lay under a thin mantle of frozen earth and a thicker mantle of snow. The room stank of them; the things seemed before our eyes to be shriveling and crumbling toward final dissolution. Two or three women stood silently by while the Americans, doffing their fur caps, made closer examination. The women wept a little, hiding their faces.

Most of the bodies were in civilian dress; one or two in Russian uniform. Three of the men had evidently been peasants, and two, judging by their clothes, were priests. The winter had done its work so well that it was almost impossible to tell with certainty the nature of their wounds, but the skulls of two had been battered in. A Russian, who had helped bring the bodies from their burial-place, said that the entire fourteen had come from one trench. They were now awaiting identification by their relatives; and as we stood by, two more women came in quietly, and without a word passed us and began to scrutinize the shriveled things in their disordered, rotting garments. They went from body to body, looking long at the faces, striving to find some familiar lineament. They were unsuccessful in their quest and moved slowly away. Beneath their close-drawn shawls their faces showed a pitiful mingling of hope and fear.

From the theater we went to the place of the dead—the Golgotha of Bolshevik violence. We drove for nearly a mile over the snow-plain, coming then to a spot where newly-dug earth blemished the white fields, and men and women were laboring with wooden spades among the brown hillocks already cast up. The earthen heaps extended for perhaps two acres, and on one side of this plot

were long and shallow trenches, freshly freed of soil. These were the trenches dug by the Bolsheviks, or, more often, by the prisoners they were about to kill, and the toiling men and women, finding a trench, had only to spade out the snow and dirt along its length to uncover bodies by the twos and threes and tens. There were also single graves, and there were roughly circular holes in the ground where many bodies had lain, one on the other as they had fallen dying of bullet or rifle-butt.

Two soldiers were on guard. The Bolshevik lines were not far to the westward, and there was no security that some sniper might not creep within gunshot, under shelter of the pine thickets, and fire upon those who searched and dug amid the bleak hummocks.

As we arrived they were placing the body of a man in a rude coffin of wood. It had been identified by the widow and daughter as that of Andre Michaelovitch Pryagin. The crime of Andre Michaelovitch Pryagin was that he lived in a brick house. To this the Bolshevik objected. He was, they said, one of the capitalist class which for centuries had exploited the proletariat. So one night they took him from his home and he was heard of no more, until the widow and daughter, laboring and searching in the place of the dead, found the body in a small trench.

I saw the brick house afterward. It was not a large house—just such a modest home as a man of small means in America might build at the end of years of hard work and sacrifice. But the ownership of it was Pryagin's crime.

His body was placed in the coffin and made ready for the sledge to transport it to Osa. The widow and daughter gave their shovels to others and waited, beside the pine-box, to walk with the sledge to the town.

There had been three bodies in this grave, one atop the other. Beneath that of Pryagin was the corpse of a woman. They had just found in her clothing some pieces of money and several rings, the latter tied together with a bit of string, as she had hidden it while the Reds battered at her door and demanded the surrender of her husband for action by the commune. She was, Casagrande said, the wife of a Russian general. They had lived in Petrograd, a well-known family. Her offense was that her husband was a general of the old army—the army that fought when the Czar was in power.

Other bodies were being slowly disinterred. As at the theater, so here, there were women with close-shawled heads, looking among the things that came from the trenches and holes. One, a frail little peasant woman with an edge of white hair showing at her forehead, had just found her son. He had been missing since August. She helped to lift the twisted bundle of rags from the hole into which it had been tossed, and with infinite tenderness tried to smooth from the battered forehead the matted locks of hair. No coffin was in readiness at the moment, and after covering his face and helping to lay the body decently behind a little mound, she took her shovel and aided another peasant woman digging along a trench. The tears ran slowly down her cheeks, and she had often to stop and wipe them away with a cheap cotton-print handkerchief, but I did not hear her sob until the coffin came and two men placed therein the body of her son.

As we drove back to the town, Colonel Casagrande said: "The finding of the bodies progresses slowly now. Sometimes they are discovered a considerable distance from the main trenches. When the snow goes off, it will be easier—the crows will point the way. It is certain also that many—how many one cannot tell—will be found in the fields through all this district. The Reds raided the country, and often their victims were not brought to the town at all—were shot down as they were driven across the fields or along the roads. They lie now under the snow. Sometimes we find them by watching the dogs who hunt and dig in the fields."

On the following morning we visited military hospitals. The Bolsheviks had "administered" these also. They had killed, driven away, or forced into their service almost every doctor in the town. Four out of five of the surgeons, Osa people told us, had been pressed into the service of the Reds under threat of death. This is by no means unusual. One frequently finds in Siberia or Eastern Russia doctors who escaped from the hospitals of the Bolsheviks, just as convicts, desperate under their restraint or persecution, escape from jails.

In the afternoon we heard the stories of women whose husbands, brothers, or sons had been killed by the Bolsheviks. One of the Russian staff had sent out word that the Americans wished to get first-hand and detailed informa-

tion of Red activities. More than fifty women appeared in the course of an hour, and we could have seen and talked to at least a hundred more had there been time or necessity. "They will come as quickly as we can get word to them, but you will find ample confirmation of Bolshevik excesses from these already here," the staff officer predicted.

There were in that group of shabby and white-faced women those who had occupied high station. There were those who had never known anything but toil and struggle to hold their bit of land and feed the multiplying children. There were women from the larger Russian cities—Petrograd, Moscow, Kazan, Kiev; women who had been well-to-do; women from peasant homes; women of the little official circle of Osa. They told their stories with notable straightforwardness, often answering questions slowly to be certain of accuracy. Very seldom that afternoon did I see tears or hear sobs. They had by now borne their grief so long that the tears had all been shed.

From the mass of evidence given us, I shall tell here but a few of the stories, condensing those to the main facts:

Maria Ilynishna Kamaneva: Her husband, a blacksmith, had a little shop of his own. The Bolsheviks demanded of him 5000 roubles. He had no such sum. He was arrested and held prisoner for several days. His wife, imploring the Bolshevik officials for information, was refused any news whatever. A neighbor told her he was taken away and shot about August 25th or 26th. He has never reappeared.

Anastasia Rakutin: On the night of July 28, their home was raided and her husband, a hatter, was taken away by the Bolsheviks. Someone told her that he was shot soon after his arrest, the body thrown across a horse and taken to the Kama river, where it was tossed into the water. A week later the body was found in the river and her friends helped her bury it secretly in the cemetery. Previously the Reds had taken all their live-stock—they had a small stable—except one cow. The wife is now left with four small children.

Maria Gregorievna Chapiro: Husband and two sons killed by the Reds. Husband a customs officer in the Russian service for 31 years; sons were students. On the night of August 26th or 27th a raiding party shouted to open the doors and immediately broke them in. One of the reeling soldiers asked, "Well, who are we going to shoot?" and the two sons and the father were seized. The sons were taken away that night; the father, for some reason unknown, was allowed to remain. Next day the father went to ask the chief commissar for the lives of the sons. The commissar said that they had been sent to Perm. Then the mother went, and on her knees begged that the boys might be spared. The commissar would not even answer her entreaties. Two nights afterwards the house was again raided and the father taken. The following day the mother again went to the commissar, this time

to implore mercy for three instead of two. The commissar said, as he told the sentry to throw her out, "We're tired of you and your talk. If you come again you'll be shot as those three have been." She has heard no more of the missing men.

Ryisa Vasilievna Kasevitch: Her father, Vasili Kasevitch, was assistant police inspector. He was taken on the night of August 18. The day after, she went to the Bolshevik committee and asked for him. They would not give her information. Following this, her mother went to the committee and was told that Kasevitch had been "sent to Perm." They learned from friends that he had been strangled and his body flung into the communal trenches.

Ekaterina Kirilovna Cherdinsova: Her husband, a bailiff of the court, was arrested on September 18, and a week later taken from prison to Red headquarters. That night he was shot. No trial was given him either at the prison or at headquarters. At the latter place he was merely brought before the committee and ordered executed.

Maria Nasonova Petrovitch: Her husband, an attorney attached to the local courts as counsel for the defense, was shot on September 18. The body was flung into the river, and later found on the bank, nude.

So the long toll ran. We questioned the women particularly as to whether the Bolsheviks, after arresting their husbands or sons, had given the prisoners trial. In not one case had a trial been heard of. In many cases it was known that no such preliminary, travesty though it might be, had been allowed by the Red commissar and committees.

One woman, the wife of the peasant Aksonoff, told of the murder of her husband. He had been taken at night, marched to the snowfield, and ordered to dig his grave. When it was finished, his throat was cut, and before he was dead he was flung into the hole and his head and shoulders covered with dirt.

We were told of the killing of Yakov Butokoff, manager of the Osa bank, a man of forty-eight, highly respected in the little town. He was arrested on the night of September 8. In the morning an emissary of the Reds came to the man's wife and demanded 10,000 roubles as the price of her husband's life. They had no money put by, but by appealing to her neighbors, themselves with the scantiest of hoards, she was able to borrow 5,000. This she took to the Red committee, saying it was all she could give. They promised that her husband would be released. He was shot without trial, friends reported to her, but she could learn nothing definite, and went again to the committee to ask for news. They told her that Butokoff had been "sent

to Perm." By this time Osa knew that such an answer meant that the prisoner had been shot. The body was found in the snowfield trenches on March 14.

It was a well-established habit of the Bolsheviks to demand money for the life of the prisoner, to get the money, and then to kill the prisoner. A Tartar merchant told us of the slaying of his father. They had a little shop, and the Reds demanded and received of them 35,000 roubles—the declared price on immunity. After this they arrested and shot the father, a man of sixty; the son escaped by flight.

We had heard at Ekaterinburg that the Bolsheviks, evacuating Osa, had forced a number of girls to accompany them, the girls being chosen after a medical examination to which all females between fifteen and nineteen years were compelled to submit. At Osa, a mother, Varvara Ivanovna Kandakova, confirmed it. She told us that her daughter, employed as clerk in an Osa office, had been forced to go away with the Reds, and that she had heard definitely of other cases. The mayor of the city, Skrutkowski, declared to us that several hundred girls had been taken from the Osa district.

Similar tales of murder, rapine, and extortion were told us at the villages where we stopped between Osa and Kungur. The stories varied in little but the names of the victims—they were all part of one grim tragedy. Men were taken without provocation, killed sometimes in sight of their families and tortured until they succumbed; or their fate was kept secret, to be all too easily guessed. In one village, Yugoknovsk-Zavod, the Bolshevik committee had meetings to name those who were to be killed. This was no secret and there was no pretense of trial.

This story of Osa deals with Bolshevik violence toward inoffensive men and women, but there should be included also reference to their heralded division of property equally among all the proletariat. In point of fact, there was no such division in any of the districts we visited. In all the country thereabouts—between Osa and Kungur—the Bolsheviks had taken the land, stock, and farm implements from peasants and small owners against whom was no complaint of any sort save their modest prosperity, and given it to the hangers-on of the Red camps, the sycophants of the commissars, the rag-tag of the army. In numerous

cases, peasants had suffered the loss of all their land, without compensation.

At Yugoknovsk-Zavod we had the testimony of Nicholas Pfofonoff and Paul Tchernikoff, plain, simple men of the peasant type. Pfofonoff was chairman, and Tchernikoff, a member of the local committee to investigate Bolshevik excesses. It is perhaps needless to state that his committee was not formed until after the Bolsheviks had been driven out. Pfofonoff had hidden for seven months to escape the Reds. He told us that in his district the Bolsheviks had seized all the property of the peasants, delivering it exclusively into the hands of their own men. There was no division of property save among the Bolsheviks.

In brief, the Bolshevik administration in Perm was a military-politico campaign against property, education, religion; against homes and industry; against decency and thrift. In Yugoknovsk-Zavod there is an aged mother, Marfa Simevona Kurochkina, whose two sons were killed by the Reds. When the youngest was shot, the drunken soldier told off to finish him (he was only wounded at the first attempt) said, as he pulled the trigger a second time, "That's what you get because you're educated!" We talked to that mother. We talked to priests of the killing of thirty monks in a great monastery which sits majestically on a snow-covered mountain, visible afar from the Osa-Kungur road. This is the monastery of Billogorski. It was raided by a considerable armed force; while some of the Reds slew the monks, others looted the chapel and choir of their sacred treasures.

The story of Osa is not that of Osa alone. It is the story of many other towns and villages in eastern Russia, under the "ideal communism" preached in Moscow and Petrograd. The Osa we saw in March, 1919, is the example of Bolshevik practices.

RILEY ALLEN.

“THEM DAMNED FROGS”

BY EX-SERGEANT ALEXANDER WOOLLCOTT

WHATEVER turn is taken by international politics during the next two years, whatever the official post-bellum relations between Washington and the Government of France, the degree of understanding and the nature of the sentiment existing between our people and the French is going to be of incalculable importance in shaping the twentieth century. It is going to give the true character and the only validity to whatever documents our ministers may from time to time endorse.

That is why it is worth while to look back over the history of the A. E. F., and by so doing, to measure and search for the causes of that mutual rancor which developed between the French people and the American troops—the rancor which broke out here and there in riots (as at Brest); which made the irritated Army of Occupation lean over backwards in its affability toward the Rhinelanders; which moved *Le Rire* to some caustic cartoons at the expense of the A. E. F.; and which poured into our astonished ports a stream of returning doughboys all muttering under their breaths a disparagement of “them damned frogs.”

What was the origin of that feeling? What was its extent? How long will it last?

Perhaps it would be well first to consider two rather fixed delusions on the subject. For one thing, stay-at-home Americans have, quite pardonably, come to the easy conclusion that all the rancor could be explained by overcharging. Whenever a homecoming soldier was cross-examined because his emotions toward the French hardly seemed in the familiar and difficult key of Lafayette Day oratory, he was wont to talk vaguely of their profiteering, simply because that was the easiest explanation to give.

The real explanation lay much deeper—in most cases beyond reach not only of his powers of expression, but also of his powers of analysis.

As a matter of fact, the amount of overcharging was very slight—astonishingly slight, when one considers that there were more than two million spendthrift Americans in France, far from home, overpaid, irresponsible, and loose in an impoverished country. It is against the nature of the French peasant or shopkeeper to go in all at once for resourceful profiteering, just as it is against his nature to part lightly with a sou on which he has once laid his thrifty hands. Furthermore, both the French Government and the American Army were vigilant in the matter, so that the doughboy was not despoiled with half the unscrupulousness which would have been practised on him among his own people—certainly no more than is the average lot of the expeditionary soldier anywhere under the sun.

Not one French shopkeeper in twenty seemed to think that, with these carefree Yanks scandalously overpaid and overfed when compared with their less fortunate brothers in *horizon bleu*, he was therefore justified in squaring matters slightly by exploiting them at every opportunity. Yet the rising tide of prices the world over, and the steady dwindling of the franc, affected trade in France enough to lend some color to the rumors of exploitation, and it came to be the fashion to talk about it and magnify it in stray *buvettes* from Verdun to Bordeaux.

It was easy to fall into that fashion. I know I fell into it. I remember when our teeming transport set sail from Marseilles one afternoon in May of this year. It was a wonderful day. The Château-d'If lay in the unruffled bay like a pearl set in a plaque of turquoise. A gorgeous Marseillaise, a very Carmen in appearance, stood on the pier and threw parting oranges to the doughboys on board, threw basketful after basketful, while every eye along the rails watched the lithe turn of her splendid body, followed the brilliance of her kerchief, and reflected the flash of her smile when the M. P.'s, for some reason, tried to stop her. "Who would have thought," I ventured, "that our last sight of France would be of someone giving something away?" It won an easy laugh from the loungers within hearing. Yet surely it came contemptibly from the lips of one who, in twenty-two months of soldiering in many towns

and villages of France, had ever been treated fairly, honestly, and with kindly, simple courtesy. This paragraph is written in expiation.

Then, too, there was the delusion from which the French Government suffered—the notion that the whole source of bad feeling was the friction between the French and American staffs. There was such friction, and, during the first few weeks of the Armistice, the staff officers of the Third Army were on edge with irritation at the neighboring French command. But the emotions of a staff officer were not then and are not now of any great importance, and a tide of feeling that sweeps the ranks cannot be turned back or deflected by the handing out of decorations. It is true that the French intrusion on our area of occupation, the French disposition at least to enter every important town of ours from Luxembourg to Coblenz, and the French manner of swaggering into such a town with all bands playing, when the Americans had thought it better sportsmanship and generally more becoming in a victor not to rub it in—it is true that these things turned every American officers' mess in the Rhineland into a forum for the airing of discontent with the "frogs." The sensitive French liaison officers found how the wind was blowing, and sent in effective protests to André Tardieu and other interested parties at Paris. But the liaison officers knew not what was in the minds of the troops.

For between the troops and the French people there had been brewing for many months a mutual dislike. Does it surprise you that there could not be perfect harmony between a stricken nation and the rescuing army of its strongest Ally? Then let me say, rather, that it is astonishing how little outward friction there really was, how great was the genuine good feeling. Consider that here was a nervous, war-worn, disillusioned people, an essentially stay-at-home people that had never learned or cared to learn how to adapt themselves to the ways of outlanders, now suddenly invaded by a further two million of boisterous foreigners, who spoke a different language and lived on a different scale—a host rich in all the youth and gaiety and energy that France was only too bitterly conscious of having lost.

At best, it is as doubtful an experiment for two peoples to dwell together as it is for two people. It is doubly difficult if one of them is old and shrewd and frugal and

poor and old-fashioned, while the other is young and sentimental and gay and spendthrift and rich and modern.

I think that if the dislike developed on one side before the other, its first appearance can be traced to a certain disdain for the French which the outspoken Americans were only too wont to display. To the resulting friction, a hundred and one things contributed, of which high prices constituted the least—little things like the French truckdriver's enraging habit of driving dreamily in the middle of the road, big things like the French street-walker's unprejudiced habit of accepting a negro's attentions as affably as a white man's. Then think of the source of ill feeling there must have been in the spectacularly successful philandering of the Yankees in the villages depopulated by the call of the natives to the front.

Remember that all French cities were not hospitable. Paris, for instance, was quite disinclined to open its gates to swarms of American soldiers on leave, and they were so opened only after General Pershing's stubborn insistence. Even an American who resented the fabricated "crime waves stories" which were the result, could not help sharing some of the old Parisian's dismay, could not help echoing the prayer in Montaigne's tribute to his beloved city: "God of his mercy free her and chase all our divisions from her!"

Nor are all French cities of the sort to win the wayfarer's regard for that troubled country. Any American who has tarried even a little while in some of its sorrier sections can well understand why not every homegoing doughboy was in any mood to repeat the farewell of an earlier exile: "*Adieu, charmant pays de France!*" Indeed, much of the bewildering variations in the doughboy's report on France and the French can be ascribed to France's own infinite variety. Different parts of France, even different towns in the same part of France, are unlike to a degree without parallel in America, and without explanation to the American mind. You might expect to find differences between Le Havre and Marseilles (though Portland, Maine and Portland, Oregon, are not half so unlike) but why should such close neighbors as Ste. Ménéhould and St. Mihiel vary as night and day? Why should a hike from sour Bar-le-duc to nearby St. Dizier strike the startled wayfarer as a walk from Purgatory to Paradise?

A Frenchman visiting these intriguing *Etats-Unis*

would, if he liked the people of Geneva, N. Y., also find himself at home in Bixby, Arizona, or in Winston-Salem in La Caroline du Nord. But an American who knows only the sweet languor and friendly folk of Avignon does not know how chilling an experience it can be to settle down even for a season in such a sink-hole as *Éfize-la-bruléé*, or to know the French only through the rather forbidding samples who make up the citizenry of *Meaux*. So an American who was stationed in *Coulommiers* would come away with fond memories of a cheery, hospitable people he could not possibly have cherished had his service overseas kept him a few kilometers to the East among the drab streets and long faces of *La Fère Champenoise*.

The reason why French communities have such pronounced personalities and have grown so far apart is, of course, because, for several thousand years, there has been little coming and going from one to the other. Your true Frenchman lives and dies within the village where he was born, and if he ever embarks on such an adventure as a journey to the village over the hill, he considers it well worth talking about over his dominoes for the next thirty years. The good folk who dwell in *Hattonchatel* (and whose ancestors probably dwelt there before Caesar started the fashion of laying siege to Paris) can see the steep slope of our *Montsec* from the square beside the monastery in their own hilltop village. But how many have ever made the day's walk to *Montsec*? Not one in a hundred. Kin of the *d'Arc* family still live in sheltered, drowsy *Domremy*. It took the tremendous pressure of an aroused public opinion to force *Tartarin* out of *Tarascon*. It is easy to see how the French towns have taken on each its separate character, and how you can no more say, without qualification, "France and the French are lovable," than you can say all men are lovable or all food palatable. Parts of France, many parts, are, I think, more winning than any place under the sun. Other parts are repellent. Had I known *St. Nazaire* alone and not *Soissons*, I too, might have cursed the "damned frogs." The tourist who has been to Paris and Avignon, and who has done the *château* country in a motor-car, doesn't know the France the doughboy knew, doesn't know the France pictured in the letter of a machine-gun captain I want to quote, a letter worth pondering because, within

it, there are the clues to so much of all the friction that developed. The captain wrote :

My battalion was billeted for four months in a small town not far from Dijon. Last November we marched down from the Argonne, a distance of 150 miles. The town has perhaps three hundred people altogether. A tourist might tell you that it was picturesque, but things have a rather different aspect when viewed from the tonneau of a limousine or from the first floor of an old barn, and whatever else it might have been, it certainly was darned uncomfortable. Our battalion, about 1,000 strong, found themselves confronted with roofs that leaked and doors that seeped, with cooties and with mud, with endless inspections and drills, fatigues and marches, with rain for 53 (actual count) consecutive days, to say nothing of a shortage of fuel, a lack of lights and few amusements. I think any fair-minded person would agree that obviously the thing to do was to drown your troubles in *vin blanc*, and although I must say the men behaved remarkably well, still, there was all the drinking that the Army pay allows, and the things incident to it.

We stole honey and rabbits, smashed windows, tore up doors for firewood, shot wild boars with service rifles, with wonderful disregard for the safety of the French civique, and once in a while would start a killing party, which fortunately, never killed anyone, although some poilus told me they thought it safer at the front. Aside from these things, there were the necessary evils incident to occupation—i. e., increased prices, ruined roads, and the general wear and tear.

Yet in spite of all these things, in spite of the fact that we had run over their town roughshod, there was not a woman in the town who did not cry when we marched away. The cynic will say that they were thinking of the 60,000 francs we spent there each month, but I think it was more than that. Big, sunny, exuberant Yanks—as carefree and cheerful as school boys—how could any one, let alone the kindly French people, help liking them? You cannot tell me that the one desire of these peasants of Yonne was to see us go—no, not by a good deal. With all our faults, they loved us still, and with all our talk there are lots of us who have learned to love the French.

Also, of course there was always present as an irritant the abiding difference between the French and the American point of view about the war. It was inevitable that the high-pitched, rose-strewn, arm-in-arm fraternity with which the first American contingent was received in Paris could scarcely have maintained. You might as well expect Caruso always to sing high C, a feat which would prove not only physically impossible to him but extremely monotonous to his audience. Many arriving transports, however, came keyed to expect some such pleasant welcome, and were disconcerted by the routine absence of any demonstration. Then, when a little friction would arise, here or there, perhaps a squabble over the bill for

deux oeufs sur-le-plat or a scrimmage over the last remaining seat in a second-class compartment,—the doughboy would feel, and very likely say, that the frogs were ungrateful.

And the frogs,—who coldly resent being so called, anyway,—saw absolutely no reason why they should be grateful to the Americans. If anything, they considered that the shoe was on the other foot. To the mussy, battered old poilu, sitting in the corner of his smoky, smelly *buvette* and listening to a stalwart young American proclaim that America had won the war and saved the world, there must have risen a vision always of a lost brother, a mutilated *copain*, a million wooden crosses which told him who did most to save the world.

By the time the Armistice was signed, the French had grown weary of being slowly “saved” by England and America—unutterably weary of forever being called the “guardians at the frontier of freedom,” and then being left to do all the guarding. As the French never forgave England for taking and holding so little of the line during the first three years of the war, so they never quite forgave America for holding back so long. If, as all Frenchmen believed from the first, and as in time, most Americans came to see, it was as much to America’s interest as to France’s that the German plan should be checked, then the French could see no reason why the Americans should not have entered the lists from the start. The Frenchman was thankful when America came, keenly appreciative of the quality of American aid when it did come, and thoroughly aware that that aid had turned the scales. But he also knew that the youth of his own country would not all have had to be spent had America come quickly. The American thought of the few magnificent troops that were flung into the breach at Château-Thierry and talked of “saving France.” The Frenchman thought of the bitter acres before Verdun, and knew who saved America.

This feeling found no expression in the months of battle. The poilu was too polite and too politic to give it voice. But it is small wonder that it was blurted out occasionally in the trying weeks of negotiation after the peace delegates assembled—as it was, for instance, on a cover of *Le Rire*, where a cartoon showed the poilu on guard at the Rhine, on the other side of which a shadowy but gigantic ogre

crouched ominous. Large, hearty, cheery, a Yank was bidding farewell to the little man in faded *horizon bleu*.

“Good bye, Poilu,” the Yank was saying. “And if that fellow comes back across the river, just you send for me and, after waiting for three years, I’ll run over and help you.”

Which expresses, if not the French national viewpoint, at least the French irritation at the American’s bland ignoring of the French side of it. There was provocation enough for such lampoons, Heaven knows. I remember the fatuous colonel commanding the troops returning on one voyage of a commandeered French liner. He was properly indignant at the absolutely inedible meat which the French cooks were dishing out for our boys. He descended majestically into the ship’s kitchen and made a ringing speech to those cooks. He asked them with a flourish what they meant by feeding such stuff to the soldiers who had “saved their country for them.”

But none of all this—not the exasperations of the French viewpoint on the war, not the chilling reception from this or that French town, not the dismal memory of any particular town, were really in the back of the soldier’s mind when he called the French “the damned frogs.” The young American dislikes the Frenchman because he is not clean.

In the evil-smelling French villages, with their medieval notions of sanitation, their heaps of long-undisturbed manure, the Yankee felt that he was in a country scarcely worth saving; nor did the months of fog and rain in such ghastly spots as Brest and Blois and St. Aignan reveal France in a more appealing light. Many sympathized with the darkey soldier who swore that all he had seen in France was mud and kilometers.

To some, of course, the very age of the country commended it. To some, the sight of Nantes and Tours and Angers stirred old memories, and there was ever an exultation in the very thought: “I am in France.” But not many Americans had an historical sense to bring over with them in their barrack bags. A relish for the quaint is not widespread in a democratic army.

For the most of the A. E. F., there was no softening veil of sentiment drawn across France, and it might as well be said plainly that the average American was scandalized at the personal uncleanness of the average Frenchman,

appalled at his indifference to the dentist and his unfamiliarity with the tooth-brush. Young America is clean. The difference in this between an American camp and a French camp was startling. The campaign of education in the matter of cleanliness which our public-schools have made in routine fashion these many years has borne fruit in a generation of bathers and toothbrushers such as even Harrow and Eton and Rugby could not outdo.

It was an army made up of youth intolerant in these matters that entered Rhennish Prussia and found it dotted with well-kept, broad-walked, towns, lively with modern and enterprising shopwindows. Above all, they found it clean. Then, on all sides, the doughboys could be heard saying: "These people are more like us. We like them better than we do the French." Whereat the French were hurt, worried, perplexed.

It would, however, be a mistake to think this physical kinship deeper than it was, or not to recognize that the fellowship of the liberty-loving peoples of France and America is a deeper and more permanent thing. The Americans share the same sewage system with the Germans: with the French, they share the same ideals and cast of political thought. The things which made the Germans and the Army of Occupation dwell in harmony were the purely physical things which count most when two people are trying to live together in the same house. The things that bind the French and the Americans are matters of the spirit, and it is these which, I hope and believe, will count as the years pass by.

So I am glad that the legend of French exploitation took possession of the A. E. F. and that the troops were moved to assign all their rancor to it. Because, when they came back to prices far more staggering, it left them a little sheepish, a little remorseful, and opened the door of their hearts for readmission there of such sneaking fondness for the French as they may have had. Most soldiers, at one time or another, swore at the frogs. Many of them already can say with Laertes:

Yet now, I must confess, that duty done,
My thoughts and wishes bend again toward France.

ALEXANDER WOOLLCOTT.

THE DUTY OF A WAR PENSION

BY MAJOR JOHN L. TODD

(LATELY A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF PENSION COMMISSIONERS FOR CANADA.)

ALL democratic peoples hold that war is a social risk, When a social unit, a nation, is at war, each of its citizens is equally affected, equally liable for public service. Those who give public service do so not for themselves alone but for the society of which they are a part. Therefore, each citizen should share equally in the suffering which war brings to his nation. War may make citizens suffer in property or in person. Compensation for property loss lies outside the province of a war pension. A war pension compensates only for personal detriment.

To secure good pension law and its proper administration we must fortify and guide our desire to deal fairly with fighting men by understanding what should be done for them and the manner and cost of doing it. The bill is a heavy one. Its payment will be a burden. In Canada, war pensions, apart from other benefits of similar intention, already cost each Canadian four dollars a year.

A pension is but part of the compensation which is provided by the State on behalf of those who have suffered in their persons by death or disablement. Additional compensation is given in other ways. War disabilities, whether they appear during service or after discharge, are made as small as may be by medical and surgical treatment and by the use of artificial limbs or other appliances. Men who, by their disabilities, are unable to follow ordinary employment, are taught, in schools, shops, and soldiers' settlements the vocation for which they are best fitted. Assistance in obtaining suitable employment in industry, agriculture or commerce, is given to individuals not only through employment agencies but by loans. By these measures, the economic effect of personal disablement and of the loss of

habits occasioned through absence at the war are minimized. Similarly, training and opportunity of employment are offered for the dependents of men who have died. These things, in varying degree, are being done by each of the nations. That they are being done by peoples differing greatly in tradition and organization is a striking witness to their necessity and appropriateness.

War pension money is, then, a part of the compensation provided by a community for those of its citizens who have suffered personal detriment during war service. A war pension is not paid because of ordinary or exceptionally gallant services given in war; naval and military pay and allowances do that. A war pension does not compensate for economic loss through destruction of property, or interruption of business. A war pension compensates only for detriment, bodily or mental, to the persons of those who serve their country in war. The peace-time pensions of professional sailors and soldiers have a different basis. They are a part of the remuneration provided by the terms of their engagement in the Navy or Army.

A war pension is money owed to a *sailor*, *soldier* or his *dependents* because of his *disablement* or *death*. The object of the pension is to ensure for the pensioner and his dependents *maintenance* which he is unable to provide. That statement seems simple; but it leaves many things undecided. Let us ask ourselves questions suggested by the words printed in italics.

Who is "a soldier"? Should not those who were injured by hostile action while serving with the Y. M. C. A., or with the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, receive pensions? Yet they are neither sailors nor soldiers.

Who are "dependents"? Are all whom a soldier supported, or whom he would support were he able to do so, eligible for a dependent's pension? Or, are pensions to be refused to those who are not nearly related to him or are able to support themselves? At present, the tendency is to pay pensions, without question, to all whose actual dependency on a soldier can be shown to exist.

Must disablement or death, to give right to pension, be the direct result of naval or military service? It is often difficult, even during a man's service—sometimes it is impossible—to determine whether a casualty is or is not the result of that service. The difficulty is the greater since,

after a man's discharge, a disability, caused by events which occurred during his service, may appear or be increased. Because of these difficulties, unless death or disablement is caused by a man's own deliberate wrongdoing, most nations grant pensions for all who die or are disabled during their war service. A strong reason for doing so is the national desirability of ensuring a healthy home to every worthy citizen and his family; by his service is proved the quality of a soldier's citizenship.

What standard of maintenance does pension provide? The standard of maintenance which pension should ensure is, by most nations, considered to be that decent comfort for himself and his family which the labor of an unskilled but healthy and willing man can always secure in the general market for labor such as his. It is a wise decision. That standard of decent comfort makes it certain that the homes of former sailors and soldiers can be those of efficient citizens.

In war, public service may be required from every citizen. The accident of vocational skill, or of private income, or of military rank, should make no difference in the amount of pension paid to each of two former civilians who, drafted for service under the same law, while advancing side by side, suffer identical injuries from a single shell. Like disabilities entitle to like pension. In estimating pension ability the degree of injury to the soldier's person alone is considered—not his earning power or his manner of living as a civilian. Apart from its undesirability, the administrative difficulties of basing pensionability on earning power or on former habits are insurmountable. Actual attempts, in many cases, have shown it to be impossible to do so; on this continent few men have permanently settled occupations; again, it is not possible to determine what young soldiers who were students or apprentices would have earned had they not been disabled. The United States has decided that there shall be but one standard of maintenance for pensioned men, officers and privates alike. The United States is alone in giving a like pension for a like disability to men of all military ranks; in other countries, an Officer receives a larger pension than does a Private who suffers from an identical injury. In some cases, this is so because the Officer's higher pension is looked on as an incentive to good work and as a reward

for responsibilities borne; in others, because it is rightly held that officers and their dependents must receive the higher pensions to which they are entitled by the terms under which they engaged in the service.

What pension law should do is clear. It should distribute the cost of personal injuries so that no one of us may bear more than his share of the hardships which the death and maiming of thousands have brought to our people. The purpose of war pensions is to insure the individual against personal war risks; we all want the policies to be paid. The intention is simple. But the questions which have just been asked and, in part, answered, indicate that the drafting and administration of a law which will accomplish the effect desired are matters of great and detailed difficulty.

Let us, while bearing in mind all that has been said, re-read the definition of a pension and discuss points, suggested by it, which most require consideration.

War pensions—war risk insurance against personal injury—is an extension to the risks of war of loss-distributing methods familiar in ordinary business. Through war pensions, the joint responsibility of all citizens to share in damages incurred by individual citizens while giving war service is recognized. In doing so, the community of interest and interdependence of each citizen in a commonwealth is again acknowledged. That community of interest is especially felt in closely-organized communities. Consequently, it is especially in the Old World that nations provide both pensions against the risks of war and, against the risks of peace, State Insurance for death and ill-health.

Because it is often impossible to decide whether a disability is due to the risks of a soldier's war service or to the accustomed risks of existence which continue during his service, pensions are usually paid for all disabilities incurred during service. It is logical to do so in countries where State insurance against ill-health and death exist. The United States' system of War Risk Insurance—War Pensions—has a similar tendency. It differs from other pension systems in the arrangement by which a soldier, who is always protected against war risks by an adequate pension, may purchase insurance against death and disablement at normal rates. The insurance protects him both during his service and after his discharge. The plan is a sound one.

It presents a means by which those who are accustomed to a high standard of living may arrange for an income larger than an ordinary pension in the event of their being disabled or killed; and it obviates the difficulties which often make it impossible to decide whether a casualty, appearing during service or after discharge, is or is not the result of war risk.

The difficulty of doing otherwise makes it justifiable to accept all detriments affecting a soldier during his service as being due to war risks, and to pay pension in compensation for them. It is not justifiable to do so after his discharge. Yet protection for discharged men must be provided against disabilities and death, the result of war risks, which may appear after service is ended. That protection may be provided by war pension, by insurance services, or by both.

It has been suggested that it should be possible, at a soldier's discharge, to make an estimate of any reduced expectation of life or of any increased susceptibility to ill-health and accident, and to pay him a proportionately increased pension. It cannot be done. To attempt to do so would place a task of prophecy, impossible of fulfillment, upon the physicians and surgeons appointed to make the estimate. Attempts to protect men by pension against war-caused detriment appearing after discharge are hampered by the impossibility of determining whether some disabling conditions do or do not result from service. Disagreement and dissatisfaction are, therefore, inevitable under a system which attempts to do so. If the attempt is made, pensions will be granted in all doubtful cases as well as through political pressure in some that are not doubtful; and public money will be paid to men who suffer from disabilities in no wise connected with their service. It is simpler, and cheaper, to pension men at discharge for disabilities then apparent in them and to offer them insurance at normal rates against the appearance of additional disabilities.

Insurance may be given either by the Government or by private companies. In whatever way it is provided, disabled men should be able to purchase appropriately limited amounts of insurance against life risks and industrial or personal accident at normal rates, irrespective of any lessened expectation of life or of greater susceptibility to ill-health or accident which may exist in them. The body

administering pensions must be closely in touch with the administration of any insurance service provided for men after their discharge. Indeed, since war pensions are State insurance against war risks, war risk insurance might well be grouped with all other forms of State-provided personal insurance under a single administrative body.

Proved dependency, almost invariably, should entitle to pension. Legal right to support often fails to indicate those whom a pensioner would support; experience shows that many soldiers have never been legally married to the wives whom they maintain. To prevent abuse, some pension laws prohibit the granting of pensions to certain categories of persons. As a rule, such prohibitions are unwise. There are always exceptional cases in which a prohibition works hardship, unless exceptional means of giving relief are provided.

To illustrate this point let us consider three cases. In order to prevent brothers and sisters who are able to support themselves from claiming dependency, it has been held that pensions should not be paid to brothers and sisters who have reached adult age. This would prevent pension from being granted to the crippled sister of a sergeant, killed in the war, who had supported her until she was 35 and had enlisted believing that a pension would safeguard her should he die. In order to prevent pensioners who are nearing death from being married to secure pension for a surviving widow, it has been held that women who marry a man subsequent to the incurrence of his disability should not be pensionable if that disability subsequently causes her husband's death. This would deny pension to a woman who married a legless pensioner and bore him children, if he died after an operation necessitated by a recurrence of inflammation in his stump. His widow and children would receive no pension; but their husband and father died as a result of injuries incurred in the war. In order to prevent parents who should be able to support themselves from claiming dependence, it has been held that pension should not be payable to parents of pensioners who are already receiving pension for a wife and children. This would prevent a disabled man from giving his father and mother the hospitality which the fireside of a sound man can always offer aged parents. The factors which influence the establishment of dependency are too varied to

be reduced to definitions. Exceptions, where hardships would be inflicted, are certain to result from any attempt to do so. It is better to adopt a general principle—to decide that, where dependency is proved, pension is payable, and to secure the wise application of that principle by an efficient administration of pension law.

The pension paid to disabled men varies in amount in accordance with the degree of disability existing in them. In estimating the degree of a disability, no consideration is given to a man's age, previous earnings, or specialized technical ability. Consideration is given only to the pension applicant's inability to do things which he is unable to do because of events occurring during his service. The physical and mental condition of a sailor or soldier is established by medical examinations made at his enlistment, at his discharge, and whenever it is necessary to do so for pension purposes. At these examinations the extent of any disability is estimated. In order to assist and guide the physicians and surgeons who estimate the extent of disabilities, Disability Tables have been drafted. These tables are based upon the practice of old pension administrations, upon judgments from all parts of the world in industrial accident cases, and upon experience of what has actually happened to men disabled in civilian life who, thrown on their own resources, have attempted to maintain themselves by their own labor. The material upon which the tables are based is insufficient. Some of the values given in the tables are certainly wrong. Nevertheless, as a whole, the tables are reliable. They are essential in order to secure uniformity among surgeons in their estimation of the degrees of disability resulting from identical injuries.

The values given in a Disability Table should be based, not upon precedent, but upon the actual experience by each pensioning nation of exactly what men suffering from given disabilities can do. To secure sound values, the Disability Table should be maintained by the pensioning authority and be corrected, as necessity arose, in accordance with actual experience of the success in civil life of disabled pensioners. As has been said, some of the values given by existing tables are certainly wrong. For example, a man who loses one eye does not lose half of his capacity; it is wrong to say that the loss of one eye entails a disability of 50%. An estimate of 20% would be more nearly accurate.

The nature and combinations of injuries may vary infinitely. Consequently, no Table of Disabilities can give a percentage of disability for every possible injury or combination of injuries. In a Disability Table, certain injuries, such as the loss of both eyes, both arms, both legs, are taken as being totally disabling; they are listed as entailing a disability of 100 per cent. Less grave injuries, such as the whole or partial loss of use of an eye, or of an arm, or of a leg, cause disabilities of less than 100 per cent. To say that an injury produces a disability of 100 per cent, means that it produces a disability equivalent to that caused by the loss of, let us say, two legs. It does not mean that the man who is said to be totally disabled is unable to work and to contribute to his own support. Most blind men earn little or nothing; therefore, blindness is said to cause a disability of 100 per cent. Exceptionally, by determination and industry, a blind man earns much. The exceptional income earned by a disabled man of exceptional merit is his. That he earns it is not considered in the estimation of his disability; the percentage of total disability present in him is determined, in accordance with the Disability Table, by the extent of the inability to do things occasioned by his damaged body and mind. If he earns in spite of his disability, his earnings are the reward of his exceptional industry and determination, and his pension is uninfluenced by them.

When the extent of a disability, or combination of disabilities, not stated in the Disability Table is estimated, a comparison is made between the inability to do things entailed by some injury named in the list and by the injury which is in question. By that comparison, an estimate of the percentage of disability existing in the case under consideration is arrived at. The extent of the disability at first caused by a given injury diminishes when the injured man becomes accustomed—accommodated—to his injury. For example, the absence of an arm entails a greater percentage of disability during the first months after the loss than it does later. Similarly, the pensions awarded at first for many disabilities are later reduced. Men who are past middle-age and those of unadaptable temperament sometimes cannot accommodate themselves to their disabled condition or do not do so as rapidly as is done by the average man; cautious consideration must be given to this fact

in making allowance for the period of accommodation.

In estimating for pension purposes the *extent of disability* resulting from a war injury, the damage done to the body and mind of the pension claimant is alone considered; consideration is not given to the loss of earning power resulting from the injury. In estimating, for the administration of a Workmen's Compensation Act, the extent of disability existing in a man injured in an industrial accident, consideration is given, in determining the *amount of compensation* to be paid, to the past and possible future earnings of the injured man. In the administration of pensions, the number of dollars as pension for total disability is set by the accepted standard of decent comfort. The physician, in estimating the extent of the disability existing in an applicant for pension, considers only the amount of incapacity produced in the human machine which he is examining by the injuries which it has received. Sound men are able to do many things. If a man is disabled, one or more of his abilities is lost, or lessened. It is for the loss, or lessening, of ability to walk, to handle, to see, to hear, and so on, that pensions are paid. There is an obligation upon a disabled man, as upon all citizens, to use the ability which remains to him. That ability, coupled with a pension compensating for his disability, permits the pensioner to obtain the decent comfort for himself and his dependents which it is the intention of pension law to secure to him. An injury disables either through making the performance of a normal action impossible, or through making it inadvisable for a man to engage in certain occupations: watch-making is impossible for a man without hands; it is inadvisable for a man with a damaged heart to engage in heavy labor, or for one whose disfigurement is repulsive to act as a salesman.

If a disability is wilfully self-inflicted, pension is not payable. Society owes nothing to a man who has made himself an inefficient soldier or citizen by his own deliberate, unsocial action. Similarly, if a man refuses to accept reasonably undangerous and unpainful treatment by which his disability may be removed or reduced, he should receive no pension. The removable disability persists through his refusal to accept appropriate treatment. Nevertheless, for social reasons, it is desirable that relief should be given to the necessitous dependents of a man to whom pension is refused for these reasons.

Conceivably, disabilities might be arranged according to their severity in an infinite number of gradations; actually, the degree of an injured man's detriment is estimated in percentages of total disability. The hundred grades so set are, for convenience of administration, usually grouped in fives; and though disabilities vary, they receive a pension of the same class unless there is a difference of five per cent between them. If classes covering a range of less than five per cent are established, administration becomes meticulous and irksome; if a greater range is used, men with too obviously unequal disabilities receive equal pensions.

If a totally disabled man requires the constant or periodical services of an attendant, an allowance for assistance is made to him for that purpose, and is added to his pension.

The amount of money which will secure decent comfort for a totally disabled man can be determined, from time to time, with sufficient accuracy by referring to existing costs of living. The object of the pension is to ensure to pensioners homes which will permit those living in them to be efficient citizens. In a sound community, a healthy laborer, without any special ability, can provide such a home for himself and his family. Therefore, the object of a pension will be obtained by a sound community if the amount of the pension paid to a totally disabled man, who is presumably unable to contribute to his own maintenance, is equal to the remuneration which a healthy laborer commands. If a Government pays, from the taxes of its citizens, a sum greater than this to soldiers by way of pensions, it makes of them a privileged class. It makes of them a class who live at a higher standard than do the majority of those whose taxes support them. Under such an arrangement, a civilian becomes a helot; helotism is healthy for no State.

Since the number of dollars which will purchase the things—food, shelter, clothing, education, and recreation—necessary for decent comfort varies, from time to time, it is necessary that the amount given to a totally disabled pensioner should be revised periodically in accordance with changes in the cost of living. In determining the cost of living, a general average of the whole community should be taken and the amount of pension should be based neither

upon the highest cost of living in a large city nor upon the lowest cost in a backward rural area.

The pensions paid by some of the Allied nations are insufficient to secure a decent livelihood for men who left their recently-made American homes to fight in the armies of their motherland and are now returning disabled. The pensions paid by Canada and the United States are more than sufficient to secure decent comfort to those who leave this continent to become permanent residents of places where living is cheaper than it is here. It would be in accordance with the principles on which pension law is founded if we increased the pensions of those pensioners of Allied countries who are resident with us to the amount which is considered necessary to secure decent comfort for our own men. Conversely, the amount of pension paid to our pensioners who leave us to live elsewhere should be reduced to an amount sufficient to secure decent comfort in the place of their residence.

In a country which accepts the majority of its citizens' voices as the highest authority, the power of final decision must remain with the elected representatives of the people. But, under a form of government which permits the pressure of personal interest to be exerted immediately upon administrators, it is often advisable to place officials responsible for the execution of a definite public service beyond the effect of any influence which might tend to deflect them from an exact realization of the responsibility entrusted to them. Also, where prompt action is the essence of efficient service, as it is with pensions, it has been found advisable to entrust the administration of important public matters to hands that are untrammelled by the red tape of governments. For these reasons, war pensions should be the province of an important administrative and advisory body of Commissioners. The functions of the Commissioners are, in part, judicial. As for Judges, the terms of their appointment should secure in them understanding and impartiality.

A Board of three Commissioners appointed to administer war pensions should be formed of pensioners who have given distinguished war service. They should be made independent of partisan control by sufficient remuneration and by making them revokable only by joint action of both Legislative Houses. The Board's authority over all

questions of pensions administration should be absolute. While the making of law is the function of legislative bodies, the Pension Commissioners should be consulted and their advice should be heard before any measure affecting pensions becomes law. In order that as little as possible may be left to their unguided decision, they should recommend to the Government for enactment, as it becomes possible to do so, concrete legislation which their codified experience has shown them to be necessary. The Board should, as necessity arose, and guided always by the intention expressed in the general principles of pension law, recommend changes in the Disability Table and in the amount of pension made necessary by variation in the cost of the standard of living accepted as constituting decent comfort. By such an arrangement the needs of pensioners would always receive prompt relief from appropriate laws.

In the administration of pensions the Commissioners must be supported by a law permitting the imposition of severe penalties for attempted pension fraud. In order to make certain that the money paid to a pensioner as the head of his family, or, if he is dead, paid to his dependents, is fulfilling the purposes for which it is granted and is providing the decent comfort for which it is adequate, pensioners should be visited periodically. If the money is being improperly spent its proper expenditure should be made certain. If necessary, guardians for minors and incompetents should be appointed or actual assistance and instruction be given to those whose failure to secure decent comfort is due to avoidable causes, such as ignorance and household mismanagement. Prompt and acceptable service of this nature can only be given through local organizations. Branch offices of the Pension Board should have an intimate knowledge of their field and employ professional social service workers; those who give assistance and instruction in social matters must receive professional training in their work exactly as a nurse receives training in the care of those who are ill. The visitors and social service workers of branch pension offices must be prepared to do everything from straightening out a matrimonial tangle to finding a job or nursing a baby! Since it may be necessary to consider such intimate details of family life, pensions administration can be satisfactory only if a wide measure of responsibility is vested in the local agents who actually come in contact

with pensioners. Nevertheless, while immediate action should often be taken upon decisions made locally, all local action must be subject to the control of a central office where the power of veto and final decision must always remain. It is only through such a control that uniformity and impartiality can be secured in the administration of pensions.

While pension is the most familiar of the methods by which returning sailors and soldiers are assured an independent position in civilian life, it is but one of the measures established for that purpose. From the nature of its functions, the body administering pensions must be in constant touch with pensioners long after their daily dependence upon departments giving them medical attention, vocational training, or assistance in finding employment has ceased. For that reason, it is advisable that all of the agencies by which the community liquidates its debt to those who died or have been disabled in the war, should gradually pass to the administrative control of the body administering pensions. The word "all" is used advisedly. In some countries, private and semi-official societies publicly solicit subscriptions and distribute assistance to persons who suffered in the war and who cannot, under existing laws, be relieved by governmental pensioning bodies. Such a situation is inadmissible. There is no place for private charity in a plan of relief for war-caused hardship.

JOHN L. TODD.

CHAPTERS OF ROOSEVELT'S LIFE—IV

By WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER
PROMETHEUS BOUND

THE event which put Roosevelt's patriotism to the final test, and, as it proved, evoked all his great qualities in a last display, was the outbreak of the atrocious World War in August, 1914. By the most brutal assault in modern times, Germany, and her lackey ally, Austria, without notice, overran Belgium and Northeastern France, and devastated Serbia. The other countries, especially the United States, were too startled at first to understand either the magnitude or the possible implications of this war. On August 18th, President Wilson issued the first of his many variegated messages, in which he gave this warning: "We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another." He added that his first thought was of America.

Any one who analyzed his message carefully must have wondered how it was possible, in the greatest moral issue which had ever been thrust before the world's judgment, to remain impartial "even in thought" between good and evil.

But the masses did not reason. They used his admonition to remain neutral "even in thought" to justify them in not having any great anxiety as to who was right and who wrong; and they interpreted his concern for "America first" as authorizing them to go about their affairs and profit as much as they could by the warlike conditions. Some of us, indeed, took an opposite view. We saw that the conflict, if fought to a finish, would decide whether Democracy or Despotism should rule the earth. We felt that the United States, the vastest, strongest, and most pop-

ulous Republic in the world, pledged to uphold Democracy, should throw itself at once on the side of the European nations which were struggling, against great odds, to save Democracy from the most atrocious of despots. Inevitably, we were regarded as incorrigible idealists whose suggestions ran counter to etiquette and were, after all, crazy.

For several years, Roosevelt had been a contributing editor of the *Outlook*, and although his first instinct, when the Germans ravished Belgium, was to protest and then, if necessary, to follow up our protest by a show of force, he wrote in the *Outlook* an approval of our taking immediately a neutral attitude. Still, he did not let this preclude stern action later. "Neutrality," he said, "may be of prime necessity to maintain peace . . . but we pay the penalty of this action on behalf of peace for ourselves, and possibly for others in the future, by forfeiting our right to do anything on behalf of peace for the Belgians at present." Three years afterwards these sentences of his were unearthed by his enemies and flung against him; but his dominant purpose, from the start, was too well known for any one to accuse him of inconsistency. He assumed, when President Wilson issued his impartial "even in thought" message, that the President must have some secret diplomatic information which would vindicate it.

As the months went on, however, it became clear to him that Mr. Wilson was pursuing towards the European War the same policy of contradictions,—of brief paroxysms of boldness, followed by long periods of lassitude, which had marked his conduct of our relations towards the Mexican bandits. He saw only too well, also, into what ignoble depths this policy led us. Magnificent France, throttled Belgium, England willing but not yet ready, devastated Serbia, looked to us for sympathy and help, and all the sympathy they got came from private persons in America, and of help there was none. Meanwhile, the Germans undermined and gangrened the American people. Every ship brought over their slyest and most unscrupulous propagandists, who coöperated with the despicable German professors and other agents already planted here, and opened the sewers of their doctrines. Their spies began to go up and down the land, without check. Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, assumed to play with the Adminis-

tration at Washington as a cat might play with half a score of mice, feeling sure that he could devour them when he chose. A European gentleman, who came from a neutral country, and called on Bernstorff in April, 1915, told me that when he asked the Ambassador how he got on with the United States, he replied: "Very well, indeed; we pay no attention to the Government, but go ahead and do what we please." Within a fortnight, the sinking of the *Lusitania* showed that Bernstorff had not boasted idly.

Roosevelt understood the harm which the German conspiracy was doing among our people, not only by polluting their ideals, but actually by strengthening the coils which the propagandists had been winding to strangle at the favorable moment American independence itself. We discovered then that the process of Germanization had been going on secretly during twenty years. Since England was the chief enemy in the way of German world domination, the German-Americans laid themselves out to render the English odious here. And they worked to such good purpose that the legal officers of the Administration admonished the American people that the English, in holding up merchant vessels laden with cargoes for Germany, committed breaches against international law which were quite as heinous as the sinking by German submarines of ships laden with American non-combatants. They magnified the loss of a cargo of perishable food and set it against the ferocious destruction of neutral human beings. Senator Lodge, however, expressed the clear thought and right feeling of Americans when he said that we were more moved by the thought of the corpse of an innocent victim of the Hun submarines than by that of a bale of cotton.

These enormities, these sins of omission and commission, of which Roosevelt declared our Government guilty, amazed and exasperated him, and from the beginning of 1915 onward, he set himself three tasks: He wished to expose and circumvent German machinations over here. Next, he deemed it a pressing duty to rouse our country to the recognition that we must prepare at once for war. He saw, as every other sensible person saw, that as the conflict grew more terrible in Europe and spread into Asia and Africa, we should be drawn into it, and that therefore we must make ready. He seconded the plan of General

Leonard Wood to organize a camp for volunteers at Plattsburg and other places; and what that plan accomplished in fitting American soldiers to meet and vanquish the Kaiser's best troops, has since been proved. President Wilson, however, would not officially countenance any preparation which, so far as the public was allowed to know his reasons, might be taken by the Germans as an unfriendly act. Finally, Roosevelt labored unceasingly to revive and make militant the ideals of true Americanism.

That the Germans accurately gauged that President Wilson would not sanction any downright vigorous action against them, was sufficiently proved on May 7, 1915, when German submarines torpedoed and sunk, at two o'clock in the afternoon, the British passenger steamship *Lusitania*, eastward bound, a few miles south of the Point of Kinsale on the Irish coast. With her went down nearly thirteen hundred persons, all of them non-belligerents and more than one hundred of them American men, women and children. This atrocious crime the Germans committed out of their stupid miscalculation of the motives which govern non-German peoples. They thought that the British and Americans would be so terrorized that they would no longer dare to cross the ocean. The effect was, of course, just the opposite. A cry of horror swept over the civilized world, and swiftly upon it came a great demand for punishment and retribution.

Then was the moment for President Wilson to break off diplomatic relations with Germany. The very day after the waters of the British Channel had closed over the innocent victims, President Wilson made an address in which he announced that "a nation may be too proud to fight." The country gasped for breath when it read those words, which seemed to be the official statement of the President of the United States that foreign nations might outrage, insult, and degrade this nation with impunity, because, as the rabbit retires into its hole, so we would burrow deep into our pride and show neither resentment nor sense of honor. As soon as possible, word came from the White House that, as the President's speech had been written before the sinking of the *Lusitania*, his remarks had no bearing on that atrocity. Perhaps the most amazing piece of impudence in Germany's long list was the formal visit

described by the newspapers which the German Ambassador, Bernstorff, paid to Mr. Bryan, the Secretary of State, to present to our Government the official condolence of Germany and himself at this painful happening. Bernstorff, we know now, planned the sinking, and gave the German Government notice by wireless just where the submarines could best destroy the *Lusitania* on that Friday afternoon.

Ten days later, Mr. Wilson sent a formal protest to Germany in which he recalled "the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial German Government in matters of international right, and particularly in regard to the freedom of the seas"; and he professed to have "learned to recognize the German views and the German influence in the field of international obligation as always engaged upon the side of justice and humanity."

Three years later I asked Roosevelt what he would have done, if he had been President in May, 1915. He said, in substance, that, as soon as he had read in the New York newspaper¹ the advertisement which Bernstorff had inserted warning all American citizens against taking passage on the *Lusitania*, he would have sent for Bernstorff and asked him whether the advertisement was officially acknowledged by him. Even Bernstorff, arch-liar that he was, could not have denied it. "I should then have sent to the Department of State to prepare his passports; I should have handed them to him and said, 'You will sail on the *Lusitania* yourself next Friday; an American guard will see you on board, and prevent your coming ashore.' The breaking off of diplomatic relations with Germany," Roosevelt added, "would probably have meant war, and we were horribly unprepared. But better war, than submission to a humiliation which no President of this country has ever before allowed; better war a thousand times, than to let the Germans go on really making war upon us at sea, and honeycombing the American people with plots on land, while our Government shamelessly lavishes praise on the criminal for his justice and humanity and virtually begs his pardon."

Thus believed Roosevelt in the *Lusitania* crisis, and many others agreed with him.

¹ The advertisement was printed in the New York Times of April 23, 1915.

President Wilson's apologists assert that the country was not ready for him to take any resolute attitude towards Germany in May, 1915. They argue that if he had attempted to do so there would have been great internal dissension, perhaps even civil war, and especially that the German sections would have opposed preparations for war so stubbornly as to have made them impossible. This is pure assumption. The truth is that whenever or wherever an appeal was made to American patriotism, it met with an immediate response. The sinking of the *Lusitania* created such a storm of horror and indignation that if the President had lifted a finger, the manhood of America, and the womanhood, too, would have risen to back him up. But instead of lifting a finger, he wrote that message to Germany, praising the Germans for their traditional respect for justice and humanity. And a long time had yet to pass before he made the least sign of encouragement to those Americans who would uphold the honor of the United States and would have this, the greatest of Republics, take its due part in defending Democracy against the Huns' attempt to wipe Democracy off the earth forever.

Having missed his opportunity then, Mr. Wilson could of course plead that the country was less and less inclined to go to war, because he furnished the pro-German plotters the very respite they had needed for carrying on their work. By unavowed ways they secured a strong support among the members of the National House of Representatives and the Senate. They disguised themselves as pacifists, and they found it easy to wheedle the "lunatic fringe" of native pacifists into working for the domination of William of Hohenzollern over the United States, and for the establishing of his world dominion. The Kaiser's propagandists spread evil arguments to justify all the Kaiser's crimes, and they found willing disciples even among the members of the Administration to repeat and uphold these arguments.

They told us, for instance, that their massacre served the victims of the *Lusitania* right for taking passage on a British steamship. They even wished to pass a law forbidding Americans from traveling on the ocean at all, because, by doing so, they might be blown up by the Germans, and that would involve this country in diplomatic

difficulties with Germany. Next, the Germans protested against our selling munitions of war to the Allies. Neither custom nor international law forbade doing this, and the protest stood out in stark impudence when it came from Germany, the country which, for fifty years and more, had sold munitions to every one who asked and had not hesitated to sell impartially to both antagonists in the Russo-Japanese War. By playing on the sentimentality of this same "lunatic fringe," the German intriguers almost succeeded in driving through a bill to stop this traffic. They knew the true Prussian way of whimpering when bullying did not avail them. And so they not only whimpered about our sending shells over to kill the German soldiers, but they whimpered also over the dire effects which the Allied blockade produced upon the non-combatant population of Germany.

Roosevelt watched impatiently while these strange phases passed before him. He listened angrily at the contradictory utterances. He felt the ignominy of our country's being at such a depth. He knew Germany too well to suppose that she could be deterred by President Wilson's messages. He saw something comic in shaking a long forefinger and saying, "Tut, tut! I shall consider being very harsh, if you commit these outrages three more times." To shake your fist at all, and then to shake your finger, seemed to Roosevelt almost imbecile. Cut off from serving the cause of American patriotism in any public capacity, Roosevelt struggled to take his part by writing. Every month in the *Outlook*, and subsequently in the *Metropolitan Magazine*, he gave vent to his pent-up indignation. The very titles of some of his papers reveal his animus: "Fear God and Take Your Own Part"; "A Sword for Defense"; "America First: A Phrase or a Fact?"; "Uncle Sam's Only Friend Is Uncle Sam"; "Dual Nationality"; "Preparedness." In each of these he poured forth with unflagging vehemence the fundamental verities on which our American society should rest. He showed that it was not a mere competition in letter-writing between the honey-worded Mr. Wilson and the sophisticated Bernstorff or the Caliban-sly Bethmann-Hollweg, but that God was in the crisis, and that no adroitness of phrase or trick of diplomacy could get rid of Him. He showed that there

could not be two kinds of Americans: one genuine, which believed wholly and singly in the United States, and the other cunning and mongrel, which swore allegiance to the United States—lip service—and kept its allegiance to Germany—heart service. He lost no opportunity to make his illustrations clear. On resigning as Secretary of State after the sinking of the *Lusitania*, because President Wilson insisted on mildly calling Germany's attention to that crime, Mr. Bryan addressed a large audience of Germans. Then Roosevelt held him up to the gaze of the American people as a man who had no true Americanism.

"He kept us out of war," was a paradoxical battle-cry for one who in a very short time thereafter wished to pose as the winner of the greatest war in history. But the battle-cry, it turned out, was used chiefly for political purposes. The year 1916 was a Presidential year and his opponents suspected that everything President Wilson had done at home or abroad had been planned by him with a view to the effect which it might have on his reelection. Politicians of all parties saw that the war was the vital question to be decided by the political campaign. For the Democrats, Wilson was, of course, the only candidate; but the Republicans and the Progressives had their own schism to settle. First of all, they must attempt to reunite and to present a candidate whom both factions would support; if they did not, the catastrophe of 1912 would be repeated, and Wilson would again easily win against two warring Progressive and Republican candidates. The elections in 1914 showed that the Progressive Party was disintegrating. Should its leaders strive now to revive its strength, or should they bow to the inevitable, combine with the Republicans on a satisfactory candidate, and urge all the Progressives as a patriotic duty to support him?

All depended on Roosevelt's decision. After reflection, he consented to run for nomination by the Progressives. It soon became plain, however, that the Republicans would not take him back. The Machine did not want him on any terms: many of the Republicans, blinding themselves to the fact that, as the number of votes cast in 1912 proved, Taft and not he had split the Republican Party, held Roosevelt responsible for the defeat in that year. One heard also of some Republicans who, for lack of a better reason,

opposed Roosevelt because, they said, Roosevelt, having put Taft into the Presidency, ought not to have "gone back" on him. Yet the same persons, if they had taken a partner into their firm to carry on a certain policy, and had found him pursuing a different one, would hardly have argued that they were in loyalty bound to continue to support this partner as long as he chose. The consideration which weighed with a much larger number, however, was that Roosevelt had so antagonized the German vote and the Pacifist vote and all the other anti-American votes, that he might not be a winning candidate. Accordingly, the Republicans sought for somebody who would please everybody, and yet would have enough personal strength to be a leader. They pitched on Charles E. Hughes, former Governor of New York State, and then a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The unwisdom of going to the Supreme Bench for a standard-bearer was immediately apparent; because all the proprieties prevented Justice Hughes from expressing any opinion on political subjects until he resigned from the Court. Hence, it followed that no great enthusiasm could be aroused over his candidacy for nomination since nobody knew what his policy would be.

The Progressives held their Convention in Chicago on June 5th, the same day that the Republicans met there. Some of the original, simon-pure Progressives disapproved of this collusion, declaring that it represented a "deal," and that the Progressive Party, which had come into existence as a rebuke to machine politics, ought never to soil itself by entering into a "deal." Nevertheless, the will of the more worldly-minded prevailed, and they probably thought that there would be a better chance to have the Republicans nominate Roosevelt if he were already the nominee of the Progressives. But they were disappointed. They nominated Roosevelt and the Republicans Justice Hughes. Suspense followed as to whether Roosevelt, by accepting, would oblige the Progressives to organize another campaign. He sent only a conditional acceptance to the Progressive Committee and, a few days later, he announced publicly that he would support Justice Hughes, because he regarded the defeat of Wilson as the most vital object before the American people.

I find among my correspondence from him a reply to a letter of mine in which I had quite needlessly urged this action upon him. I quote this passage because it epitomizes what might be expanded over many pages. The letter is dated June 16, 1916:

I agree entirely with you. I shall do all I can for Mr. Hughes. But don't forget that Mr. Hughes alone can make it possible for me to be efficient in his behalf. If he merely speaks like Mr. Wilson, only a little more weakly, he will rob my support of its effectiveness. Speeches such as those of mine, to which you kindly allude, have their merit only if delivered for a man who is himself speaking uncompromisingly and without equivocation. I have just sent word to Hughes through one of our big New York financiers to make a smashing attack on Wilson for his actions, and to do it immediately, in connection with this Democratic Nominating Convention. Wilson was afraid of me. He never dared answer me; but if Hughes lets him, he will proceed to take the offensive against Hughes. I shall do everything I can for him, but don't forget that the efficiency of what I do must largely depend upon Hughes.

Roosevelt was as good as his word, and made four or five powerful speeches in behalf of Mr. Hughes, speeches which gave a sharper edge to the Republicans' fight.

The result of the election, which took place on November 5th, hung in suspense for many days. Then it appeared that Wilson, by capturing 13 California votes, had won by 277 electoral votes to 254 for Hughes. Of the popular vote, Wilson got 9,128,000, and Hughes 8,536,000. So the slogan, "He kept us out of war," accomplished its purpose.

(To be concluded)

THE STRATEGY ON THE WESTERN FRONT—IX

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. H. SARGENT, U. S. ARMY, RETIRED

THE ALLIED VICTORIES IN PALESTINE AND THE BALKANS.

DURING the great fight for the Hindenburg Line, there were taking place in Palestine and the Balkans certain events which were destined to have a far-reaching effect upon the strategical situation and conduct of the war on the Western front.

On September 19, 1918, General Allenby, in command of British, Indian, Australian, and a few French troops in Palestine, attacked the Turks from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. East of the Jordan he was assisted by an Arabian army. In this attack, known as the Battle of Samaria, Allenby broke through the Turkish line between that town and the sea, and, having pushed his cavalry northward and eastward, succeeded, in the next few days, in cutting the Damascus railway in rear of the Turks and in seizing the passages of the Jordan, thereby closing their last avenue of escape. The result was that a large part of the Turkish army was enveloped and captured. What remained was routed and dissipated, a few thousand, incapable of further resistance, escaping towards Aleppo. These operations annihilated the Turkish army in Palestine and put Allenby's army in a position where, by a rapid march northward, it could reach Aleppo ahead of the retreating Turkish Mesopotamian army, sever its communications at that point, and compel its surrender. On September 25, the day before Foch opened his great attack on the Hindenburg Line along the Meuse-Argonne front, the British War Office announced that General Allenby had taken more than 40,000 prisoners and 265 guns in the Palestine offensive.

While these stirring events were happening in Palestine and Syria, the Allied forces were meeting with similar success in the Balkans. On September 15, 1918, General Franchet d'Esperey commanding the Allied armies on the Salonika front in Macedonia, attacked the center of the Bulgarian line across the high ground in the angle formed by the Vardar and Cerna Rivers, broke through the line, and pushed northward some twelve or fifteen miles up the Vardar Valley. This attack, followed a few days later by other attacks against the Bulgarian line east of the Vardar in the vicinity of Lake Doiran, opened a great gap through the center of the Bulgarian line across the Vardar Valley, along which passes the Nish-Uskub-Veles-Salonika railway. Upon this railway the Bulgarians and Austrians in Macedonia depended almost entirely for their supplies, munitions, and reinforcements. Consequently, when the Allied forces pushed into this gap, seized the railway, and ascended the valley towards Uskub, they cut the communications, not only of the Bulgarians east of the Vardar, but of the Bulgarians and Austrians west of that river, and thus placed them in an extremely perilous position.

On September 26, the day that Foch began his great offensive along the Meuse-Argonne front, the Serbians reported an advance of seventy-five miles up the Vardar Valley and the capture of the fortress and railway center of Veles; and, on the same day, the French War Office stated that the Allied troops on the Salonika front had captured in this offensive more than 10,000 Bulgarians. On the following day the Bulgarians asked for an armistice and, two days later, on September 29, 1918, withdrew from the war by accepting the purely military terms dictated by General d'Esperey, which were to be effective until the peace conference should determine the exact conditions of peace. By the terms agreed upon, the Bulgarian army was to withdraw from Greek and Serbian territory and demobilize, and Allied troops were permitted to use strategic points in Bulgaria and all means of communications. The Austrian army on the right of the Bulgarians, having lost their communications also *via* Uskub, were forced to make their way as best they could by irregular trails over the hills and mountains of Albania back to their own territory.

The Allied victory in the Balkans not only disposed of Bulgaria but it separated Turkey from Germany and Austria, severed the Berlin-Constantinople-Bagdad railway, cut in two the great theatre of operations of the Central Powers, and laid open to attack the communications of the Austrian army in Italy and of the German army on the Western front.

Coming as it did right on the heels of General Allenby's great victory in Palestine against the Turks, and just at the time when Foch on the Western front was beginning to make great breaches in the Hindenburg Line, it was a lethal blow to Germany which sealed the fate of the Central Powers. It meant that Germany had lost the war: for, from the beginning, the strategical and vital center of the whole theatre of war had been in the Balkans; and just as soon as the Salonika army was sufficiently reinforced to make a successful campaign against the Bulgarians, and cut the Berlin-Constantinople-Bagdad railway, over which the Turks were obtaining munitions of war from Germany, while Germany and Austria were getting cotton and other supplies from Asia Minor, the entire scheme of defense of the Central Powers fell to pieces like a house of cards.

The reasons were these: With the Turks deprived of munitions of war, and this deprivation coming immediately after General Allenby's masterly movements against them in Palestine, they had no alternative but to withdraw from the war and seek such favorable terms as they could obtain. This left the Salonika army free to move northward into Austria, where it was certain to be reinforced by many Jugo-Slavs and Roumanians, who were ready and anxious to join with the Allies in striking a powerful blow against Austria and Germany. Such an advance into Austria through Budapest to Vienna would cut the communications of the Austrian army in Italy,—the only army left to Austria of any consequence,—deprive it of its supplies, and compel its surrender. Indeed, the mere threat of such an advance upon its communications kept it in such a demoralized state that, when attacked about three weeks later by the Italian army, it was easily driven from its strong defensive positions, defeated, routed, and almost destroyed.

In this war, as in the days of Napoleon, a successful

battle fought by the Allies in the vicinity of Vienna would have conquered Northern Italy for them all.

Austria once defeated and out of the war, the way would have been left open for the Salonika and Italian armies to unite and attack Germany from the south. Such an attack would not only have deprived her of the wheat, oil, platinum, and other supplies which she was obtaining from Roumania and Ukrania, but, when pushed northward, would have destroyed or threatened the communications of her army on the Western front with Berlin and other important German cities. Moreover, an advance from Vienna through the friendly territory of Bohemia would have brought the Allied army almost to Dresden and within one hundred and twenty-five miles of Berlin. Such an invasion of her territory would have meant, of course, the destruction of her railways, canals, and cities; the blowing up of her bridges and munition plants; and the laying waste of her fields. And there was no way to prevent it; for she could not detach for this purpose any troops from the Western front, since she was not then even able to hold her own there. Even had troops been available, she could not then continue to feed them and her own people, with the British blockading her northern coasts and her sources of supply to the south destroyed. Seeing that all this would mean the bringing home to her people the ruin and desolation of war and, finally, the inevitable annihilation or capture of her great army on the Western front, she realized that there was nothing to do but to make terms with the Allies. Accordingly, on October 5, just six days after Bulgaria withdrew from the war, she asked for an armistice.

This, then, was the situation: Bulgaria had been defeated and had withdrawn from the war. Turkey, as a result of the annihilation of her Palestine army and the victory of the Allies in the Balkans, had become absolutely powerless to continue the struggle and was making preparations to surrender. Austria, with her whole southern boundary open to attack and the communications of her army in Italy seriously threatened, was on the verge of complete collapse. There was needed only one more thrust of the Italian army against her already partially demoralized troops on the Piave to defeat, rout, and dissipate them, and force her, too, out of the war. And Ger-

many, her armies short of food and her people threatened with starvation, her supplies from overseas and outside countries cut off, and her territory open to invasion from the south and no available troops with which to stop it, knew that she was beaten—not through the defeat of her great army on the Western front, for that was still fighting without showing the least sign of demoralization, and was to continue to fight desperately, for a period of five weeks, through a most skillfully conducted retreat; but nevertheless beaten—beaten by the collapse of her rear, brought about by the great blow in the Balkans.

When it is remembered that William II, from his first meeting with the Sultan of Turkey in 1889 until, and even after, the beginning of the great world war in 1914, had borne his grandiose scheme of a mighty German Empire almost constantly in mind; and that from the conquest of Serbia in October, November, and December, 1915, until the defeat and overthrow of the Turks and Bulgarians in September, 1918, Germany had had substantially complete control, through its entire length, of the Berlin-Constantinople-Bagdad railway, as well as control over all the territory in Europe and Asia, save that occupied and controlled by the Salonika army, which she deemed essential for the accomplishment of her great plan, one cannot but appreciate the crushing effect which the Allied blow in the Balkans must have had on her purposes and hopes; nor can one fail to appreciate, also, Germany's great strategical mistake in trying to end the war by an attack on the Western front in the spring of 1918, without first disposing of the Salonika army, and thereby making strong the strategical and vital center of the great theatre of operations of the Central Powers.

LUDENDORFF'S GREAT RETREAT

No sooner had the first break-through of the Hindenburg Line been made by the Americans on the Meuse-Argonne front than Ludendorff saw his great peril. At once he realized that unless this thrust could be stopped immediately, he must begin the withdrawal of his armies from Northern France and Belgium. Accordingly he made every effort to stop it, and was for a time partially successful. But in the meantime, other break-throughs along the Flanders and intermediate fronts of the Hinden-

burg Line had occurred; and, moreover, he soon saw that the Americans were only temporarily checked in the Argonne. Under these circumstances, there was but one thing for him to do; and that was to withdraw his armies from Northern France and Belgium to the line of the Meuse River. Accordingly, at the beginning of October he gave the order for a retreat which he had foreseen might be necessary, and for which he had previously provided.

A very difficult problem confronted Ludendorff. It was much the same kind of problem that he had had to face when Foch broke through the west side of the Château-Thierry salient, except that it was on a much larger scale. Then, only the portion of his army in the Château-Thierry salient had been endangered, but in this instance the whole of his army north of Verdun was threatened with destruction. Not only this, but the great Allied victories which, in the meantime, had been won in Palestine and the Balkans, added to Ludendorff's situation a still greater peril.

With Bulgaria out of the war; with Turkey virtually out; with Austria certain to withdraw as soon as her army on the Piave should again be vigorously attacked; with Germany already asking for an armistice; with Foch delivering anvil blows daily against the only army of any consequence left to Germany: with—in short—all the Central Powers in a state of collapse and disintegration, and nothing to stand between Germany and the on-rushing victorious armies of the Allies but the Germany army,—which though in retreat, was still unconquered,—Ludendorff was confronted with one of the most difficult military problems in all history. What could he do? What should he do? What, from a German point of view, was it best for him to do?

Strategically, had it not been for the collapse of the German nation in his rear, the thing for Ludendorff to have done, the moment he saw that it would be impossible for him to hold the Hindenburg Line, would have been to withdraw to the line of the Meuse as quickly as possible without allowing his retreat to degenerate into a rout. Because, once safely there, the river would not only stop the tanks,—then a most important offensive weapon in the hands of the Allies,—but would form with the Ardennes

Mountains, through which the river cleaves its way, an exceptionally strong defensive position, whose length was less by one hundred miles than that of the Hindenburg Line from Verdun to the English Channel.

In this connection, it should not pass unnoticed that the broad-nosed salient, whose lines run through Liège, Namur, Dinant, Mezieres, and Sedan, which the Germans would have occupied had they fallen back to the Meuse River line, had not the vulnerability to an enemy's attacks characteristic of most salients, for the reason that no important lines of railway pass through or from it into Germany. Then, too, this salient presented the greatest irregularities of surface, being "intersected by numerous ravines and streams with steep and rocky banks, by deep valleys, and by ridges of hills,"¹ which make it a great natural fortification that would have been very easy to defend.

But to make a quick retirement to the line of the Meuse, even though the German rear had not been in collapse, would have been an exceedingly risky operation, for the reason that it would have been interpreted by the German people, as well as by the Allies, as an open confession of defeat, and might have had a demoralizing effect upon the German army, which would have led to a great German disaster. And had the great bulk of the German army learned, in the course of such a hasty retirement, what they did not then know,—that their whole rear was in a state of collapse,—there would have been a great probability of this very thing happening. Then, too, a speedier withdrawal would have necessitated abandoning to the enemy greater quantities of supplies, equipments, and guns.

It was apparent that if the armistice could be agreed to while the German army was still unbeaten and on foreign soil, it would lessen for the German people the bitterness of defeat, prevent an Allied invasion and devastation of German territory, and probably result in Germany's receiving better terms in the treaty of peace. But these were the only objects for continuing the struggle, since it was evident that the conditions in Germany at that time utterly destroyed all hope of final success. Knowing that Germany was beaten and that the end was near, Ludendorff was nevertheless anxious, of course, to maintain the courage

¹ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, Ninth Edition. Vol. III, p. 513.

and *morale* of his army to the last, and to retain in his possession upon the signing of the armistice as much of the enemy's territory as possible.

Accordingly, he made his plan for a deliberate retreat. His purpose was to contest every position; to make the Allies fight for every foot of ground gained; and to fall back only when he was forced to, or when he found it absolutely necessary to prevent the cutting of his communications and capture of parts of his army.

From October 5 until the signing of the armistice on November 11, Ludendorff followed this plan. During the withdrawal, he brought every possible force to bear against the Americans and French advancing from the Meuse-Argonne front on Sedan and Mezieres, in order to hold open the line of railway from Hirson through these towns to Metz, so as to facilitate the retirement of the Germans and give them more time to withdraw their troops and supplies, especially from the Laon salient.

But, although he was able to retard greatly their progress, he could not stop them. They had seen the importance of closing the gap and of seizing the railway, and in the face of forty German divisions which Ludendorff had ordered there to oppose them, as well as in the face of the most discouraging conditions, they continued slowly but surely to press forward to their goal. And the British, French, and Belgians along other portions of the line, gradually forced back the Germans in their front.

But their progress was very slow; for Ludendorff conducted this difficult operation with great skill. His retirement was methodical. There was no rout, no *débâcle*. Up to the very last, the discipline and *morale* of his troops were good, and his rear guards fought bravely, fiercely, desperately to hold back the onrushing Allies.

It is not the purpose here to describe in detail this great retreat. It will suffice to say that, taking advantage of every known means to delay the advance of the Allied armies, Ludendorff made it extremely difficult for them to push forward; so difficult, indeed, that although they made what seemed to be almost superhuman efforts to drive back the German army, they succeeded in forcing it back during these six weeks of almost continuous fighting only a distance of some forty miles behind the Hindenburg Line.

By November 1, the Germans had retired from the Belgian coast; the British and Canadians had captured Valenciennes and were pushing forward between the Sambre and Scheldt on Mons; the Americans had forced their way northward to Bayonville, Aincreville, and Doullon, about twenty miles south of Sedan; and the French on their left had reached Vouziers about twenty-five miles south of Mezieres. By November 11, when the armistice was signed, the dividing line separating the Allies from the Germans southward from Holland to a point opposite Metz ran, approximately, from the mouth of the Scheldt, about twelve miles northwest of Antwerp, up the left bank of that river to Ghent, thence through Mons, past Hirson, through Mezieres, past the southern outskirts of Sedan, and thence along the left bank of the Meuse to a point opposite Mouzay, where it crossed the river, and thence through the northern edge of the Woevre Forest to Bezonvaux, thence to Vandieres, and thence across the Moselle to Port-Sur-Seille, opposite Metz.

Examining this line, we note that when the end came, the Germans were occupying a line through Belgium which lay approximately forty miles east of the Hindenburg Line, thirty miles west of the Meuse River line, opposite Namur, and one hundred miles west of the German frontier; and that the Americans and French had closed the gap between the Verdun-Reims front and the Ardennes Mountains, but that the gap northward of these mountains to the Dutch frontier was open and was completely covered by the German army, which extended from the mouth of the Scheldt through Ghent and Mons to the northern outskirts of Mezieres. It will be noticed also that the great Maubeuge-Charleroi-Namur-Liège-Aix-la-Chapelle railway, which passes directly through the gap into Germany, crossed the German line at right angles to it and was completely covered by it; and that the flanks of the German army occupying the line were protected on the right by Holland and on the left by the Meuse River and Ardennes Mountains from Mezieres to Sedan.

Thus we see that the great length of time required by the Americans and French to close the gap south of the Ardennes Mountains, brought about by Ludendorff's desperate and terrific fighting to keep it open, had enabled him to withdraw that portion of his army facing the

British and the Belgians along the Hindenburg Line eastward through Belgium to a position where it completely covered its line of communications back into Germany, and where its flanks rested on practically impassable obstacles.

Nevertheless, the closing of the gap from Verdun to Sedan would have made it necessary for him to continue his retreat to the Meuse River line even had the armistice not been signed; for the reason that, with such an extended front and only one line of railway behind him, he was still in a dangerous position. Then, too, the Meuse line was much stronger and much shorter, and, besides, would form a water barrier between his army and the enemy's tanks.

Had it been possible to close this gap earlier—say before the German army along the Hindenburg Line from the vicinity of St. Quentin northward to the English Channel had retired so far eastward—the strategical effect in all likelihood would have been much greater; since, in that case, an Allied thrust northward from Mezieres probably would have resulted in cutting the Charleroi-Namur-Liège-Aix-la-Chapelle railway behind the German army and would have forced a large part of that army to surrender.

But, whatever might have been the outcome under such conditions, the point I wish to emphasize is that at the time the armistice was signed the German army was in an excellent position from Mezieres northward for completing its withdrawal to the line of the Meuse without any great disaster; and once there, would have been in a very strong and most favorable position for making a determined stand.

It is, therefore, my opinion that had the armistice not been signed when it was, no great *débâcle* would have overtaken the German army in the next few weeks or months as a result of the strategical situation at the time.

There can be no question that Germany would never have signed an armistice before the defeat of her great army on the Western front had not the break in the Balkans exposed her to an attack from the south, threatened her communications, and cut off a large part of her remaining sources of supply. Nor would she have yielded until her army had been either annihilated, captured, or driven

across the Rhine. But would it have been possible for the Allied armies to do this? Let us see.

We have already pointed out the great defensive strength of the line of the Meuse. But back of it is the Moselle River and Metz with its great system of fortifications, and back of them is the line of the Saar; then come the fortress of Strassburg and the great river Rhine; and on the east bank of the Rhine, extending from Switzerland almost to Karlsruhe, are the Black Forest Mountains, which, from the days of Caesar, have been considered a most difficult obstruction for armies attempting to move through them from west to east. These are all strong defensive positions; but the Rhine and Black Forest Mountains are more than that: they are formidable obstacles, and would be impassable if defended by adequate military forces armed with modern weapons.

"Of all the operations of war," says Jomini, "there is none more arduous and difficult than the passage of a large river in the face of an enemy." When it is remembered that the passage—or attempted passage—of the Rhine in this case would have been in the face of a nation in arms, and not in the face of an enemy few in numbers, as were the armies in Jomini's and Napoleon's day; when it is remembered that the bridges of the Rhine were strongly protected by bridge-heads and field works, and that two parallel railways along the banks of the river, and many others near the German frontier, had been constructed solely with reference to battle lines, permitting quick concentration of troops upon any front of the Rhine or German frontier; and that the defensive positions, forts, and great fortresses along and near the German frontier had for more than forty years preceding the war been strengthened in every possible way to prevent an invasion of German territory, one is appalled by the magnitude of the task, and cannot but feel that its accomplishment would have been an impossibility—a task beyond human power. In view of these facts, it is submitted that there would have been no chance of the Allies winning the War on the Western front had there been no collapse of the German rear as a result of the Allied victory in the Balkans.

But even supposing, for the sake of the argument, that the war might have been won on the Western front in the following year, after approximately 4,000,000 American

soldiers had been sent there, as was the plan of the War Department, would it not have been in the face of an appalling and unnecessary sacrifice of life?—since a few thousand soldiers sent into the Balkans would, as the sequel has shown, have been a deciding factor in bringing the war to a close.

It is not the purpose in this concluding article to carry further the discussion of this interesting question, except to say that it is the deliberate opinion of the writer that, had there been no break in the Balkans and had the campaign continued during the Spring and Summer of 1919, two hundred thousand Americans sent to the Balkans would have had a much greater effect in bringing the war to a speedy end than ten times that number sent to the Western front.

To strike at the communications of the enemy without exposing your own to his attack: it was the carrying out of this principle which enabled General Foch to win the Château-Thierry salient at the beginning of his great offensive on the Western front; which enabled the British army commanders to drive the Germans from the Amiens salient and force them back to the Hindenburg Line; which enabled General Pershing to obliterate in two days the dangerous St. Mihiel salient that for many months had menaced French communications. It was the carrying out of this principle by the Americans and French, in their great thrust from the Verdun-Reims front through the Argonne Forest to Sedan and Mezieres, that put the German army in a precarious situation and forced its retreat through Belgium toward the Meuse River line. It was the carrying out of this principle by General Allenby in Palestine that enabled him to annihilate the Turkish army in his front and force the Turkish government to sue for peace. And it was the carrying out of this principle in the Balkans by General d'Esperey which not only forced Bulgaria out of the war, but, at the same time, cut or threatened the communications of the other armies of the Central Powers, and which, taken in connection with the persistent pounding of the Germans by Marshal Foch on the Western front, brought the great war to an end.

H. H. SARGENT.

(The End).

AUSTRIA AT THE CROSS-ROADS

BY F. V. KEYS

EVER since the beginning of the War, the best informed French opinion has been insistent in directing attention to the importance of Austria-Hungary as a field for Allied military and diplomatic action. The objective which was sought has been attained. The ill-assorted racial conglomerate held together by the ingenuity of a cynical statecraft has been dissolved into its constituent parts. Yet the field still remains one of importunate interest, on account of the psychological possibilities which grow there. Of these, it is the psychological problem of the Austrian—the name henceforth reverting to its primitive meaning as the designation of the descendants of the Germans who, a thousand years ago, settled in the valley of the Upper Danube as the advance guard of the Empire of the Franks—that may well continue to engage the attention of the student not only of the Balkans, nor of Central Europe, but of Teutonism itself. For on the chart of human psychology, Austria occupies the same strategic position that has been hers topographically with relation to Germany: she is the bridgehead connecting Teutonism with the rest of the world. Or, as it may be, the rest of the world with Teutonism.

The issue of the War has destroyed the scaffolding of the empire built up on Bismarck's design. How far it has modified the psychology of the people that has lived, moved and had its being within that scaffolding, and how far it has destroyed Prussia's former prestige of success, are questions unanswerable for those who refuse to read the present and the future in the light of their own wishes or of the fanaticism of party. Yet these are the only questions that in the long run will count.

As a solution to the fundamental menace of the Teutonic psychology, the various separatist movements observ-

able here and there in the old empire are worse than no answer at all. If examined at all closely, they reveal motives and point to quarters identified with anything but political or any other kind of freedom or equality. Further, any attempt to hinder the ultimate union of Austria with the rest of the Germans is almost certain to be as ideally futile as it is logically unsound from the point of view of the principle of national self-determination. Any such embargo merely reflects on paper, and for a time, a European state of mind, inevitable in the present circumstances, but not to be taken for the settled decision of statesmanship. Meanwhile, we must reckon with the fact that by the sheer force of spiritual gravitation, the Austrian will coalesce with the German into a psychological unit. Even though the Austrian state remain a separate political entity, and seek its economic affiliations with its Balkan neighbors, as is possible in view of the economic nexus of the old Dual Monarchy, racial sympathies cannot but be infinitely heightened among all Germans on account of the common defeat in a common attempt. In all endeavor to understand the future of Teutonism, the Austrian contingent must be considered a part of the German *bloc*; the problem being whether it is to be, as in recent years, merely an extension, or whether it may possibly effect a modification, of the Teutonic mind. In other words, is there a distinctive Austrian psychology, and if so, what are the chances of Austrian leadership, and whither shall it turn the Teutonic mind, in the years that lie ahead?

When Bismarck, in discussing the Triple Alliance in his *Thoughts and Recollections*, observed that he should have preferred Russia to Austria, he was thinking not only of the "fits and starts of public opinion among the Hungarian, Slav and Catholic population of the Hapsburgs," but of a certain incalculable strain in the Austrian character itself. It is the strain that insinuates itself subtly into the features of the landscape and the people as soon as the traveler crosses the border from Bavaria into Austria, and that accounts for the profound contrast Vienna offers to Berlin. West and East in faces and tongues and costume; the spiry Gothic of the tower of the Stefansdom and the quaint and civil beauties of Baroque and Renaissance; the princely scale of her modern monuments of national and civic life; the taste and originality of the products of her

industry; flowing through her dark labyrinth of old and narrow streets, a sea of human indigence; everything points to long ages of human occupancy, and draws the mind and imagination to dwell on past centuries, races, cultures, in this city whose foundations were laid by Roman legionaries among a Celtic people, and where Marcus Aurelius took leave of life. Still more profound is the contrast between the physiognomy of the people of the Austrian and that of the citizens of the German capital. There is a delicacy about the now rarely seen pure Austrian type that involuntarily makes one think of the sitters to Romney and Lawrence: and as in the wide meadows on the fringe of the Prater the groups of tall trees detach themselves with something of the quietness of an English landscape, so there is something English in the spirit that handles the reins of the fine horses that flash by in the Corso, although in the lithe and jaunty elegance of the figures, in the dark and striking features of so many faces, there is a suppler, a more romantic strain that signals the Magyar and the Slav. And in spite of the glitter of the sun in the May leafage and the *fesch und resch* of the style of the cavaliers, there hovers in the air, and in the dark distinctive faces, something like a mist, the after-thoughts of a people diverted, but unsatisfied; that keeps a memory or a hope of something that is not, repaired to at long intervals but never quite forgotten, in a corner of the soul. Mozart caught it and gave it voice, when he set his wistful melodies to the so gaily tripping measures. Edward Fitzgerald called his the music of *sweet civilized life*. That music is the key to the spirit of the Old Austria. The New Austria stands to-day at the cross-roads of destiny.

Of the voices of modern Austria, none is more significant, none so prophetic as that of Hermann Bahr. That he is known to Americans chiefly by what is only a travesty of one of his plays, reveals more of ourselves than of him. Born in 1863, in Linz on the Upper Danube, growing up in the atmosphere of the older genuine liberalism, of which his father was a convinced and faithful disciple; pursuing his higher studies at Austrian and German universities, he reflects in tradition and experience those influences which shall be the central and determining ones for the future of Austrian democracy. Imbued with that vaster spirit of progress which, again and again in the course of history,

has refused to be confined by newer dogma, or diverted into temporary channels of reform, not because it lags behind but because its objective transcends their aim, Bahr has remained aloof from the ranks of party socialism, although well acquainted with its economic theory and sympathetic to its professed object of emancipating the workers. In other words, he is a modern, not in the sense of a partisan, but in the essential fact of temperament, which has insured the receptivity of his genius to many and various cultural influences. For thirty years, his work as journalist, essayist, novelist and playwright, has been focussed on a single aim: to arrest and synthesize the elusive and conflicting elements of the distinctively Austrian spirit, and enlist it to take its own distinctive part in the shaping of what long before the war he heralded as the new Europe. Democracy, in her obscure but splendid implications, has presided over his vision of the peoples; while in the world of fiction, it is the shape which he calls the New Human Being that has haunted his imagination and determined the values he seeks to discover and suggest in character and personality.

Central, for the present purpose, is the little known monograph *Vienna*, written in 1906, and confiscated within the Austrian frontiers on the ground of certain observations on the Hapsburgs, construed as *lèse-majesté*. It is a portrait painted with a sort of frenzy, in a passion of resentment and love, of regret, pity, contempt, and hope. It is a relentless and subtle piece of work, significant because painted really only for the eye of the sitter, to hang in his house like a writing on the wall: a reminder, a warning, an appeal. In the extraordinarily varied style, throbbing with poetry, scornful and familiar, simple and subtle and supple, now pure colloquial Viennese in its clipped phrasing, now classic in rhythm and imaginative power, is reflected the mood of the author as he looks backward and forward across the drama, which is the tragedy, of the Viennese.

After observing that "in Europe, they know Vienna as the place where it is always Sunday, and the spit always turning before the fire, further: as the Capua of the spirit—where they live in half-poetry, dangerous for the whole," he proceeds:

Abroad, this repute of a city happily rocked to a lullaby of airs

and dances, a city of harmless, rather slovenly, not very active, not very reliable, but altogether kindly and nice people, has persisted. But whoever is doomed to live here, cannot understand it. He is full of wrath.

It has another ring, when Metternich says: On the highway, Asia begins. And when Kuernberger rails against . . . 'the indolence, frivolity, vulgarity, the impious wantonness, the lust for obscenity, the fanaticism of smut, the loathing of culture, the obstinate, self-affirmative, good-for-nothing raggamuffinism' of the nevertheless beloved city. 'Of the nevertheless beloved city.' That's the Viennese of it. To listen to the Viennese, it must be a positive curse to live here. But nobody leaves. He grumbles, he rails, he sneers, each in his own way. But he stays on. It seems that in spite of everything he can't give up the so despised and detested city. And he does nothing to change Vienna, or the Viennese, not even the Viennese in himself. He doesn't try to himself, and whoever does, is his enemy. The Viennese is a very unhappy person . . . who puts up with everything, except with being helped—then he resists.

Such is the Viennese. How he came to be what he is, I shall show. And: whether he must remain so.

In the subsequent analysis, two dualisms emerge as the distinguishing factors in the Austrian character. One proceeds from within: his mixed blood. The other is imposed upon him: the Hapsburgs.

It affords an interesting sidelight on the racial feeling between Austrian and Slav and Magyar, that Bahr does not once refer to the undoubted mingling of these strains in the veins of his countrymen to-day; that he discusses exclusively the ancient and what he considers fundamental mixing of the Celt and the Teuton in the population of the Austrian Marches. What this strain means is thus set forth:

The Celts are incapable of tranquilly taking shape by themselves. They require a foreign element to which to adhere. Only then can they crystallize. Here [on their first penetrating to the valley of the Upper Danube] they found a silent, heavy, timid people . . . laborious . . . of wholly unwarlike temper. . . . Now it is the manner of the Celt to make his way in by cunning. He flatters his way up to mastery. He can do this, because he has nothing to overcome; for he brings no substance with him,—he hasn't got any, that's just what he's out searching for, what drives him out across sea and land; his function it is to bring form, to give a mould, but he himself has nothing within himself to put into it; for that he always needs a foreign people and it needs him, because it has nothing to lose by subjection to him, but through him first comes into possession of itself, first learns itself, can see itself. Celts. That is to say, a people not strong in themselves . . . Always ready to go round, to give way, to assume, to absorb, to adapt, to merge themselves. . . . No character, all

figure. A people that contains only form. A people that must always be looking at itself in the glass. The people of the great actors.

When, over the first settlement of the Celts, there has passed in turn the storm of the Romans and the Avars, at last "the heavy Germans come."

They take root. And there follows a long quiet period of steady growth. And they have the good fortune of the Babenbergs, who look after their people as a farmer looks after his farm. . . . So there arises the German city of Vienna. And here, brighter than in any other, shines the German strain. That is the Celtic drop. . . . German civic culture has no more radiant beacon than Vienna, in the days of Walter von der Vogelweide, the poet of Vienna at the court of the Babenbergs. And this Viennese is, with Goethe, the greatest poet the Germans own . . . like Goethe, in that in him everything was Nature, Nature that bears art as the grape bears wine. . . . But he is forgotten in Vienna, like his time, the great time of Vienna.

It was soon over, that happy period when a ruling house of enlightened and progressive princes fostered a people whose solid, heavy, industrious German stock was duly tempered by the Celtic blend.

The Celtic mould became firm, the German substance learned to adapt itself. The one took on brilliance, the other strength. All the coarser virtues of the German strain were carried on, but here they were tinged with the mobile charm of the Celt. Irresistibly one thinks of England, it is the same blend.

But with the Babenbergs and Ottokar, the Bohemian, the art of ruling departed out of Austria. With the rise to power of Rudolf of Hapsburg, "whose first care it is *to restore the old order*," who begins his reign as "the servant of the nobility," a dark fatality settles over the land and its people.

Among the Hapsburg rulers there have been gifted men and block-heads, there have been quarrelsome and peaceable, affable and morose, victorious and vanquished, sociable and solitary, men of every variety, but all of them have had this in common: that they have lacked a sense of reality. Perhaps from sheer high-spiritedness they can not endure to have to bend, and even from Reality itself they refuse to take orders. They are incapable of conceiving that anything must be. . . . That is law which God gives them to understand is right. There can be no other law. That there is a law that grows in men, unordained, unsolicited, unawares; that there are laws which things bear in themselves, that there is anything in the world that is in and of itself necessary, not one of them has ever been able to perceive. Not one of them has known that only he is a ruler who sees that each one has his rights, and who knows how to take measures to maintain the rights of each one.

The Hapsburgs are "the race of the great Jacobins," each of them "creating the world out of himself," seeing "lands, peoples, human beings only as his raw material which he is there to shape" as he sees fit. Whether it is that Emperor Maximilian who preferred to be "the last of the knight-errants instead of the first Monarch of the Germans"; or Charles the Fifth, who might have placed himself at the head of the Reformation and a united Germany, but who "misjudged necessity, and, obsessed with visions, died as a modern Diocletian"; or the second Ferdinand, who found his land Protestant and left it Catholic, whose watchword was "better a desert than a land full of heretics," who earned his title of *catholicae fidei acerrimus defensor* by "keeping his oath to stamp out reality throughout the length and breadth of the land," and who, on the fateful 9th of June, 1620, while the Twenty-Seven were being executed in Prague, "lay on his knees in Mariaszell praying for their souls;" or Joseph, the autocrat-liberal, who suddenly resolves that the whole psychology of the people is to be "re-modelled" to suit his notion of free citizens: always it is the same Jacobinical spirit that would do violence to the world by means of the *Geist*. By *Geist*, exterminate Reality, their enemy; their method, to save men's souls by terror, to shape a people by terror.

Henceforth, for the Austrian, reality becomes sin. The spirit of the master brooks only its own form. A new life is ordained. The Bohemians, the Hungarians, the peasants of the Alps, take refuge in silence. The Viennese has an ally in the secret Celt in him. He knows how to simulate everything and thus he hides the Viennese and shields him. The Viennese . . . turns out his Celtic side, which proceeds to play the part demanded by the spirit of the master. . . And the real Viennese was tucked into a secret drawer. Hence the peculiar Viennese spitefulness . . . for everyone knows that everyone else is only pretending . . . hence too the freedom and security of the Viennese irony, for all that's being said and done doesn't really concern anyone: the real fellow is hid at home, in the secret drawer, safe out of harm's way.

The unnatural command has been issued, the "great divorce" has been pronounced between nature and living, between the "desire of the heart and behavior." What should have developed as a rich, complex, and harmonious type, has been divided against itself; the element that should have made for flexibility, brilliance, progressiveness, has been diverted to the exercise of what to-day we

call camouflage; a situation that gave rise to what the strongest natures felt as a national disease, producing a society ready to the purposes of what Bahr calls its last assailants: the casuistry of the Jesuits, the insincerity of Parlor Liberals, the vapid pretensions of the "reformed" Jew. A disease that explains the tragedy of a Beethoven's death, Beethoven, given public burial paid for with English gold; and of a Grillparzer's life, "a horrible life, burst in two in the middle . . . withdrawn from living till in turn poetry withdrew itself from him. Torn out of life, cut off at the root, he withered up."

And the future?

Vienna's future is Austria's future, is Bahr's answer. And at last, it would seem, Austria had spoken. For the first time, there was to be an Austrian State, "which had never yet existed, in spite of its having so often been enjoined." "Now for the first time it is being undertaken, not at the command of a prince, but out of the necessity of the people." The reference is to the passage, in the autumn of 1906, of the universal manhood suffrage bill, and the re-distribution of electoral districts. In the previous year the Dual Monarchy had witnessed the monster demonstrations in all its industrial centres, that had moved to tears every generous spectator of the multitudes whose very silence affirmed more impressively than words their will to be free. For the first time in her history, Austria was to represent more than the ring of "families" that had hitherto exploited her in their own private interests; she was to hear another voice in her council than that of the army, the church, and the court. Austria at last is to have a soul.

We will give her a soul. Then it may come to pass, that the Viennese too will awake from his dream. And he unlocks the secret drawer, and takes out himself, the real Viennese. He ceases to seem, he begins to live. As once in the Babenberg times.

The Call of Life, Schnitzler has named one of his pieces. On every side it resounds about us. Everywhere we hear the call of Life. To live, to live, to be! As once upon a time, when der Vogelweide sat in our midst.

Or else . . . only a kind of Venice?

Thus, in the characteristic Viennese fashion—which is the Austrian—the monograph ends with a note of question, with the echo of that mood, which is not the author's own, that sees the Austrian rôle as one finally played out, except

as preserving a graceful picture of a vanished past. It is a mood which Bahr recalls over and over again, in argument, in some of the most striking of the characters in his novels, but which he dwells on only to appeal against. He and the group of Austrians that distribute themselves in various constructive movements in the country, believe too deeply in life to disbelieve in the national contribution to life. He rebukes Schnitzler for the latter's underlying assumption that strength and beauty do not belong in life. To assume that, he says, is to be a deserter from life. It is his belief that it is the function of Art to assist Nature in her endless task of creation, for she has created the artist that henceforth she need not toil alone,—“he is now toiling with her, until perhaps at last one will come who will not only know what Nature wants, but will be able to do it too.” And the art that will do this will not spring from any isolated, exclusive spirit. It will arise from the conviction that “in art too the individual is nothing, that only that work counts that comes as an unalloyed utterance out of the depth of a common life.” By belief in this common life alone can the individual assure his own deepest identity. For Schnitzler, he wishes significantly “the work *that will contain yourself.*”

Consistently with his belief that only through human solidarity lies the way to the highest individual development, Bahr has opposed the forces making for separatism among the nationalities of the Dual Monarchy. The blame for conflicting racial passions he lays upon the prejudice “that makes us believe the lies we tell about one another;” and upon the policy of the government, which fostered alternately loyalty and irredentism, interested solely in playing off group against group in bargaining for temporary conformity, never aiming at a permanent psychological unity. In this criticism he represents the attitude of the group of enlightened Austrians who have been fully aware of the vast cultural values wasted by the benighted Teutonism of officialdom and by the intransigence of professional Germanizers. As an example of the difference between the Austrian and the Prussian minds, the volume of social studies entitled *Austriaca* affords instructive reading, with its incisive and richly humorous criticism of official ineptitude, whether parading itself in the conduct of a worse

than Burlesonized postal service, or of state trials in which Serbian subjects of the Hapsburgs appeared as defendants. Such a work would be looked for in vain among the writings of German authors, outside of the ranks of political parties. Bahr is indeed the best possible proof of the composite Austrian spirit that has outgrown the leading-strings of Hapsburg autocracy and Prussianism, that insists on breaking down the barriers between art and politics, between thinking and acting, between "composing" and living. And in the searching analysis which he has made of the Austrian character, the contrast he has implied between its true native bent and its historical deformity, we distinguish the vitality of a modern movement against the continued imposition of a spirit, a civilization, essentially more primitive than that to which Austria has an inherent right.

Nevertheless, no attempt to estimate the future trend of the Austrian mind can leave out of account the enormous influence exerted on it by the neighboring German Empire. Arrested in his own development by the Hapsburg blight, the Austrian had become an enigma, most of all to himself; his destiny too was enigmatical, more than ever after he had been rudely shaken off the parent stock and had seen the doors of United Germany closed upon him. And while he saw Germany moving out of the old loose confederation into the triumph of a compact, powerful and purposeful military and economic unity, the catastrophe of 1866 consigned him to an apparently issueless struggle with alien races, whose very virtues were abhorrent to him in his obstinate insistence on dominating those who were superior to him in numbers, and still more superior in their genius for parliamentary strategy. For the Austrian of the old school, it was with a wrenching of his nature that he reluctantly turned away from Germany to look for his future elsewhere. Among the younger generation, a group of intellectuals saw clearly that "the future of Austria is in the Balkans," as the phrase was. What was the meaning of this phrase? As developed by its supporters, the policy involved was, in one respect, admirable and far-sighted in statesmanship. It meant the cultivation of friendship with Austria-Hungary's Balkan neighbors, particularly with Serbia, by replacing the current method of thwarting her economically and persecuting politically the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy, by

a policy of economic solidarity and an atmosphere of friendly confidence. It meant extending into the Balkans the real values of western civilization, the rule of law over tribal feuds, popular education, the application of science to industry and public sanitation. It meant the recognition of the high cultural values of the Slav and the Magyar. But there was another side to the policy advocated by this slogan; and the march of events disclosed a curious disparity between the end and the means. It was not the development of the Balkans for their own sake that was the ultimate object of this new orientation; nor even Austria's gain: it was to serve the interests of the German Empire, as those interests were conceived by Bismarck. Bismarck was quoted as averring that the Empire had no interest in a little German neighbor on its border, but on the contrary was deeply interested "in the creation of a Slavic state which the economic power and the political strength of its German population would prevent from ever getting away from the German alignment." In other words, Austria was to do not only transcendental police duty for Prussia, but at need rattle the sabre and stoop to the favorite old Prussian method of coercion. When Aehrenthal annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was hailed by these otherwise modern intellectuals as a possible Austrian Bismarck, and there was talk of taking up the issue with Serbia even to the extent of declaring war on her, although war was solely for the purpose of "*compelling her friendship*." Familiar and ominous words in their German version; words to which history to-day happily lends a singular irony, strong enough to light up, perhaps, for the Austrian mind the psychological fallacy that underlies them, now that the torch of Imperial Germany's military glory is quenched.

Read in the obscurity that replaces to-day that once effulgent torch in Central Europe, what is the future that opens before the Austrian, as he has been interpreted in the above analysis?

The Great War has emancipated him in a double sense. First, politically, in freeing him from the secular incubus of the Hapsburgs,—and every friend of human freedom should oppose with his whole strength any attempt to restore that most baleful and insidious despotism already, at this present writing, sidling in through the door secretly un-

latched for it by its close bosom-friend the Magyar Junkers. If any arraignment beyond that of history were needed of this house, Bahr the Austrian has supplied it. In that fact alone lies an immense hope for the Austrian future. There, if anywhere, the people may legitimately be distinguished from its government, which, hybrid in race, was united only in its determination to enforce the spirit of a medieval reaction by keeping open the sores of national animosities in every other class of the nation. The divorce between government and people was proclaimed and proved in Austria long before the war, long before it became a catch-word invented abroad to serve the purpose of shielding a people more responsible than any other in history for the acts and constitution of its leaders. The power of the Austrian for self-criticism means further his capacity to profit from the second emancipation wrought for him by the issue of the War: henceforth he should be able to cast off the psychological domination of Prussia, whose *Realpolitik* has been exposed as no whit less illusory, no less "contrary to those laws that things bear in themselves" than the dreams of Hapsburg Jacobins. The hour has struck that is to free him from the old torturing dualism of nature, if he will recognise that the taint in his blood is not Celt nor Slav nor Magyar, but "Prussian:" if he will turn his mingled racial inheritance from being the barren curse it was under the old régime into the fruitful gift it has proved to the English. Let the Viennese in the secret drawer now come forth in answer to the Call of Life that echoes to the living from the graves of the young dead, in the bosom of every nation that has fought the Great War. Let the Celt within him whisper to the merely German intelligence an understanding of others than himself, that he may inaugurate what Germany and Europe needs; an Austrian Renaissance.

F. V. KEYS.

SUPPOSE, FOR EXAMPLE—

BY P. BECKWITH DAVIS

CIVILIZATION has always progressed through military and diplomatic action by the more advanced States directed against predatory nations and those permitting predatory acts within their borders, either designedly or through negligence in administration. As civilization has advanced and extended its influence, the methods of depredations have changed; piracy on the high seas is no longer countenanced by any nation, although it was once licensed by rulers of nations. The nineteenth century saw a great advance in civilization, promoted by military action, when the United States engaged in the war against the Barbary pirates, which freed the Mediterranean trade routes from the tribute-taking buccaneers who were encouraged by their Governments. It saw another advance when the British and American Governments joined in action against the Chinese pirates; and when the British sent their military expeditions into Africa.

The twentieth century has no pirates to eliminate—at least, no pirates of the old school; but its problems of civilization are arising and must be met. It is proposed to shift the individual responsibilities of nations in handling these problems of civilization, by transferring them to a League of Nations. One question that is in the mind of every thoughtful American today, while the League of Nations is being discussed, is this: What effect would the adoption of the proposed League of Nations have on the actively—or permissively—predatory nation of today? This is a question that is especially pertinent in the United States. Would the League of Nations, with its present proposed Constitution, encourage or discourage internationally illegal acts of the ruling groups of nations or of their nationals?

We have always had predatory nations. Probably always shall have. Their depredations may change in form, as civilization itself is altered. Without predatory nations there would be no wars; and then the League of Nations, as at present planned, would have no reason for being. The very proposal of this League, with the Constitution as determined upon by the delegates at Paris, is an admission that predatory, ill-willed nations exist and are expected to exist. It is their acts that lead to wars. The query persists: Will the proposed Constitution of this League of Nations prevent, or encourage, these predatory nations in acts of depredation, or in complacent neglect to control their nationals on evil bent?

Let us suppose, for example, that after the adoption of such a League constitution as the one now being considered, Mexican leaders should consider themselves safe in permitting uninterrupted confiscation of properties. The producing oil properties for example, would be, according to programme, seized and distributed among favored Mexican companies.

Four Nations have already lodged complaints and protests against this confiscation of oil properties. By the proposed constitution of the League their action is prescribed in Article XVII. Mexico would be invited to become a member of the League for the purposes of considering the dispute, on equal terms with the protesting nations. The despoiled nations might then, as provided in Article XII, submit the question of the legality of such confiscation to arbitration or inquiry by the Executive Council of the League. The States, parties to the inquiry, have an indeterminate time for presentation of their arguments. The Council has six months within which to make "recommendations." For three months thereafter no step involving force may be taken.

It is fair to assume that the recommendation, or award, would be along lines of right and justice—to the effect that Mexico must respect property rights of foreigners legally acquired under former Governments and laws, and must return the properties to the owners. Suppose, as may well be supposed, that Mexico refuses to abide by the award of the League. What then? The dire results are laid down in Article XIII as follows: "The Executive Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto."

Article XVI provides, in addition, that such breach of covenant shall be treated as an act of war—resulting in what? War? No; severance of trade relations, inhibitions, prohibition of all intercourse with League States—boycott and isolation. This would make the confiscation of oil fields unprofitable, if effectively applied. But suppose some country not a member of the League—Germany, for instance—refuses to boycott or aid in isolating Mexico. As a result, Mexican companies get the stolen oil fields, Germany gets cheap oil, and everybody outside the League of Nations is happy. The United States, England, and France would thus be cut off from the supply they urgently need, even now, to fill their requirements for the arts of peace, not to mention their needs in case of another war. In fine, all nations which refuse to boycott or isolate the offending country, together with predatory Mexico, profit by the arrangement.

But suppose, on the contrary, that Mexico, impelled by the moral force that has to date had no effect upon her performances, should accept the recommendation or award. In such a hypothetical—and highly improbable—case, much time would elapse before and during the consideration of the case by the League, and millions of barrels of oil meanwhile would be taken from the properties of American, British, and French owners and sold by the Mexican corporations substituted for them in ownership. The danger of exhaustion of the oil deposits by unskillful management during the tenure of Mexican companies is real. The value of two years' production of Mexican oil is more than \$50,000,000. Mexico is now unable to pay even the interest on her bonds; how could she be forced to pay this larger sum to compensate the American, British, and French owners when justice was done, and the legal rights of foreigners, legally acquired, were recognized by the final award?

Let us consider the Mexican problem and the League from yet another angle. Suppose that the United States has accepted the Covenant of the League. Thereafter, a border town is raided by starving Mexican soldiers, American men and women are killed, and property is stolen (an admissible supposition, in view of the fact that this has occurred more than once). By the League Covenant, the United States may not invade Mexican territory; a Pershing expedition

or a Glenn Springs pursuit is impossible under Articles XVI and XVII. The only result is a dispute covered by Article XVII. Mexico—actively, permissively or negligently guilty of an act of warlike aggression—is invited to become a member of the League in order to argue on an equality with the United States. She may refuse or accept; no time is set for her refusal or acceptance. During this delay—judging strictly from precedents—more raids may follow (other raids followed that of Columbus, in spite of, or because of, the New London conference). The hands of the United States are tied by the acceptance of the League Covenant. She may not even resist attack and aggression.

It is fair to assume that Mexico would refuse to discuss the situation at all. Carranza so refused in 1915. Then Article XVI fixes the penalty: boycott and isolation by members of the League. But will other States, not members of the League, co-operate? Some States may well be expected to take advantage of the boycott and continue trading with Mexico—and Mexicans will continue raiding as in the summer of 1916. It is not apparent how even a water-tight boycott can be expected to end unresisted border raids. Moral suasion cannot be expected to accomplish too much, even in these idealistic days.

But suppose Mexico accepts membership, and the question comes before the Executive Council. No time limit is set for presentation of statements of the case. Article XV says that this shall be done “as promptly as possible;” but a defendant nation may be expected to find prompt presentation impossible—and meantime the raids go on. Add, to the unlimited time for the presentation of statements of the case, the six months allowed for the formulation of the report, and then three months before an expedition may be sent against the raiders. Meanwhile, the raids continue, fostered by assurance of immunity.

Consider what the award will be. Will it take the form of admonition to Mexico to police her own borders and prevent the recurrence of murderous raids and land piracy? That is only a reminder of a duty Mexico always understood but always performed grudgingly, if at all. Will it be payment of indemnity to families of the killed and to owners of property carried away or destroyed? It would be refreshing, at least, to know that after these many years some damages must be paid. But how would the damages

be paid, and from what source would they come? Mexico pays today not even the interest on her national debt, or full salaries to civil employees. What means are provided to force payment?

As between two well-disposed States, both members of the League, the proposed Covenant may offer the cooling-off period provided by Mr. Bryan in his arbitration treaties. Its effect, doubtless, would be to bind collectively the States signatory to those treaties which Mr. Bryan began to make painstakingly between two nations at a time, the United States being one of the hobbled Powers in each instance. But the proposed Covenant, if accepted by the United States, would prevent this and other well-disposed and well-behaved States from taking the quick and decisive action necessary to repel invasion and aggression by predatory States, or by States unable to control their disorderly nationals. At the same time, it offers to such predatory or care-free States immunity from the immediate chastisement that alone could end, or has ever ended, their piratical transgressions.

Senator Hitchcock has stated that no aggression need be feared from Mexico because (1) League members are to respect only the territory of League members, and (2) Mexico cannot become a member, since she cannot give guarantees of compliance with her international obligations. Suppose, however, that some member of the League turns predatory. Had this Covenant been signed prior to 1914, Germany would have been a member—and undeterred, probably, from her ambitious undertaking thereby. Invasion of her borders would have been impossible by Russia or France because of the fact that she was a member.

Or suppose that some member becomes unable to control its predatory nationals. Mexico would have been a member of the League, beyond question, had the League been formed during the orderly days of Porfirio Diaz. Immunity from territorial invasion would have guaranteed the success of the revolutions that have been raging solely because of non-interference by the civilized nations; and Columbus, Agua Prieta, Glenn Springs, and worse, would have happened. With Mexico enjoying immunity as a League member, aggressions and invasions could have been met only by conversation, while the raiders, enriched and emboldened by this fatuous castigation, would have be-

come bolder, and the raids more frequent and farther reaching.

But, one moment. *IS* Mexico to be permanently debarred from membership? The United States has given Carranza *de facto* and *de jure* recognition, indicating that the nation thus favored can give and is giving satisfactory guarantees of compliance with its international obligations. Who will raise the question of Mexico's qualification for membership when she makes her application? The United States seems to be estopped from doing so. What wonder, in view of the situation that a little consideration of the past conjures up for the future, that the League Constitution as proposed is hailed as a beneficent gospel by the Mexican Government press? Extreme prison reform, with ice cream and cake for the daily menu, invariably meets with loud cheers from the criminal classes.

P. BECKWITH DAVIS.

BUSINESS MEN AND POLITICS

BY EDWARD G. RIGGS

THE entertaining and instructive article, "Quality versus Equality," contributed by Mrs. R. Clipston Sturgis to the August issue of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, has opened a new field of thought. Mrs. Sturgis gives personal experiences, states facts within the purview of her environment, and makes no pretense of furnishing a remedy for the discomforts of which she so good-naturedly speaks. Nor shall I attempt to offer a panacea or any form of remedy, for I am well aware that our friends in the labor organizations do not regard the high and mounting wages of today or the hours of work as inequalities. They regard them as a long delayed rendering of justice to themselves, and as the fulfillment of rightful demands on capital. Even had I a thought of suggesting remedies, I cannot forget a scene in the office of President Harrison in the White House thirty years ago when the President signed and handed to Theodore Roosevelt his commission as a United States Civil Service Commissioner. It is customary on such occasions for the President to proffer a few kindly words of advice or guidance, especially to the recipient of an influential office. "Congratulations, Mr. Roosevelt," the President said as he handed the engraved scroll to the man who twelve years later was to occupy his place, "and if you will permit me—I am somewhat older than yourself—do not, I pray you, think you can reform the universe in twenty-four hours."

I shall attempt only to offer a few suggestions, rather than to propose remedies for the inequalities of which Mrs. Sturgis speaks. Rather am I inclined to favor a kind of homeopathic treatment. If our workmen have unions and organizations, why should not our business men enjoy the same privilege?

Mr. A. B. Garretson, then President of the Order of

Railway Conductors, testified before the United States Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce in February that there are 3,000,000 workmen—perhaps a few more than that—who are members of labor organizations in the country. According to the census of 1910, the last official word, there are 38,167,336 persons engaged in useful occupations in the United States. It would be interesting if we could ascertain the real reasons why only 3,000,000 of that vast number of over thirty-eight millions are affiliated with labor organizations. Many theories have been advanced and much useless speculation indulged in by way of explanation; one fact remains: that the 3,000,000 represent a compact, unified force.

If our business men do not care to unionize or organize, why could they not take a more active personal interest in politics, and attend the primaries of their parties? Chambers of commerce and boards of trade are well enough, and the National Chamber of Commerce at Washington has done excellent work in getting the opinions of their thousands of members on the vital economic problems of the times, but as a rule the average business body “resolute” a good deal and lets it go at that.

Business men and others complain that labor unions receive first consideration at Washington and at most of our State capitals; that all legislation affecting labor interests has been looked upon in a favorable light. But why should not these labor unions and their representatives receive such consideration when their leaders, representatives, and members take an active and intense interest in political organizations and political questions? Labor men join political organizations, and thus take part in selecting, through the primaries, the members of the party committees, who compose “the organization” as well as the delegates to city, State and national conventions of the great parties, where platforms and principles are adopted for the consideration of our voters. The Presidential vote of 1916 was coincident with the vote in every cross-roads town and hamlet in the country for town officers, for members of Congress and State legislators, and for United States Senators, and the election of these latter carried with it the power to accept or reject appointments to office submitted by the President and by Governors, and to frame legislation.

Some business men complain that political heads of or-

ganizations pay little or no attention to their wishes in the make-up of tickets of candidates to be voted at the primaries. The political heads of organizations reply that they cannot interest business men in the details of the machinery of political organizations. The competition of our business life is swift and strenuous, and business men must devote most of their energies and time to their own affairs. Then, too, many of our business men object to holding public office, where the emoluments are small, and where their time would be taken up to the disadvantage of what they consider to be their legitimate undertakings. But when business men refuse to attend the primaries of their political parties, they turn over their powers and their influence to the heads of political organizations who are constantly associated with labor leaders and their friends. When the time for appointments to office comes around—either by a President, a Governor or a Mayor—do the candidates for those appointments seek indorsements from chambers of commerce and boards of trade, or individual business men? Sometimes, but mostly as a matter of form. On the other hand, those candidates for office are anxious for the endorsement of labor organizations. Labor men represent a compact force; and yet labor men do not vote as a class any more than do lawyers, physicians, clergymen or any other class of our citizens; or any more than our women vote, or will vote, in the future, as a sex.

It has been the fashion for political leaders to name through the primaries a sprinkling of business men as delegates to city, State and national conventions, but this action is quite gratuitous. These business men did not themselves, like their brother labor representatives in the conventions, earn the distinction at the primaries by personal effort.

Could the Greenback craze, the mania for rag money, have got under way fifty years ago if the business men of that time had performed their full duties as citizens? Could Populism have got a start? Could the Sixteen-to-One nonsense have come within an ace of electing a President of the United States if the business men of those days had given full heed to the beginnings of that heresy? Our business men are shrewd observers of events, they are among the best of our practical psychologists in the study of men; but how often does one hear the remark that while they are generous enough in contributions to campaign funds on the

eve of elections—as generous as the present laws allow—they take little or no interest in those perfectly human institutions, the primaries, which absolutely determine the nominations of candidates for office and the adoption of platforms which may bring very radical economic changes?

Our business men have, through indifference, or absorption in their own affairs, neglected the political opportunities they enjoy in our great Republic. They have neglected them in the shaping of municipal, State, and national affairs, and they have no one to blame but themselves for the attitude of legislators, who are frequently swayed by strictly labor influences.

The business men have permitted the political leaders and their affiliated politicians practically to govern for them, and thus to advance any sort of political and economic doctrines that redounded to the strength of political leaders and political organizations. In a word, they have delegated to the politicians the powers which they themselves, individually and collectively, should enjoy—powers which if properly exercised, would protect them from the subversive doctrines which are often tolerated by the politicians for reasons of political expediency.

How has this come about? Because our men of business have neglected to attend the primaries of their parties. In most of our States we have primaries for city, State and national affairs, for the selection of delegates to conventions or caucuses, or conferences where the candidates for local and federal offices are nominated and platforms of principles framed. But all that the business men of our country do is to step up to the polls on election day and vote for the candidates selected for them by the politicians at these primaries.

At a dinner party a short time ago eleven business men who were present were denouncing a certain political leader whom they believed to be unfair to them. His representatives, they said, had advanced in conferences, caucuses and conventions, alleged socialistic, anarchistic doctrines with no other thought than to gain popular support by appealing to prejudices against the financial and business men and institutions of our country. Finally, when they had become sufficiently excited in their comments over this political leader, they asked for my opinion as to the fairness of their comments.

"There are eleven gentlemen here, all of you business men," I replied. "Let me start at the beginning of your criticism by asking how many of you attended the primaries of your parties?"

Not one of them had attended their party primaries.

I then told them that there was not a primary in the United States—city, State or national—which, if attended by the business men, would not lead to the correction of many alleged inequalities; that the criticisms they had in mind were not based on substantial personal action; and I reiterated that if they and other business men would attend their party primaries, they could exert a potent influence on public affairs.

Some demurred, saying that they could not find time to attend the primaries of their parties. I replied that it would take only fifteen or thirty minutes of their time, once or perhaps twice a year. They answered that, even if they did attend the primaries, they found the tickets for delegates made up for them, already printed, and that all they could do was either to vote for the delegates on the printed tickets or not to vote at all.

"Not at all," I replied. "In your business organizations, chambers of commerce and boards of trade, you could stimulate your members to attend the primaries, and before going to these primaries you could have printed tickets naming the business men you desired to vote for as delegates to the various caucuses or conventions which adopt platforms and nominate candidates for office."

They looked dubious—it would, they said, take too much time and trouble.

I replied that they could do this in a single evening, two weeks before the primaries were called; that if they devoted only one evening a year to such a purpose, they could help to select delegates to the city, State, and national conventions, who, in naming the candidates for office and in adopting platforms, would have in mind the business interests of the country.

Several in the group replied that business men did not desire to enter the lists for public office. Admitting that, I rejoined that it would not be necessary for the business men's delegates to the various conventions or caucuses to become candidates for office, but that it was their duty to attend these primaries and to select business men as dele-

gates to the various conventions and caucuses, so that the political leaders would be compelled to nominate men for office with some idea of the business requirements of the country.

Our professional men,—lawyers, physicians, journalists, architects, professors, college presidents, civil engineers,—must be charged with similar disregard of their political duties as business men. What a power these professional men could wield for the benefit of all classes were they to act as compact bodies of our citizens through their societies and associations, accepting their full duties as citizens of the Republic!

Perhaps the most vivid illustration I can give of this lack of interest, is the result of the primaries to nominate a Governor for the State of New York last year. This was a hotly contested primary fight, yet the total vote in the Republican primaries for Charles S. Whitman and Merton E. Lewis, the two candidates for the nomination for Governor, was only 414,350, while the vote on election day for Governor Whitman, the winner in the primaries, was 956,034. The total vote for Governor in the Democratic primaries for the two candidates for the nomination, Alfred E. Smith and William Church Osborn, was only 232,513, while the vote on election day for Mr. Smith, the winner of the Democratic primaries, was 1,009,936. To analyze the figures still further, even in this stout primary battle Governor Whitman's individual vote in the primaries was only 295,471, whereas his vote on election day was 956,034; and in the Democratic primaries Mr. Smith received only 199,752 votes, whereas on election day his total vote was 1,009,936.

This shows a very wide discrepancy; and it should be remembered that the business men and other voters had no choice on election day save to vote for Mr. Whitman or Mr. Smith, or not to vote at all. The figures illustrate the failure of a vast majority of business men and our professional men and farmers in New York State to take any effective interest in the primaries.

One often hears bursts of indignation over the charge that the politicians control the selection of our Judges—Municipal, Supreme Court, United States Circuit, and Federal. Well, are not our business men, our professional men, lawyers especially, perfectly aware that this power

begins at the primaries? It is at the primaries that delegates are elected to the judicial conventions or conferences where candidates for Municipal Court and Supreme Court Judges are nominated. In these primaries is lodged also the power of the politicians to recommend to Mayors and Governors the appointment of Judges, Municipal and Supreme Court, when vacancies occur. It is from these same primaries that the political leaders and their friends derive the power to recommend to the President the naming of Judges for the Federal and Circuit Courts. Do not our business men and others of equal intelligence understand fully that from these primaries the politicians derive also the power to elect United States Senators, who in turn confirm the President's appointments of Circuit and Federal Judges, as well as the Judges of the Supreme Court?

The business men of few countries in the world are so neglectful or so indifferent to their political duties as the American business man.

Our business men seem to forget that politics in this country is a business, a trade, that the politicians are constantly on the job, day in and day out, studying and perfecting their trade, just as our business men are studying and perfecting their own particular vocations. By a mingling of the two interests, legitimate business and legitimate politics, there would be perhaps fewer opportunities for politicians to sneer at business men and for business men to scoff at politicians, and a more equable understanding as to economic policies, and problems could be brought about,—and I have not read Rousseau's *Perpetual Peace* in twenty-five years.

Massachusetts in November last voted to accept the amendment presented by the Constitutional Convention calling for a compulsory voting law. The law is to be in operation for the first time this coming November. The total vote for Governor of Massachusetts last year was 412,691. It may be interesting to note the total vote for Governor in the State this year. Up to the time that Massachusetts passed this compulsory voting law, compulsory voting was mentioned in only one of the constitutions of the forty-eight States, that of North Dakota, which provides that "the Legislature . . . may prescribe penalties for failing, neglecting, or refusing to vote at any General Election." Thus far, however, the legislature of that State has

not passed any act in execution of this permissive power. There are compulsory voting laws in Austria, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, New Zealand and Tasmania, but they have not proved effective influences in getting out to any great extent a larger vote—mainly for the homely old reason that you may drive a horse to the trough but you cannot force him to drink; and the penalties attached to the compulsory voting laws in the foreign countries mentioned have not been sufficiently severe to overcome a disinclination to exercise the franchise.

In America a new and potent force is to be exerted in 1920: the women voters. Full suffrage franchise already exists in Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Washington, California, Kansas, Arizona, Oregon, Montana, Nevada, New York, Michigan, Oklahoma, South Dakota; and additional States will doubtless fall into line before election day 1920. Mrs. Carrie Chapman Catt, President of the National American Women's Suffrage Association, has been good enough to estimate for me the number of women voters to take part in the Fall election next year: 12,000,000, she says, is a fair guess. Are the women voters of the States mentioned to be as neglectful of their power and influence in the primaries,—the starting post of all who determine executive and legislative action, municipal, State and federal,—as the business men of our country have been?

EDWARD G. RIGGS.

TWO POEMS

BY AMY LOWELL

I.

LITTLE IVORY FIGURES PULLED WITH STRING

Is it the tinkling of mandolins which disturbs you?
Or the dropping of bitter-orange petals among the coffee-cups?
Or the slow creeping of the moonlight between the olive trees?

*Drop! drop! the rain
Upon the thin plates of my heart.*

String your blood to chord with this music,
Stir your heels upon the cobbles to the rhythm of a dance-tune.

They have slim thighs and arms of silver;
The moon washes away their garments;
They make a pattern of fleeing feet in the branch-shadows,
And the green grapes knotted about them
Burst as they press against one another.

*The rain knocks upon the plates of my heart,
They are crumpled with its beating.*

Would you drink only from your brains, Old Man?
See, the moonlight has reached your knees,
It falls upon your head in an accolade of silver.
Rise up on the music,
Fling against the moon-drifts in a whorl of young light bodies:

Leaping grape-clustres,
Vine-leaves tearing from a grey wall.
You shall run, laughing, in a braid of women,
And weave flowers with the frosty spines of thorns.
Why do you gaze into your glass,
And jar the spoons with your finger-tapping?

*The rain is rigid on the plates of my heart.
The murmur of it is loud—loud.*

II

TREES IN WINTER

Pine-trees:

Black clouds slowly swaying
Over a white earth.

Hemlocks:

Coned green shadows
Through a falling veil.

Elm-trees:

Stiff black threads
Lacing over silver.

Cedars:

Layered undulations
Roofing naked ground.

Almonds:

Flaring needles
Stabbing at a grey sky.

Weeping cherries:

Tossing smoke
Swept down by wind.

Oaks:

Twisted beams
Cased in alabaster.

AMY LOWELL.

NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

SOCIAL STUDIES OF THE WAR. By Elmer T. Clark, Litt. D. New York: George H. Doran Company.

There are two sides to the moral lesson taught by the war. While unsuspected resources of heroism have been revealed, depths of depravity have been laid bare. And perhaps the most important effect that the war can produce upon men's minds is just this new conception of human nature as a thing of tremendous height and depth. In a sense, the religious view of human life has been forced upon a world that has been but mildly religious and far from theological in its usual mode of thought. *The Pilgrim's Progress* is a great book precisely because it realizes with dramatic intensity the struggle between good and evil in ordinary life. And now, by a tremendous object-lesson, we are being made to realize that the battle with Apollyon is unavoidable and more bitter than we had supposed; that the wickedness of Vanity Fair is viler than we had imagined.

According to Dr. Clark, several of the Entente countries have been, during the war, fairly inundated with vice. Though little supported by documentary or statistical evidence, and hence open to incredulity as containing elements of exaggeration or hearsay, the author's statements upon this subject are impressive. Dr. Clark has had ample opportunities to make observations and to receive inside information. Nor does he strike one as, in the least, an alarmist or a sensationalist. His words point to a condition that, in England, has been, to some extent already bruited. The social evil, it would appear, has increased enormously—especially in England, in France, and in Italy; it has got beyond all bounds; it is open and shameless. What is worse, unnatural vice—vice said to have been propagated by German agents, and then made an instrument of blackmail—has spread frightfully. Doubtless, there is something of hysteria in these reports. But there is nothing hysterical about Dr. Clark, and to him the whole situation seems exceedingly grave.

Over against this evil condition may be set an actual religious uplift. "In a real sense," testifies Dr. Clark, "in spite of unmorality and anti-ecclesiasticism, the war has given birth to the God-idea. And this insures the perpetuation of religion." Nay, more; "out of the changing order there seems destined to issue a more vital religious faith than anything we have ever known before."

What, then, are we to do in the light of this new conception of humanity, this enlarged vision of sin and of heroic virtue? Qualities

better than military gallantry or disciplined bravery have been evoked by the struggle; but if the worst vices generally prevalent among American fighting men are cigarette-smoking, swearing, and bad grammar, moral looseness of an infinitely worse sort appears to have flourished elsewhere. What sort of adjustment should be made to this anomalous and challenging situation?

Dr. Clark's point of view seems to be that of one who believes that the natural and proper instruments of reform are the churches. This view is perhaps too narrow. The whole problem, though not too big for religion, is conceivably too big for the churches. For the churches, as human organizations, are just one of the forms of endeavor that religion inspires.

Doubtless the churches need admonishing. Dr. Clark makes it appear that they have conspicuously failed to check vice. Chaplains at the front have winked at immorality, and have adopted a lower moral standard than the inner sense of the men has approved. In welfare work, too, the churches have been less efficient than the lay organizations. But if the churches have really lost spiritual leadership, advice to them to regain it seems only a very indirect answer to the general ethical problem.

Probably Dr. Clark's suggestions are wise. Though controversy is not just what the present situation demands, the author, speaking the truth as he sees it, may legitimately conceive that he is doing good by arguing that the Papacy has not gained in repute during the war, and by urging the Catholic Church to give up the idea of temporal headship. Among the Protestant churches a simplified and vivified theology is certainly to be wished for. If premillenarianism and that sort of thing is nearly so prevalent as Dr. Clark indicates, there is a world of misdirected religious thinking among the masses. And the suggestion that theology must be "harmonized with sociology" is undoubtedly good, if rightly understood. But only if rightly understood. For the *preaching* of sociology has seldom proved satisfactory; it rather easily becomes the preaching of socialism or of pacifism or of sociological doctrine too doubtful for practical use. And, then, too, sociology seems to have a singular power to absorb and dissolve theology; we are already perhaps too much inclined to think that the "God-idea" and the humanitarian idea are identical.

Dr. Clark's ideas seem to need further explication. But, supposing them adequately explained, do they not fall considerably short of the larger mark at which constructive suggestion should be aimed? Is the church the right institution, for example, to teach the brute facts about vice, to re-educate and reinstate prostitutes and drunkards, to secure the right relation between employer and employed? The "church" as religion in action, as the unofficial and mystical union of all religiously minded men could do these things and more; for the church in this sense is simply morally inspired humanity. But for such tasks the churches, as instruments, seem, to speak bluntly, indifferently fitted.

The fire that "we cannot kindle when we will" has been burning brightly "over there." It appears to have been kindled and kept alive not by the churches but by the war. The pressing question is how to canalize and employ the new energy. Men need causes to fight for

as good as that of winning the war; they need a simpler sense of duty in ordinary life, a better adjustment of potential virtue to obvious duty. To meet this need, heart-work and head-work are required of all persons and of all agencies: the war lesson needs to be learned by the schools, the press, and the theatre; by the corporations and by the labor unions. Doubtless there is power in Christianity to unify all these forms of activity, and Christianity is even now unifying them. But can the churches at present do this work? Without in the least denying the power of religion, one may suggest that a good deal of preliminary work must be done by other agencies before the church can get the full benefit of the emergent moral impulse. A church that cannot solve the labor problem—because it is not a storehouse of wisdom about labor—will suffer from ethical bewilderment as much as any other group—until the labor problem is solved.

NEW SCHOOLS FOR OLD. By Evelyn Dewey. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company.

We can have new schools for old if we want them. The thing needed is simply the individual will to think intelligently and to work devotedly. But what one invariably finds when one investigates backward institutions like the country church or the country school is that extremely little "common sense" (moral intelligence) has been applied to the situation; remarkably little moral effort has been made. The kind of "sense" that enables people to make the most of small means for a worthy end and so to achieve results that seem astonishing cannot be taught by lectures; it cannot be produced by circularizing people; it cannot be bought. It works by example, by demonstration; it works from within and leavens a community. And within the community moral intelligence always seems to do its work effectually. We are invariably surprised when we hear of such results as those accomplished by Mrs. Marie Turner Harvey in the school of Porter, Missouri. Yet it is hardly an exaggeration to say that such experiments always succeed. A person who wants to labor for his fellows need not be a genius, nor even an expert. All experience seems to show that a vast number of human problems can be solved by good intelligence, inspired—yes, actually uplifted and made keener—by unselfish purpose. This fails only when the problem involves rare intellectual difficulties, such as require the mind of a statesman or a specialist. And the assistance of the specialist, at least, can usually be had.

The Porter School is in the northern part of Missouri, in a district that lies next to the city of Kirksville. A few years ago it had a one-room school that was as bad as bad could be—unhygienic, ill-equipped, inefficient. Now it has a one-room school that is a marvel of suitability to its environment. Mrs. Harvey, an experienced rural teacher who had charge of a model country school in connection with the State Normal School at Kirksville, accomplished the change. Her model school, she knew, did not fit the conditions of any particular community, and it did draw pupils from Porter, thus encouraging the drift away from country life; and so she resolved to try an experiment *in situ*. To this experiment she devoted not merely a part of her mind—her specialized knowledge—but her whole self. And while she gave

herself freely, she insisted upon independence—a cottage of her own, a recognized position in the community. These conditions are obviously essential. Having them, Mrs. Harvey wrought a miracle; and the most striking fact about her achievement is, as Miss Dewey points out, that "it has been accomplished with no greater resources than are available in any isolated district." The lesson is plain. "What we need is not a certain system, nor a lot of new methods and equipment, but a direction, a conscious purpose toward which the schools shall strive." The purpose, be it noted, is not to be merely a phase of communal enthusiasm (Germany had communal enthusiasm) but a broadly self-respecting—that is, a fundamentally unselfish purpose.

Such is the lesson, but how are we to apply it? It is the old, old question of how to make moral energy work and spread. We cannot get better schools merely by legislative enactment. We cannot get them merely by paying rural teachers better wages. We cannot get them merely by teaching improved methods. "The theoretical training given in normal schools to-day all points," says Miss Dewey, "to the value of such teaching as Mrs. Harvey's." Mrs. Harvey's teaching is up-to-date, intelligent, above all suited to the particular needs and interests of her pupils, but it is not revolutionary. The fundamental question, then is not so much how to teach as how to get a Mrs. Harvey to do the teaching.

Is not here, one may suggest, exactly the sort of sociological problem which the churches, without involving themselves in speculative sociology, could help to solve? There are plenty of serious-minded girls in America; they may be found doing all sorts of work—some of it unsatisfying enough, however well-paid. Ministers are commendably active in sending young people to college and out into the mission fields. Couldn't ministers—or, better, the whole church community—exercise a valuable influence by directing the right sort of young folks toward a career of splendid usefulness in the rural field? College or normal school probably would have to come first; but after that the church would have a practical and idealistic answer to the aching question, "What next?"—an answer that would doubtless fit many cases.

Miss Dewey's account of Mrs. Harvey's work is as fascinating as an old-fashioned fairy-tale: everything comes out so much better than one's hopeful interest dares to predict. In the beginning Mrs. Harvey encountered unbelievable prejudice; in the end she obtained wonderfully hearty coöperation. Miss Dewey's book ought to be in every public library, in every school library, in every Sunday-school library. It ought to be talked about wherever young people may hear about it and be impressed by it. It ought to be on the moving picture screens.

PRUSSIANISM AND PACIFISM. By Poultney Bigelow. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

The story of Prussianism as related by Mr. Bigelow is a singularly consistent narrative of intrigue, ambition, evil will. "The violation of Belgian neutrality by Wilhelm II., in 1914, stands as a landmark in criminology, but it is inseparably linked with that pleasant day in September of 1862 when the grandfather of Wilhelm II. gave one of many

instances where treaties have been but scraps of paper—in Hohenzollern eyes.” When Wilhelm I., at the instance of Bismarck decided to abolish the constitution, a step was taken in the direction of Armageddon. History is continuous. “This war,” writes Mr. Bigelow with his customary pungency, “is but one of a chain of wars that commenced when the first German saw that his neighbor had something.”

The story is told with great freshness and vigor. It speaks out the truth, as one man saw it and felt it, in a manner not common in histories. Especially striking are the authors’ estimates of men and the vision he gives of German system and German directness of purpose. Mr. Bigelow writes as one who has lived in the atmosphere or under the shadow of such personalities as Bismarck, Moltke, Wilhelm II.; and concerning them he gives us the results not only of logical judgment, but of moral insight. He makes us see that America might have learned from Germany in 1870 the meaning of preparedness. “In the summer of 1870, Moltke received word that his King had declared war on France. ‘Very well—open draw X. Y. Z. and you will find the French frontier—the orders are all made out—see that they are delivered. Good day!’ and the head of the general staff turned over and finished his nap.” It is an old lesson and a good one: the Devil is never lazy or unprepared. But it is a hard lesson for some to learn: in 1917 Americans were authoritatively assured that if this country were invaded a million well-armed soldiers would spring from the ground and chase the enemy into the sea!

Throughout the narrative, a reasonable and wholesome stress is laid upon the effect of individual thought and action. Washington and Cavour are contrasted with the Iago-like Bismarck; Frederick the Noble, under whose leadership Germany might conceivably have attained moral greatness, with the megalomaniac Wilhelm II. Character, good or bad, weak or strong, is a force at least as potent as economic causation, and not nearly so well understood as questions of wealth and population. Bismarck willed that Wilhelm I. should not abdicate; Queen Victoria willed that England should not interfere to prevent the spoliation of Denmark; the Empress Eugénie willed that France should go to war with Germany—in such things there is an unaccountable element that should put us on our guard against hasty generalization.

And the moral of it all is that we cannot safely depart from the good old dualistic and individualistic view of human life—from the belief that the good man should “trust in God and keep his powder dry.” We must not put all our faith in laws or leagues, or luck; in treaties or in general “progress.” We must not uncritically adopt a pleasant theory about human nature. “Let us honor the peacemakers,” writes Mr. Bigelow; “let us labor for brotherhood amongst nations; let us rear churches to him who preached upon the Mount of Olives, and let us even believe that man is improving in some respects, if not in all. But the man who loves his country should feel that the first duty of Government is to make that country safe from attack.”

History, of course, does not prove that the human race has made no progress. It does not demonstrate that universal peace is an impossibility—who does not believe that sooner or later this ideal will be

realized? But it does furnish a most ironic commentary upon pacifism—which is the mistaking of an ideal for a reality. The irony of the rise of Prussianism, as a commentary upon pacifism, Mr. Bigelow very tellingly expresses.

THE OLD FREEDOM. By Francis Neilson. New York: B. W. Huebsch.

Drawing largely upon English history for facts, quoting liberally from the histories of Stubbs, Freeman, and Green, and even from Taine's justly celebrated *History of English Literature*, Mr. Neilson seeks to establish the thesis that the salvation of society depends upon an immediate return to first principles—principles long ignored and now almost forgotten. "While science," he declares, "must go always forward, adding to its data and developing its process, in politics the tendency must be backward, back to true democracy."

To the support of this contention, the recent philosophical thinkers, as well as the somewhat less up-to-date historians are made to contribute. "There are three men in particular who have revealed to us in recent years the probability of a new era, or rather the return to the best of an old era." These men are Henri Bergson, Franz Oppenheimer, and Dr. Nicolai, author of *The Biology of War*. Bergson "has swept away all the lumber of the latter-day Spencer." In the light of his philosophy, it would appear, one may perceive that the report of the Whitley Commission, with its suggestion of a cautious evolution toward industrial democracy, is simply a piece of weak, old-fashioned, evolutionary policy. It looks to a slow, forward movement, whereas the true progress should be both backward and sudden. Franz Oppenheimer, holding a high position as an economist in the University of Berlin, has written "undoubtedly the most learned, the most thorough analytical treatise of the growth of the State," and has "revealed a desire to return to first principles." As for Dr. Nicolai, he has shown on biological principles the folly of German State Socialism and of German militarism, and he has preached a philosophy eminently sane and sound—except that its only basis is biology.

What is the proposition to which this rather oddly assorted list of thinkers are made—perhaps unwittingly—to lend their support, either as opponents of socialism or as advocates of first principles? In about seven pages at the end of his book, Mr. Neilson reveals the secret: the way of social and political salvation lies through the taxation of the full monopoly value of land.

The proposition that the state should take monopoly values, giving community-created values to the community and to the individual the full value of his product, is not wholly new. In fact, it has been a good deal discussed. One realizes, of course, that quite a strong case can be made out for it. But surely it has never before been advocated in just this way.

TWELVE MEN. By Theodore Dreiser. New York: Boni and Liveright.

Certain readers who care more for literature than for realism

may possibly be surprised that the author of *Sister Carrie*, *Jennie Gerhardt*, *The Financier*, *The Titan*, and other titanic works, should write so pointedly and so pregnantly as Mr. Dreiser has done in *Twelve Men*. The narratives in this latest book of his—narratives that are at the same time artfully developed short-stories and conversationally told character sketches—do not, to be sure, lack realism. They are thoroughly unconventional, and they are true. They have also the superficial traits of speaking with little delicacy about sex and of quoting profanity exactly. But thorough unconventionality—to say nothing of the superficial traits—is a virtue. And the stories are not—thank Heaven!—realistic in the sense of being tediously and majestically true to fact: they do not tell at merciless length what may be known just as well through epitome, through sample, or through suggestion. Nor do they contain merely a grain of imagination hidden away in a wagon-load of the hay, wood, stubble of experience. On the contrary in these tales Mr. Dreiser's imagination actively interprets life, interprets it with that reserve, that skepticism which—rather than delight in the raw material of human existence—is the mark of intelligent realism.

Verily, "what a piece of work is man"! Life is ever so much bigger and more interesting than conventional morality, conventional sentiment, conventional romance—such is the excellent reaction produced upon the mind by Mr. Dreiser's sketches of such men as "Peter," the bohemian artist, thinker, and practical joker, to whom *home life* was, after all, the ultimate reality; "Paul Dresser," the author's brother who was the composer of "Just Tell Them that You Saw Me" and "On the Banks of the Wabash"; "Culhane, the Solid Man" (Muldoon), who at his sanatorium has put into practise a system of athletic morals and of moral strenuousness that is a criticism of life no less telling and no less enjoyable than is the grotesque irony of a Carlyle; "X," the one-time millionaire—one respects the author's delicacy about revealing his true name—who, having achieved affluence by a combination of the virtue preached by Samuel Smiles and the masterful shrewdness celebrated in novels about big business, developed—not high moral character or respectability—but a certain sincerity and romantic grandeur of soul.

No one, it may be said, has drawn with more truth, with more genuine humor, or with more genuine reverence for the mystery of human personality, than has Mr. Dreiser such so-called "types" as the country doctor, the Irish contractor, the religious enthusiast. All the men in the author's gallery of obscure or conspicuous notables impress one deeply by their inexplicable force, and puzzle one by the variety of their ideals and standards.

No mature and open-minded person, whether interested simply in human beings, or, like "Culhane," in the history of morals, should miss reading these realistic, and intimately realized, sketches.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

MR. WM. ROSCOE THAYER AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

SIR,—Mr. Thayer's reply to me in the September REVIEW concerning the Venezuela matter indicates that he is indifferent to documentary evidence, and finds hearsay sufficiently satisfactory for his purposes. If he had consulted the Red Book, he would have learned that it was Mr. Hay who authorized me to act for Venezuela. That being the case, I could not, of course, encourage him to state that it was Mr. Roosevelt. In asking Mr. Hay to act as mediator, I pursued the usual course; and in selecting Washington as the place for negotiations, I simply followed the good diplomatic rule to secure as the seat for carrying on a controversy one with a favorable environment. What I wanted was the moral support of the American people. The aid of Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Hay I neither solicited nor accepted during my entire stay in Washington, and it would have been highly improper for either of them to have attempted to control my work or to interfere in the negotiations. Only those who are duly authorized can act as arbitrators or plenipotentiaries. I did my work, and no one else did it, and I naturally must decline to be browbeaten by Mr. Thayer into permitting the false statement to be made and repeated without contradiction, that Mr. Roosevelt did it. Would Mr. Thayer allow any other person than himself to claim the authorship of Mr. Thayer's biography of John Hay? Of course not; and if he submitted documentary proof as conclusive evidence of the fact that he himself wrote the book, would he not expect the public to accept that evidence rather than hearsay? I offer the Red Book and Blue Book as complete and final proof of the truth of my assertions. Mr. Thayer ignores all documents, tells his impossible story, and then quotes Mr. Roosevelt and Dr. Buenz, the German Consul-General in New York, and concludes with the declaration that, if the story were not true, Bernstorff, the German Ambassador in Washington, would have denied it. Mr. Roosevelt admitted that he fooled both the American people and the Kaiser; Dr. Buenz was sentenced to an American prison for making false statements and for other discreditable reasons; and Bernstorff was too busy lying to tell the truth about anything.

HERBERT W. BOWEN.

Woodstock, Conn.

MR. THAYER'S REJOINDER

SIR,—Mr. Bowen resorts to a quibble. He must know perfectly well that I know that any correspondence which he, as an employee, addressed to the State Department, went to Secretary Hay. All I asserted, and still assert, is, that without the consent of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay, neither he nor any other diplomatic agent of the United States could have served as mediator for a foreign nation. Mr. Bowen wishes throughout to convey the impression that he was absolutely without superior. Some of the despatches printed in the Red Book for 1903, under the heading "Venezuela," will correct this impression. As to the Red Book itself, which Mr. Bowen appeals to as the beginning and end of all authority in diplomatic history, he surely cannot suppose that all his readers are as ignorant as he pretends to be of the character of the Red Book. The Red Book is a selected collection of the diplomatic documents of our State Department issued each year. It is neither complete, nor are the documents printed verbatim. In the very section referring to Mr. Bowen's transactions, I find certain despatches paraphrased, while certain others are not printed at all, as the footnotes warn the reader.

Now, as every person knows, the Secretary of State, or in England the Foreign Secretary, has confidential private letters from Ministers and Ambassadors, and he writes privately to them. These letters contain the real facts and the motives which form the basis of diplomacy. They do not go back to the archives of the State Department, but are kept by the Secretary or Ambassador who receives them. I have seen scores of such letters, and when Mr. Bowen, who has not seen them, as I know, accuses me of writing history on hearsay, I must smile at his effrontery. If he wrote no confidential letters to his chief, Mr. Hay, or received none, the inference must be that he was not regarded as a person who inspired confidence.

The public can have no interest in Mr. Bowen's opinion of my historical work. The point at issue, which he has consistently dodged since my *Life of John Hay* came out four years ago, is, whether President Roosevelt made up the story about forcing the Kaiser to arbitrate the Venezuela matter or not. Mr. Bowen thinks that President Roosevelt lied. I do not. The conflict, therefore, is between Roosevelt and Bowen, and I believe that the public, now and hereafter, which knows the two men, will credit Roosevelt.

President Roosevelt did many diplomatic strokes without consulting Mr. Bowen. He sent private letters to the German Kaiser, to the Russian Czar, and to the Mikado of Japan. I am very sure that Mr. Bowen never saw one of these letters. I do not think that he will find copies of them in the State Archives (unless they have recently been placed there). I have looked for them in vain in the Red Book; and yet, will Mr. Bowen assert that President Roosevelt did not write them, but merely lied about them?

Mr. Bowen wishes to destroy the value of Buenz as a corroborative witness, on the ground that Buenz in 1916 was imprisoned for fomenting German plots against the United States. By what rule of evidence would that vitiate Buenz's testimony in regard to Holleben and President Roosevelt given in 1903? Benedict Arnold was a

traitor in 1780; would that vitiate his competence to bear witness, on a wholly different matter, in 1765?

In closing, I wish to say that I believe that Mr. Bowen is perfectly sincere in thinking that he brought about arbitration in the Venezuelan matter. His work as mediator was his only title to fame, and I sympathize with the great chagrin he feels at having that title taken away. But evidently if he were not so obsessed with his own importance he would have learned how statesmen and diplomats conduct their confidential correspondence. He would have learned also how in many negotiations President Roosevelt took affairs into his own hands, and conducted them to a finish, even without consulting his Secretary of State, or leaving a trace of evidence in the official archives; he would have learned that the Red Book, like the English Blue Book, instead of being infallible or complete, merely contains what the officials who compiled it regarded as expedient that the public should know.

I trust that Mr. Bowen will perceive that he has no further business with me. His quarrel was, and is, with Roosevelt; and he took good care not to attack Roosevelt personally while he was living. I have no doubt that Roosevelt dead will be found by the American public more than a match for Mr. Bowen.

WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER.

Magnolia, Mass.

COLOMBIA AND "BLACKMAIL"

SIR,—In the July number of *THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*, in an article entitled "Chapters of Roosevelt's Life," Mr. William Roscoe Thayer says:

... he circumvented the attempt of the Colombian blackmailers to block our construction of the Canal. . . .

And:

German intrigue was also working in Bogota, and influenced the Colombian blackmailers in refusing to sign the Hay-Herran treaty with the United States

Why "Colombian blackmailers"? Is this the way Mr. Thayer writes history?

The *Century Dictionary* gives the following definitions:

Blackmail (noun): Extortion in any mode by means of intimidation, as the extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure.

Blackmail (verb): To extort money or goods from, by means of intimidation or threats of injury of any kind, as exposure of actual or supposed wrong-doing.

Which was the victim of "intimidation or threats of injury"—the United States or Colombia?

If our present Senate should refuse to ratify the Treaty of Peace, with its League or Covenant of Nations, would its majority members be *American blackmailers*?

Was our treaty of May 8, 1871, with Great Britain, by which we secured millions for the depredations committed by the *Alabama* and other vessels, a "hold-up" or blackmail?

Article I of this treaty reads:

And whereas Her Britannic Majesty has authorized Her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries to express, in a friendly way, the regret felt by Her Majesty's Government for the escape, under whatever circumstances, of the *Alabama* and other vessels from British ports, and for the depredations committed by those vessels. . . .

but we, a nation of 100,000,000 people, have persistently refused to express our regret for a misunderstanding with Colombia, a nation of only 4,500,000.

If the refusal of the Colombian Senate to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty was blackmail, what is the refusal of our own Senate to ratify the pending treaty with Colombia?

And what about the Root-Cortes treaty, made when Mr. Root was President Roosevelt's Secretary of State and which gave Colombia only fewer millions of dollars?

Can Mr. Thayer, American historian, be ignorant of the fact that in 1870 our Minister at Bogota, Mr. Hurlbut, and the Colombian Commissioners, Dr. Justo Arosemena and Señor Jacobo Sanchez, made a treaty by which Colombia ceded to the United States the right to construct the Panama Canal, and that *our* Senate refused to ratify said treaty?

Was this blackmail?

It was only after this refusal upon our part that in 1878 the concession was given to the French company through M. Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse.

Finally, can Mr. Thayer be ignorant of the fact that a majority of the present Senate—although not the required two-thirds—is and has always been in favor of the ratification of the pending Colombian treaty, that it is approved by the President and Secretary of State, and that the President has repeatedly urged favorable action upon it?

Why, then, continue to write about "Colombian blackmailers"?

Some years ago THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW published an article by Dr. Leander T. Chamberlain, entitled "A Chapter of National Dishonor," the essentials of which have never been and cannot be disproved. At Senator Hitchcock's request, this article was incorporated as a Senate Document, No. 380-62 D, Congress, March, 1912. Also, THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, in editorials, has several times urged the ratification of the Colombian treaty.

In 1903, Colombia had just emerged from the throes of a disastrous civil war. She was in terrible financial straits. The premium on gold was 25,000 per cent. It is still 10,000 per cent. She had a perfect right to put any price upon the Canal Zone, because she had reversionary rights not only in the Canal but in the Panama Railroad. These rights she could not ethically or legally forfeit, even granting the right of secession, successfully opposed in our own case, to Panama. By our intervention she lost not only these reversionary rights, but the province of Panama as well. The United States, by virtue of the treaty of 1846, had several times landed American troops upon the Isthmus, but they had always aided the National Government to put down an insurrection; this time they aided the rebels—the single incident of "a scrap of paper" in our history!

The Panama matter has never been properly understood by the usually fair-minded American people. There were, in fact, three

primary reasons for the adjournment of the Colombian Senate without ratification of the Hay-Herran treaty:

1. The first was purely political. Vice President Marroquin had succeeded the defunct Dr. Sanclemente as President of Colombia, and it was feared that, should he receive ten millions of dollars, he would either perpetuate himself in power or make his son, Don Lorenzo, his successor. The opposition in the Senate was headed by Dr. Miguel Antonio Caro, who had preceded Sanclemente and intended to succeed Marroquin. His followers, the Caristas, were in the majority, but they only desired to delay matters until the advent of Dr. Caro, less than a year later. *They* wanted to spend the ten millions.

2. The second reason was internal. It was argued that the cession of territory was unconstitutional, but the Caristas proposed to consume the necessary time in procuring an amendment to the constitution. This may have been merely an excuse.

3. The third reason was international. In the state of uncertainty that prevailed, the impatience of President Roosevelt manifested itself. The "big stick" was wielded, and Minister Beaupré, at Bogota, was cabled to inform the Colombian Government that it would amend the treaty or delay its ratification at its peril. Perhaps it was not possible to do this diplomatically. At any rate, the edict went forth, and the Senate, as any other self-respecting body would have done under the circumstances, adjourned *sine die*. The "intimidation or threats" were ours!

The writer knew Colonel Roosevelt personally—was under deep obligations to him, and told him once that if he would stick to his California speech: "I took the Canal Zone!" because he thought it necessary, but would approve the pending Colombian treaty as he had approved the Root-Cortes treaty, which differed only in degree—he would be the greatest man in America, as he already was in the United States. Unfortunately, great as he unquestionably was, he lacked one public virtue—magnanimity!

Washington, D. C.

HENRY ROWAN LEMLY.
(Captain, U. S. A.)

THE CHARGE DEFENDED

SIR,—I am obliged to your correspondent for correcting my English. After reading his defense and eulogy of the Colombian politicians, I see that "blackmailers" is altogether too mild, polite, and inexact a word for them. A political ring, like the Caristas, which refused to ratify this Treaty because they hoped that by putting off ratification to the next year, they, and not Marroquin and his ring, could divide the ten million dollars spoils, is fortunate in finding Captain Lemly to defend it.

Captain Lemly has not stated, however, that the Colombians forced the postponement in order to foreclose in 1904 the concession to the French, which was to run till 1910. By thus tearing up their sworn and signed contract, for which the French had already paid them, these Colombians counted on making twenty-five million dollars, in additional spoils, plus the value of the work the French had already done in digging the Canal.

Captain Lemly refers derisively to my supposed ignorance of other Treaties. My ignorance can not be defended, but I must protest against any American officer, wearing the uniform of the United States Army, suggesting that the American agents at Geneva—Charles Francis Adams, Judge E. R. Hoar, and Bancroft Davis—were in any way comparable with the ringsters at Bogota, who, according to his own statement, regarded the Treaty as a means to their private spoils.

I have read the despatches to and from Mr. Beaupré and Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt. If Captain Lemly read them, too, their dates and contents must have strangely changed between my reading and his.

On inquiry and by consulting *Who's Who?* and other sources of information, I find that Captain Lemly, U. S. A., was for twelve years Director of the National Military School at Bogota. The Colombian Government gave him a commission as Colonel, and presumably paid his wages. It also made him Commissioner General for Colombia at the World's Columbian Exposition. Have we a right to infer, therefore, that he is not prejudiced *against* the Colombians?

Of Captain Lemly's final shot at Roosevelt's lack of magnanimity, we must agree to differ.

He says that the Panama Question is insufficiently known. He is right. The Colombians and the lobby at Washington which has so industriously pushed the bill for paying Colombia twenty-five million dollars, have consistently tried to make the American public forget the rights and desires of the Province of Panama. This Province for fifty years did not wish to belong to Colombia, and it repeatedly strove to win independence from Colombia, with which it had neither common interests nor common principles. When the American Colonies strove for their independence, France helped them. Why should not the United States have helped the Panamanians in their struggle?

And now we propose to present the Colombian Government with twenty-five million dollars. The most it asked in 1903 was ten million. Having found that, in their blackmailing scheme, they had overreached themselves, they sent General Reyes to Washington with an offer to sign the Treaty for eight millions. Mr. Wayne MacVeagh, who was attorney for Reyes and Colombia, told me that they would have taken five. From five millions to twenty-five millions represents the unearned increment which an industrious and persistent lobby can give to a transaction of this kind.

WILLIAM ROSCOE THAYER.

Magnolia, Mass.

WHY IT STANDS ALONE

SIR.—The July and August issues of THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW appear to me to afford striking justification for the comment which I hear from intelligent men and women of my acquaintance—who seek truth and not simply a smug confirmation of their cherished opinions—that THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW stands almost alone among American magazines in the force and directness of its editorials and articles on current affairs.

I am moved to offer some comment upon this comment, because,

in my judgment, there has never been a time when firm declarations by serious students of politics, whether or not one agrees with their content, could perform a greater service to the nation, or when loose thinking and vague expression have had a greater power than they now have to set up a train of consequences so pernicious or so irremediable.

I do not, of course, agree with all your views on national polity, or with all those of your contributors; but it is when I am farthest from complete assent that your editorial policy confers upon me the greatest benefit. This policy I interpret to be one of furnishing your readers not merely with a series of brilliant, didactic statements but also with the facts upon which these statements rest.

When these facts supplement, as they must often do, the reader's own stock of information, it is a clear gain to him; when your deductions from the facts are at variance with those of the reader the clarity and vigor of your style compel him, if he is an honest student, to re-examine his position. If, at the end, he rejects your conclusions, this rejection is due to those temperamental differences which represent the gyroscopic principle in the philosophy of politics, and which give us, on the basis of accepted facts, a pull in one direction towards conservatism, and in the other towards radicalism.

The commonest form of attack to which you are subjected in the press and in the conversations of the politicians is of a character which furnishes a strong inferential guarantee of the accuracy of your facts and of the soundness of your judgments.

Any editorial you write, any article you publish, can be honestly assailed only upon two grounds: one that your facts are not facts, the other that, though your facts are facts, your reasoning from them is unsound. In the adverse criticisms of you which have reached my eye and my ear there is, in the main, a singular absence of either charge. For the most part your facts are not denied; your deductions from them are not challenged. Your guilt seems to lie in your failure to set up in front of your opponents' artillery an edifice constructed of misinformation and adorned with false reasoning, which at the first canonade of truth and logic would crumble before the approving gaze of all men.

But, since truth is your bastion and logic your portcullis, your antagonists have to content themselves with marching round the fort and proclaiming to the world at large that the Knight within is a most malicious, prejudiced, and vindictive person.

The situation reminds me of a conversation I heard some years ago at a very formal dinner in London. A young Englishman, just returned from New York, was endeavoring to entertain an elderly spinster, bearing with great dignity a name highly distinguished in the home counties, whose travels had been limited on the north by the hydropathic establishments of Harrogate and on the south by the creameries of Devonshire. The young man, amply endowed with that admirable hatred of exaggeration which is one of the noblest traits of the Briton, remarked that the Woolworth building was higher than Windsor Castle—"Oh, quite!"

This disadvantageous comparison led the elderly spinster to express her fear that the young man had become Americanized; but when this horrid charge failed to change the young man's conception of

relative altitudes, the elderly spinster brought the discussion to an end by remarking:

"Well, Sir Henry, you have convinced me that, in your opinion, the Woolworth building is higher than Windsor Castle; but I hope you will not mind my saying, as an old friend of your dear mother, that, holding such an opinion, it is rather unpatriotic of you to express it."

There you are!

But the Woolworth building is higher than Windsor Castle—"Oh, quite!"

It seems to me that your great contribution to the current discussion of public affairs is that you avoid, on the one hand, that dripping sentimentality which in the exercises of a young ladies' seminary is pleasing to some and harmless to all, and, on the other hand, that vague babbling which, whether or not it is employed for the purpose of achieving those aims, poisons the well of thought and paralyzes the arm of action.

No one has described with greater succinctness and fidelity the dangers which spring from the kind of public utterances with which the country has been flooded during the past few months than has Lord Macaulay in the following passage:

Whatever Mr. Gladstone sees is refracted and distorted by a false medium of passions and prejudices. His style bears a remarkable analogy to his mode of thinking, and indeed exercises great influence on his mode of thinking. His rhetoric, though often good of its kind, darkens and perplexes the logic which it should illustrate. Half his acuteness and diligence, with a barren imagination and a scanty vocabulary, would have saved him from almost all his mistakes. He has one gift most dangerous to a speculator, a vast command of a kind of language, grave and majestic, but of vague and uncertain import. . . .

When propositions have been established, and nothing remains but to amplify and decorate them, this dim magnificence may be in place. But if it is admitted into a demonstration, it is very much worse than absolute nonsense; just as that transparent haze, through which the sailor sees capes and mountains of false sizes and in false bearings, is more dangerous than utter darkness. Now, Mr. Gladstone is fond of employing the phraseology of which we speak, in those parts of his work which require the utmost perspicuity and precision of which human language is capable; and in this way, he deludes first himself, and then his readers. The foundations of his theory, which ought to be buttressed of adamant, are made out of the flimsy materials which are fit only for perorations.

Whom the cap fits let him set it on his head.

With apologies for the length of this letter, and with my sincere thanks for the clean-cut, unequivocal material you are giving your readers of *THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW* and in *HARVEY'S WEEKLY*,

I remain,

ALLEYNE IRELAND.

Catskill, N. Y.